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Economic Aspects of Market Segmentation 
without Supply Control 
by Sandra Martin 
In recent years, marketing agencies operating on 
behalf of New Zealand agricultural industries in export 
markets have placed increasing emphasis on market 
segmentation policies as a means of achieving producer 
objectives. However, many of the prescriptions for 
segmentation have been developed within the context of 
monopolistic or oligopolistic industries. Firms operating 
under these c~nditions have no or few competitors and 
have the ability to control output to profit maximizating 
levels. However, typically structured agricultural 
industries do not have these features. 
In this study, an economic model of market 
segmentation without supply control was constructed. The 
,1 model incorporated the optimal allocation of industry 
I 
-·-1 
. . I 
output to any number of market segments, and included 
i 
aspects of promotion given this optimal pricing behaviour. 
From the model, it was determined that market 
segmentation outcomes were influenced by a number of 
variables. Producer returns were high when the price 
elasticities of demand and supply were low, and the 
';.j 
divergence between demand elasticities in i ndi vi dual 
market segments was large. It was also noted that these 
demand elasticities are themselves influenced by a further 
set of factors, including the market share held in a 
particular market segment, the extent of product 
differentiation and competitive supply responses. 
Analysis of the promotion component of the model suggested 
that promotion activity should be carefully targeted, with 
more effort being directed towards less price elastic 
market segments. 
An application of the model to the export of New 
Zealand sheepmeats indicated that gains from market 
segmentation activity were high in the short-term. 
However, they were heavily eroded in the long-term, 
largely as a result of competitive supply responses. 
KEYWORDS: Agricultural marketing, agricultural marketing 
institutions, market segmentation, price discriminati?n, 
optimal pricing, optimal promotion, supply response. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 STATUTORY INTERVENTION IN THE MARKETING OF NEW 
ZEALAND'S MAJOR AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 
Traditionally, New Zealand's agricultural exports have 
been dominated by three industries, these being meat, 
dai ry and wool. In addition, exports of horticultural 
products have increased in significance in recent years, 
and, of these products, kiwifruit and pipfruit are the 
most important. 
In 1984, these five industries returned $4427 million 
( f. o. b. value) in export receipts, which was 75 per cent 
of the total value of agricultural based exports, and 51 
percent of the total value of all New Zealand exports. Of 
the export revenue from these five products, 
contributed 39 percent, 
percent, kiwifruit 2 
dairy products 31 percent, 
percent and pipfruit 3 
meat 
wool 25 
percent 
(Departm~nt of Statistics, 1984). Consequently, export 
marketing arrangements in these industries impinge on a 
large proportion of New Zealand's export receipts, and 
collective marketing activities by their industry agencies 
are of some national significance. 
Each of these industries is characterized by an 
institution, created under statutory authority, which is 
involved, to a greater or lesser extent, in the export 
marketing of these products. These institutions are the 
2 
New Zealand Meat Producers' Board, the New Zealand Dairy 
Board, the New Zealand Wool Board, the New Zealand 
Kiwifruit Authority, and the New Zealand Apple and Pear 
Marketing Board. 
In general, each of these institutions has statutory 
authority to significantly control the export marketing of 
their particular product, although they are not authorized 
to control the level of output produced. In practice they 
may not fully utilize these powers although this does 
occur i.n a majority of cases, with the New Zealand Dairy 
Board, the New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board, and 
I 
until recently the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board, 
exercising almost full control over the export marketing 
of their products. The New Zealand Kiwifruit Authority and 
the New Zealand Wool Board are involved in exporting 
activity to a lesser extent. 
With the excepti.on of the New Zealand Kiwifruit 
Authori ty, these institutions were created in the early 
1920' s. They were established following a period of 
depressed and unstable prices, and were given wide-ranging 
powers to control the flow of exports. Over the years, 
the types of economic activity in which they have engaged 
appears to have changed in response to changes in the 
economic and political environments in their industries, 
and casual observation suggests that current policy 
emphasis is being placed on the management of marketing 
activity in specific markets. 
The New Zealand Kiwifruit Authority arose much more 
recently in 1977. Once again, its creation was a response 
3 
to a perceived unfavourable price situation. In t hi s 
case, it was feared that prices would be depressed by the 
entry into the industry of new suppliers and exporters 
marketing low quality product. Therefore, it was given 
power to control some exporting activity. 
1.2 STUDY RATIONALE 
In the current market environment facing 
many export commodities, agricultural marketing agencies 
are being urged to place increasing emphasis on marketing 
management strategies as a means of increasing returns to 
producers. In many developing industries, such as the 
newer horticultural ones, this has led to pressures to 
create new institutions modelled on those in established 
industries, which are perceived as being able to implement 
such strategies. 
Alt'hough such strategies are being emphasized, the 
actual extent to which they have been adopted by marketing 
agencies operating in agricultural exporting industries is 
unclear. 
policies. 
Nor is it obvious what benefits accrue from such 
However, casual observation would suggest that 
a crucial element in any marketing management strategy is 
the' ability to exploit opportunities which might arise 
from segmenting the export market. This could occur if 
New Zealand's products face downward sloping demand curves 
in any or all of such market segments. This would allow 
an institution to exploit a monopolistic advantage in 
particular markets which would not be possible with 
uncontrolled competitive marketing arrangements. 
4 
If market segmentation activities are to be adopted by 
marketing agencies, then it implies that they must have 
the power to control the pricing and destination of their 
products on export markets. Some agencies may already be 
using their powers to this end, whereas others have such 
powers, but may not necessarily be utilizing them. If 
such activities are seen as essential in this latter type 
of industry, and in developing industries with no 
statutory marketing authori~y in place, then considerable 
industry restructuring may be involved. 
A study of the potential benefits to producers from 
market segmentation activities by agencies operating on 
thei.r behalf would appear to be justified on the following 
grounds. 
(a) Benefits to Statutory Authorities 
Marketing authorities already in existence attempt to 
fulfil a set of objectives in accordance with their 
statutory obligations. It is generally thought that such 
agencies have three fundamental long-term objectives. 
These are to increase returns to producers, to stabilize 
these ret urns, and to ensure an acceptable degree of 
equity in their treatment of producers. However, it is not 
known which of these objectives is most important, nor 
whether they vary between industries. When such 
institutions are considering the introduction or 
assessment of market segmentation strategies, they will be 
interested in the extent to which such an activity will 
assist in achieving specific producer objectives. 
··-:·1 
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However, many of the managerial prescriptions for 
market segmentation which result from a marketing 
management perspective have been derived within the 
context of monopolistic or oligopolistic market 
structures. Unfortunately, some of the product, market and 
o~ganizational features of these industries tend to differ 
from those which are typical of agricultural industries. 
In particular, suppliers in imperfectly competitive 
markets will tend to adjust output to profit maximizing 
levels in response to their specific demand conditions. 
The many suppliers in an agricultural market, however, 
will respond in a competitive manner when adjusting output 
in response to the marketing arrangements of an 
institution operating on their collective behalf. 
Therefore, it is not obvi ous whe the l' an unmodi f i ed 
applicat,ion of these marketing principles will result in 
benefits to agricultural suppliers which are of a similar 
magnitude to those which might be expected in industries 
which are less competitively structured. Under these 
may fi nd it circumstances, marketing organizations 
difficult to assess the extent to which market 
segmentation activities will assist them in achieving 
their institutional objectives. 
(b) Cost of Industry Restructuring 
The second justification for a study of the potential 
benefits from market segmentation in agricultural 
exporting industries revolves around the cost of industry 
restructuring which would arise if such a policy was 
introduced in an industry where the pricing and 
6 
destination of output is not effectively controlled under 
existing marketing arrangements. Such a cost could 
include the following components. 
Firstly, administrative costs may be incurred by 
Government in both the setting up of statutory marketing 
authorities, and in counterpart liaison and monitoring 
activities by Government Departments. 
Less obvious indirect costs may result from 
inefficiencies in resource allocation which could occur 
through interference in an otherwise competitively 
functioning marketing channel. For example, a statutory 
marketing organi2ation might institute a controlled export 
marketing programme by commissioning licenced exporters to 
market specified volumes of product in specific markets, 
thereby creating rents associated with these licensing 
opport.uni ti es. This can lead to considerable private 
resources being diverted from productive activity to 
unproductive rent-seeking behaviour. 
In addition, once statutory marketing is introduced 
it may crowd out private marketing activity, and can tend 
to become entrenched. Hence over time the competitive 
benchmark to marketing activity is lost, and it becomes 
very difficult to assess, ex post, the economic efficiency 
of such statutory marketing structures. 
Therefore, social costs may be incurred if it is 
necessary to introduce statutory marketing to implement 
market segmentation strategies. Consequently, 
policy-makers require some knowledge of the potential 
magnitude of benefits to producers which would arise from 
7 
such an activity. This would allow them to assess whethe~ 
the g~anting of property rights to facilitate statutory 
marketing justifies the direct tax expenditure which will 
be incurred, and the inefficiencies which may result. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Given the rationale established above, the general aim 
of this study is to investigate the nature of benefits to 
producers from market segmentation through controlled 
export marketing within the market and organizational 
context of a typically structured agricultural industry. 
This would allow statutory marketing institutions to 
assess the extent to which such strategies assist in 
achieving their objectives. It also enables policy-makers 
to determine whether statutory intervention for this 
purpose in an otherwi se. competitively functioning 
marketing channel justifies the cost of so doing. 
To this end, the study has the following tour 
obj ect i ves. 
(1) 
( 2) 
The first objective is to establish whether 
market segmentation is a significant policy of 
statutory agencies operating in New Zealand's 
major agricultural exporting industries. 
The second objective is to determine what 
organizational features may be considered typical 
in these exporting industries. 
(3) The third objective is to develop a theoretical 
model of market segmentation which incorporates 
the appropriate organizational features. 
8 
(4) The fourth, and most important, objective is to 
determine the market conditions under which 
market segmentation activities 
marketing agencies operating 
by 
in 
statutory 
typically 
structured agricultural industries are likely to 
be beneficial in terms of producer objectives. 
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter Two outlines the organi2ational features of 
New Zealand's fi ve major agricultural exporting 
industries, and establishes the relative importance of 
market segmentation policies in these industries. Thi sis 
done by examining the evolution of the statutory marketing 
institutions currently in operation, thereby allowing the 
development in their policies to be studied, and their 
objectives to be implicitly determined. In addition, 
their current powers with respect to export marketing are 
outlined, and the extent to which they utili2e these 
powers is assessed. This Chapter fulfills the first and 
second objectives of this study. 
Chapter Three establishes the theoretical framework 
necessary for constructing a model of market segmentation. 
The pertinent literature is revi ewed, an economic 
framework is established, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of this framework are discussed. In Chapter 
Four, a basic theoretical model of market segmentation 
without supply control is derived, and the factors 
influencing the magnitude of gains from this strategy are 
identified. This basic model optimi2es the price and the 
9 
volume of product in each market segment. Chapter Five 
then considers the implication of specific promotional 
activities for the pricing strategy considered in this 
basic model. 
three Chapters. 
The third study objective is met in these 
In Chapter Six the model is quantified using simulated 
sets of market characteristics. It is then utili2ed, both 
analytically and numerically, to determine the influence 
of alternatives market characteristics on producer 
objectives, thereby fulfilling the final study objective. 
In conclusion, Chapter Seven summari2es and discusses 
the results of the study, notes appropriate caveats on 
their use, 
agricultural 
and discusses their implications for 
and horticultural marketing institutions 
which are practising or contemplating market segmentation 
act i vi tie s. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IN NEW ZEALAND'S 
HAJOR AGRICULTURAL EXPORTING INDUSTRIES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter reviews the statutory economic policie~ 
and organizational structure in New Zealand's major 
agricultural exporting industries. On the basis of this 
c 
Review, the relative significance of market segmentation 
policies by statutory agencies is established. A 
representative set of objectives for a typically 
structured institution operating in the export sector is 
then developed, and the analysis is used to derive a 
spectrum of powers which typify such an institution. These 
institutional features will then be utilised in Chapter 
Four, where a market segmentation model is developed for a 
representative agricultural exporting industry. 
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. 
Section 2.2 considers alternative frameworks for 
evaluating institutional objecti~es and effective powers. 
In Sections 2.3 to 2.7, the economic policies, agency 
objectives, and effective powers of institutions operating 
in the five major agricultural and horticultural exporting 
industries are derived. By way of conclusion., Section 2.8 
discusses the relative importance of market segmentation 
policies, and a representative set of objectives and 
effective powers are determined by synthesizing the 
• 
information 
industries. 
collated and analyzed 
2.2 ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR EVALUATIO~ 
2. 2. 1 
At 
Analysis of Legislation 
first glance, it mi ght seem 
11 
for individual 
obvious that a 
standardized set of institutional objectives and powers 
coul~ be distilled from the enabling legislation currently 
binding the appropriate institutions. However, a closer 
perusal of the relevant Parliamentary Acts and Regulations 
suggests that such an approach is too simplistic for the 
following reasons. 
In the first place, institutional objectives might not 
be legislatively stated explicitly (Dairy Board Act 1961; 
Apple and Pear Marketing Act 1971; Kiwifruit Marketing 
Licensing Regulations 1977). Alternatively, they may be 
too vague to be functionally useful. For example, 
institutions might be created so that economic welfare 
will be promoted (Meat Export Control Act 1921-22), or 
such agencies might be charged with obtaining the best 
possible long-term returns for producers (Wool Industry 
Act 1977). 
A further complication arises with this approach 
because institutions may not fully utilize their powers to 
control conduct in the export sector of an industry, 
despite being vested with such authority. This appears to 
be the case with the New Zealand Wool Board in particular. 
In these circumstances, a perusal of eXisting legislation 
might not capture political inhibitions to institutional 
1 2 
behaviour, and therefore, may give a misleading impression 
of the effective, as opposed to the actual, powers of such 
agencies. 
2.2.2 Institutional Type 
A popular taxonomy in the literature classifies 
institutions according to type, where this appears to be 
defined by legislative status. Therefore, research may be 
concentrated on a particular institutional type such as 
co-operatives, marketing agreements, commodity 
commissions, licensing authorities, marketing orders and 
boards (Hoos, 1979; Warley, 1967; Veeman, 1972; Le Vay, 
1983). Alternatively, comparisons may be made between 
institutional types (Davies, 1960; Cohen, 1961 ; Morley, 
1967; Campbell, 1973; Rae, 1979>' 
behaviour of such organizations tend 
The objectives and 
to be implied by 
their institutional type. 
accepted that the objectives 
For example, it is generally 
of Boards are to enhance 
producer returns, to ensure equity among producers, and in 
some cases, to stabilize prices (Currie and Hoos, 1979; 
Schmi tz and McCalla, 1979; Veeman, 1979; Melamed, 1979), 
although it is acknowledged that individual Boards may 
differ in this respect (deVos, 1979; Blandford, 1979). 
However, there are some deficiencies with this system 
of classification when using it to determine agency 
objectives and effective powers. For example, some 
organi za ti onal types, s uc h as boards and marke t i ng orde rs, 
are essentially national variants of the same 
institutional structure (Hoos, 1979; Warley, 1967). 
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More importantly, some agencies such as Boards can 
incorporate a wide range of behaviour, with corresponding 
implied differences in powers and acceptable methods of 
achieving objectives (Currie and Hoos, 1979) . For 
instance, Morley (1967) has classified Boards into six 
broad types. These are advisory and promot i onal, 
non-trading regulatory, non-trading price stabilization, 
trading price stabilization, monopoly export boards and 
domestic monopoly boards. It is obvious, therefore, that 
a wide range of behaviour is encompassed in this one 
organizational type. 
2.2.3 Institutional Behaviour 
An alternative method of classification which tends to 
overcome the above deficiencies, is to order marketing 
institutions according to their functions. Balderstone et 
a1 ( 1982) in their study of statutory marketing 
authorities in Australia, use this approach to indicate a 
spectrum of involvement by agencies in the marketing 
process. Figure 2.1 reproduces their spectrum, which 
ranges from minimum market intervention with grading to 
maximum market intervention with supply controls. 
While a system such as this orders institutions 
'-'1 
'-'1 according·to market behaviour, such behaviour tends to be 
a mixture of market activities such as storage and 
transport, and economic policies such as price 
influencing. However, storage activities could 
conceivably form part of a price influencing policy. 
Therefore, such a classification system may not be 
Minimum market intervention 
1. 2. 3., 4. 5., 
Gradingl Research I Promotionl Licensing I Storage 
and 
Transport 
6. 
Price 
Influence 
FIGURE 2.1: SPECTRUM OF MARKETING AUTHORITIES' FUNCTIONS 
Source: Balderstone et al (1982) 
Maximum market intervention 
acquisition 
7. I 8. 9. 10. 
Pooling Licensed Monopoly Supply 
Receivers Selling Controls 
,j::o 
_ •. ;,~- -·1 
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mutually exclusive, since it incorporates activities of 
different orders. In addi t ion, the objectives of 
institutions may not be obvious 
be ha vi our alone. 
2.2.4 An Evolutionary Approach 
from institutional 
A fourth alternative which has been used to determine, 
among other things, the fundamental objectives of 
marketing agencies is to analyze the evolutionary 
development of these organizations ( Veeman, 1972; 
Campbell, 1973). Using this approach, market conditions 
which lead to the establishment of these institutions are 
exami ned, 
analyzed. 
and historical changes in their activities 
This makes it possible to infer their long-term 
objectives from their responses to changing market 
conditions over time. 
This method of analysis does not exclude the three 
approaches already di scussed, si nce it tends to 
incorporate elements of all of them, but with the addition 
of a temporal dimension. Therefore, as institutions 
evolve, their empowering legislation must be analyzed, 
their activities commented on, 
type noted. 
and their institutional 
There are advantages to using this method for the 
purposes of this study. Firstly, the problem of assessing 
institutional objectives can be directly addressed using 
this approach. Secondly, through an analysis of 
organisational behaviour over time, the extent to which 
such institutions appear to be constrained by political 
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~athe~ than legislative conside~ations can be dete~mined. 
This would allow an assessment to be made of the effective 
powe~s of such agencies, to their actual 
legislative powers. In 
as opposed 
addition, the evolution of 
statuto~y economic policies ove~ time can be t~aced, 
thereby allowing the ~elative significance of market 
segmentation policies to be assessed. 
However, a potential p~oblem which could be 
encountered with such an approach fo~ the purposes of this 
study, 
~esult 
is the lack of analytical precision which may 
f~om a purely desc~iptive discussion of 
evolutiona~y t~ends in agency activities in the relevant 
industries. For example, Vee ma n (1 97 2 ) analyzed the 
activities of statutory agencies in the New Zealand dairy, 
meat and wool industries over time. However, she was not 
conce~ned with actually deducing institutional objectives, 
as this study is, but with evaluating whethe~ such 
activities achieved the generally accepted objectives of 
Boards noted in Section 2.2.2. She qualifies her analysis 
by stating that boards have a variety of objectives which 
differ from boa~d to board, and that board objectives 
might not necessarily be consistent. 
For the 
approach is 
establish the 
purpose of this study, Veeman' s gene~alized 
not suitable, since it is impo~tant to 
objectives of individual agencies, the 
stability of these objectives over time, the relative 
importance of specific objectives, and the robustness of a 
derived set of ~ep~esentative objectives with respect to 
specific indust~ies. The~efo~e, in orde~ to achieve this, 
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a framework for discussion has been derived, which is 
diagrammatically represented in Figure 2.2. 
This framework envisages that the market environment 
in which an industry operates will determine the primary 
objecti,ves of a statutory institution. These objectives, 
in turn, determine the broad economic policies which such 
an institution wouJ.d undertake. Such policies might 
include, among others, demand or supply shifting 
behaviour, stabilization activities, supply restriction, 
and market segmentation. These broad policies would, in 
tu!n, require the use of certain market activities by the 
organi za ti on. Examples of these could include promotion, 
research, storage, buffer price activities, quota fixing 
and allocation, and distribution of product to alternative 
desti nati ons. Hence, a distinction is made between broad 
economic policies and the actual market activities in 
whi.ch an institution is involved, thus avoiding the 
problems associated with comparing functions of a 
d iff ere n tor d ern 0 ted i n Se c t ion 2. 2. 3. This set of 
market activities, in turn, determines the nature of the 
institution required, and demonstrates its effective 
powers. In Figure 2.2, the envisaged link from the market 
environment through to the institutional powers is shown 
','.-.',"C""I 
••• I by the solid set of arrows. 
In determining the objectives and effective powers of 
such institutions, analysis is focussed on observable 
features such as the market activities of institutions, 
and the market environment in which they operate. 
Therefore, an analysis of market activities gives ~n 
1 8 
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indication of the effective powers of an institution and 
the economic policies they are attempting to carry out. 
In turn, these economic policies, when considered with the 
market environment, suggest the fundamental objectives of 
the institution. The dotted arrows in Figure 2.2 indicate 
this deductive process. Note that, unlike Veeman (1972), 
the objective of this framework is not to assess whether 
agency activities actually achieve specified objectives, 
but to determine what implied objectives economic policies 
may be designed to achieve. 
In Section 2.3, this framework is applied to each of 
the five industries to be analyzed. The period over which 
each of these industries has been in operation is divided 
into discrete time intervals, each of which is 
characterized by a particular market environment. For 
each time period, an attempt is then made to deduce 
economic policies, institutional objectives and effective 
powers from the activities of organizations under' the 
ruling market environment. Due to limitations imposed by 
accessible historical documentation, some of this analysis 
is somewhat sketchy. However, despite this, it is 
adequate for deducing the long-run economic policies, 
institutional objectives and effective powers of current 
institutions. 
2.2.5 Source Material For An Evolutionary Approach 
Previous researchers (Veeman, 1972; Woods, 1981; Yerex 
and Haines, 1983) have conducted primary research into the 
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historical evolution of statutory marketing in New 
Zealand's major agricultural exporting industries. The 
objective of this brief synopsis is to comment on economic 
policies, institutional objectives and powers over time, 
rather than to derive base information. Therefore, 
material is synthesized from these and other secondary 
sources and not primary ones, except where the use of 
primary sources is necessary to update or elucidate 
material in these earlier studies. Such primary sources 
include the Annual Reports since 1981 of the New Zealand 
Dai ry Board, the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board, the 
New Zealand Hool Board, the New Zealand Apple and Pear 
Marketing Board and the Annual Reports of the New Zealand 
Kiwifruit Authority since its inception in 1978. 
2.3 ~HE EYOLUTION OF STATUTORY STRUCTURES IN THE DAIRY 
INDUSTRY 
2. 3. 1 The Market Environment and Statutory Institutional 
Activities 
2.3.1.1 Prior to 1921 
Statutory involvement in the dairy industry began in 
the last century with the 1894 Dairy Industry 
provided for the grading of butter and 
undertaken by government personnel. 
Act, which 
cheese to be 
Between 1894 and 1914, a free enterprise system was in 
operation, under which New Zealand dairy companies sold 
export produce directly to Great Britain, either on open 
consi gnment, or on an f. o. b. basis at an agreed price. 
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Assertions of monopsoni s tic exploitation by British 
merchants led to various unsuccessful attempts to organize 
collective marketing schemes prior to 1914. In addition, 
problems of co-ordination appeared 
variations in company payouts, which 
re-diverting output to temporary payout 
causing difficulties for factories 
to arise from 
led to suppliers 
leaders, thereby 
in scheduling 
production, and in increased transport costs. 
During the First World War, an Imperial Commandeer of 
export dairy produce was in operation. Under this 
arrangement, the Uni ted Ki ngdom bulk purchased all New 
Zealand butter and cheese which was surplus to domestic 
requi rements. Prices for .the contract were negotiated 
annually by the two Governments, and, over the period of 
the Commande~r, tended to be relatively high. 
Therefore, prior to 1914, the market environment under 
free enterprise was perceived by producers to have 
monopsonistic elements, and seemed to be characterized' by 
an element of instability which led to co-ordination 
problems. On the other hand, high stable prices were a 
feature of the Commandeer. 
2.3.1.2 1921 to 1934 
The return to free enterprise in 1921 
period of low prices, which largely 
coincided with a 
resulted from 
oversupply, since the UK market was the only major market 
available to several dairy exporters. This was in 
contrast to the Commandeer, and an association seems to 
have been made between relatively high, stable prices, 
i 
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and' central control' in the industry, which appears to 
have led to demands for centralized marketing legislation. 
Such pressure resulted in the 1923 Dairy Produce 
Export Control Act, which allowed for the establishment of 
the Dairy Produce Control Board in 1924. This Act made 
provision for price fixing, the regulation of shipments 
and insurance of produce in transit. 
The Dairy Produce Control Board commenced operation 
and, in 1926, assumed the power of complete ownershi p of 
all export produce, which was then sold only through 
selected agents at minimum prices set by the Board. 
However, these arrangements met with opposition from a 
number of quarters. Many producers were uneasy about the 
principle of acquisition and resented seasonal price 
pooling arrangements, while British merchants feared 
monopolistic exploitation. In addition, because of a weak 
ma~ket situation, the Board was forced to successively 
lower its minimum prices. 
As a consequence of these events, the Board abandoned 
its policy of' absolute control' after one year, and, in 
1927, adopted a policy of 'limited intervention' within a 
f~ee-market system. Board activities were restricted to 
advertising in the United Kingdom market, arranging 
shipping and freight contracts, allocating shipping space 
so as to spread shipments throughout the season, and 
supporting, through grants, scientific research into the 
dairy industry. 
23 
2.3.1.3 1934 to 1945 
The Depression marked a period of low export prices 
and market access problems. As a result, a Royal 
Commission of Enquiry into the Dairy Industry was set up, 
which resulted in the 1934 Agriculture (Emergency Powers) 
Act. The aim of this Act was to regulate the production 
and marketing of agricultural products, and to co-ordinate 
the activities of existing Boards. In addition, complete 
control of all dairy product marketing was vested in the 
New Zealand Dairy Board, 
• 
which was the renamed Dairy 
Produce Control Board. By utilizing these powers, the 
Board intended to develop minimum price and group 
marketing schemes for export selling. 
However, this proposed variant of the Board was 
largely inoperative as a result of the 1936 change of 
Government. As promised in its election manifesto, the 
Labour Government repealed the 1934 Act, and replaced it 
with the 1936 Primary Products Marketing Act. This 
provided for the establishment of a Primary Products 
Marketing Department, which had power to acquire all dairy 
produce and to fix an annual guaranteed price for such 
produce. This price was to be based on a number of 
factors. The'se were previous prices, costs involved in 
production and marketing, costs of administering the Act, 
general living standards in the dairy industry relative to 
those in other sectors, and the necessity in the public 
interest of maintaining the efficiency and stability of 
the dairy industry. 
---I 
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The Primary Products Marketing Department took over 
the storage, shipping, insurance, advertising and internal 
marketing functions of the Board, which was then left with 
the role of developing industry unity and co-operation. 
However, in the following years, dairy industry 
representatives grew increasingly unhappy with these 
bureaucratic marketing arrangements. In particular, 
concern was expressed about the guaranteed price scheme, 
since it was felt that prices were being determined on the 
basis of current market realizations rather than on the 
cost of production criteria allowed for in the 
legislation. This dissatisfaction continued until the 
Second World War, which quelled disagreements with 
Government over guaranteed price levels to some degree. 
During the Second World War, all exported dairy 
produce was sold under bulk contract agreements by the 
Government to the United Kingdom Government. During the 
War, Government emphasis was on macro-economic probiems 
such as inflation. As part of their scheme to restrain 
internal prices, stabilization accounts were established 
for meat and dairy produce, which allowed for prices 
paid to farmers to be divorced from those received for 
exports. Allowances for increased costs incorporated into 
the guaranteed price were subsequently charged to the 
Dairy Industry Stabilization Account. 
The initial guaranteed price in 1936 had been set 
high relative to the market price, but was essentially 
frozen for a number of years afterwards, during which time 
the market price had risen above the guaranteed price. 
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This led to a build-up of reserves in the Stabilization 
Account. 
2.3.1.4 1945 to 1961 
With the conclusion of the Second World War, farmer 
resentment over the price-determining process again built 
up. Producers were unhappy at the perceived gains made by 
organized labour relative to the farming community. In 
addi ti on, it was felt that the Government had not driven 
as hard a bargain with the British Ministry of Supply as 
it might have done, since higher prices had been paid to 
other suppliers. Producers also resented the freezing of 
withheld export receipts in the farm stabilization 
accounts. 
As a consequence of this intensive dairy industry 
pressure, the Dairy Products Marketing Commission Act was 
passed in 1947, which allowed for the formation of the 
Dairy Products Mark.ting Commission. The Dairy Board 
continued in its role of developing industry unity and 
co-operation, while the new Commission essentially took 
over the functions of the Primary Products Marketing 
Department. To alleviate producer dissatisfaction, the 
cost of production criterion was given increased 
wei ghti ng. 
The bulk purchase agreement continued with the United 
Kingdom until 1954. During this period, industry reserves 
continued to build up. In 1952, the Government, the Board 
·;1 and the Commission held discussions on the guaranteed 
price procedures, and on the accumulated industry funds. 
26 
It was agreed by all parties that the purpose of the 
guaranteed price scheme was to stabilize farmer incomes, 
and that, in the long-term, such a scheme must be 
self-balancing. They also agreed to use some of the 
accumulated reserves as loans for dairy factory 
moderni za ti on. 
The return to free trading in 1954 was met by a weak 
English market. 
had risen, the 
Despite the fact that production costs 
Commission responded to the market 
situation by reducing the guaranteed price. 
realizations were emphasized by 
determining factor. 
them 
Hence, market 
as a price 
Dissatisfaction with the price-determining process led 
to a Committee of Enquiry being set up. As a result of 
this, an Amendment to the 1947 Act was passed in 1956. 
This Amendment removed the power of price determination 
from the Commission, and vested it in a new Dairy Products 
Prices Authority. When setting prices, the Authority was 
required to consider current price levels, ruling price 
levels for other farm products and the cost of production. 
The Commission was bound to purchase all production 
offered to it at the guaranteed price. 
Overseas dairy prices fell sharply in the next two 
years, depleting the industry's accumulated funds, which 
led to a reappraisal of the gua~anteed price procedure. 
The Dairy Board at this time maintained that the 
guaranteed price structure should be more closely related 
to market reali za ti ons. 
Marketing Commission was now 
Since the Dairy Products 
obliged to purchase all 
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production offered to it at guaranteed prices, it 
attempted to influence production patterns indirectly by 
developing an advisory service on market trends for 
manufac t ure rs. 
2.3.1.5 1961 to 1985 
In 1961, the Dairy Products Marketing Commission, 
which was the then marketing authority, and the then Dairy 
Board, whose function for the previous twenty-five years 
had been that of developing industry uni ty, were 
amalgama ted. The new authority, was the New Zealand Dairy 
Prod uc t i on and Marke t i ng Board, whi c h was re named t he New 
Zealand Dairy Board in 1966. The 1961 Act, subject to 
minor amendments, remains in force at the present time. 
The Dairy Products Prices Authority continues to set 
guaranteed prices, based on criteria set out in the Dairy 
Board Act 1961. 
The major function of this new Board was to acq~ire 
and market dairy produce manufactured in New Zealand and 
--'.". 
intended for export. To this end, it was endowed with the 
powers necessary to achieve this. 
The New Zealand Dairy Board, therefore, markets dairy 
products on behalf of the industry. Distribution methods 
vary, but in general, the Board tends to set up subsidiary 
companies in individual markets, which act as marketing 
agents and wholesalers. In certain countries, the Board 
will appoint local agents or negotiate directly with 
individual companies. 
- --1 
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To facilitate these marketing arrangements, the Board 
co-ordinates necessary ancilliary services such as 
s hi ppi ng. Its other activities include promotion, 
research, dissemination of information, financing dairy 
company development and j oi nt ventures, and stock 
improvement. It also administered the Government's 
supplementary minimum prices scheme from 1978 to 1985. 
The guaranteed price scheme in the dairy industry 
operates at the manufacturing level. Originally, a basic 
dairy factory purchase price was set for butter. 
Similarly, a basic purchase price was offered for cheese 
such that returns to butter and cheese producers were 
essentially equalized. As alternative milk products have 
increased in importance, these have been introduced into 
the guaranteed prices scheme. Despite the firmly 
entrenched principle of equalized payouts, differentials 
to guide production have been built into purchase 
on occasion. 
prices 
In recent years, the Dairy Board, in common with 
agencies in other agricultural i ndustri es, has placed 
increasing emphasis on a marketing orientation to its 
activities. 
emphasis, 
research. 
Market research has been given increased 
and this has influenced promotion and product 
The Board, as part of its marke t i ng pI an, is 
also committed to a programme of market diversification to 
reduce its dependency on particular markets, 
increase its market flexibility. 
and to 
The current market environment facing the dairy 
industry has been characterized by a build-up of 
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international stocks, and by restricted access to 
traditional markets. In 1981/82, the Dairy Board bought 
up stocks of U. S. butter in an attempt to manage the 
international market. More recently, there were 
industry and Board suggestions that new suppliers into the 
industry be restricted (New Zealand Dairy Board, 1985), 
and such a policy has been implemented by a moratorium on 
the acceptance of new supply. 
2.3.2 Economic Policies of statutory Institutions 
The original Dairy Produce Control Board operated for 
a decade from 1924. Its activities, outlined in Section 
2.3.1.2 above, indicate that the focus of this Board was 
on demand-shifting policies through product advertising, 
and supply-shifting policies through cost-reducing 
activities. Initially, a primary economic policy was also 
price-fixing and stabilization, through the acquisition of 
produce, the reby all owi ng for co-ordi na t ed sell i ng and ·t he 
exercise of market power. However, these latter policies 
appeared to be unsuccessful, and the Board concentrated on 
the less interventionist demand and supply-shifting 
policies. 
The economic policies undertaken from 1934 to 1945 by 
the statutory successor to the Dairy Produce Control 
Board, the Primary Products Marketing Department, were 
similar to those originally envisaged for the Dairy 
Produce Control Board. The Department continued the 
demand 
Board. 
and supply-shifting policies of the original 
However, in addition to these, it resurrected the 
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price-fixing and price stabilization poli ci es. The 
price-fixing policy was facilitated by the compulsory 
acquisition of produce which was disposed of by the 
De par t me nt, and payouts to producers were then equalized. 
The price stabilization policy was put into operation by 
the guaranteed price scheme. 
At the conclusion of the Second World War, the Dairy 
Products Marketing Commission, which operated until 1961, 
continued these economic policies of the Primary Products 
Marketing Department. However, it became obvious that the 
purpose of the guaranteed price scheme was unclear. 
Uncertainty existed as to whether it was a self-balancing 
price stabilization scheme, or whether an element of 
subsidy was incorporated into it. In 1956, thi s 
price-setting function was removed from the Commission. 
Since the Commission was now obliged to accept all produce 
offered to it at a guaranteed price, this placed greater 
pressure on it to consider policies which would obtain'the 
maximum market realizations possible by exploiting demand 
opportunities on the export market. 
In 1961, the New Zealand Dairy Board superseded the 
Commission, and this new organization continued the 
economic policies instituted by its predecessors. 
However, in addition to these demand- and supply- shifting 
policies, and their administration of the price-fixing, 
stabilizing and pooling policies of the Dairy Products 
Prices Authority, the new Board, which is still operating, 
adopted a more sophisticated approach to the marketing of 
dairy produce. 
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It has engaged in market diversification activities, 
and appears, as evidenced by its attempts to influence 
manufacturing trends, to be attempting to exploit demand 
opportunities more fully by market segmentation policies. 
In fact, Veeman (1972) has found that its allocati on of 
produce to the butter and cheese segments of the United 
Kingdom market was not incompatible with the behaviour of 
a price-discriminating monopolist. In addi t ion, promoti on 
and product development are being geared to specific 
market segments. 
Recently, the Board has attempted to influence global 
prices by supply management in the international market. 
There have also been industry suggestions that increased 
output is reducing producer returns, 
the industry have been restricted, 
and new entrants to 
but as yet, the 
restriction of supply by existing producers is not an 
economic policy practised by the Dairy Board. 
The evolution of the above economic policies wnich 
have been practised by statutory institutions operating in 
the dairy industry since 1921 
2.3. 
are summarized in Figure 
2.3.3 Objectives of statutory Institutions 
Given the changes in market environment prior to, 
during, and immediately after the First World War, which 
led to the establishment of the Dairy Produce Control 
Board, it seems plausible to conclude that the intended 
objectives of this new institution were to increase prices 
to producers, and to stabilize these prices. 
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The actual economic policies adopted by the Board 
during its period of operation from 1924 to 1934 seem to 
be consistent with these objectives. However, they also 
tend to suggest that emphasis was placed on the broader 
objective of increasing producer returns as opposed to 
prices. For example, in the long-run, adopting 
cost-reducing policies may reduce price where demand is 
less than perfectly elastic, 
demand is not inelastic. 
but increase returns if 
As with the Dairy Produce Control Board, it appears 
from the market environment and the economic policies 
followed by the Primary Products Marketing Department from 
1934 to 1945, that its primary objective was to increase 
returns to its producers. However, the secondary 
objective of stabilizing producer prices appears to have 
been given higher priority than with the Dairy Produce 
Control Board. In addition, the equalization of returns 
to producers implies an acceptance of an objective of 
equity of returns, a concept which they had been unhappy 
to endorse a decade previously. 
The above objectives of the Primary Products Marketing 
Department also appear to apply to the Dairy Products 
,Marketing Commission which operated from the end of the 
Second World War to 1961. The dissension over the 
guaranteed price scheme noted previously appears to have 
arisen over uncertainty as to whether the primary purpose 
of this policy was to increase producer returns, through 
subsidy if necessary, or to stabilize prices~ The price 
stabilization objective of the scheme appeared to be 
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dominant by 1961, by which time it was administered by the 
Dairy Products Prices Authority. 
The New Zealand Dairy Board, which has operated since 
1961 , also appears to have adopted the objectives of its 
predecessors. However, during this current period, the 
objective of increasing returns seems to have been 
emphasized more than the objective of price stability, 
since the method of stabilizing prices was accepted by 
then. The principle of equity among producers appears to 
have been well-entrenched when the Dairy Board came into 
being, and it continues the policy of equalized factory 
payouts which distributes returns from overseas markets 
across all co-operatives, although it will override this 
objective to some extent when it conflicts with that of 
increasing producer returns. 
The relative emphasis on these objectives by statutory 
agencies over time is shown in Figure 2.3. 
2.3.4 Effective Powers of statutory Institutions 
The experience of the Commandeer during the First 
World War relative to the periods of free enterprise 
marketing before and after it, suggested to producers that 
absolute control of marketing by a statutory authority was 
desirable. Although the new Board which began operation 
in 1924 was endowed with wide-ranging powers to control 
the export marketing of dairy produce, its short-lived 
experiment with these powers suggests that its effective 
powers were somewhat more limited than its actual 
legislative powers. Therefore, during the late 1920' sand 
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early 1930' 5, its effective powers were restricted to 
those necessary to carry out promotion and research 
activities on behalf of suppliers, and to those necessary 
to co-ordinate the movement of produce to market. 
However, the onset of the Depression in the 1930' s 
generated a crisis in the dairy industry which led to the 
abandonment of the basic free enterprise system operating 
until then. From 1934 to 1945 the .Primary Products 
Marketing Department exercised the wide-ranging powers 
previously conferred on, but not utilized by, the Dairy 
t 
Produce Control Board. It was responsible for the 
marketing of all export produce, and returned producers a 
price based on market realizations and a number of other 
factors. Therefore, its effective powers were such that 
it could control the entire marketing process, including 
the pricing and destination of produce. 
The end of Government control of dairy products 
marketing in 1945 did not see a return to free enterprise 
marketi ng. Therefore, by 1947, the principle of 
controlled marketing of export produce appeared firmly 
entrenched in the dairy industry. Hence, the effective 
powers of the Dairy Products Marketing Commission were 
such that it controlled the 'entire marketing process. 
However, towards the end of the period, these powers 'flere 
constrained to the extent that the Commission was forced 
to accept all product offered to it at guaranteed prices 
set by the Dairy Products Prices Authority. 
No changes in the effective powers of the statutory 
marketing authority occurred when the powers of the Dairy 
. ....! 
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Products Marketing Commission were transferred to the New 
Zealand Dairy Board in 1961. That is, the current Board 
still effectively controls the entire marketing process in 
the export sector, with guaranteed prices being set by the 
Dairy Products Prices Authority. 
The effective powers practised by each of these 
institutions is outlined in Figure 2.3. 
2.3.5 Summary of Objectives, Effective Powers and Economic 
Policies of Statutory Institutions 
From Figure 2.3, it is obvious that the long-term 
objectives of agencies operating in the dairy industry are 
to increase producer returns, to stabilize prices and to 
provide equity among producers. These objectives appear 
to be quite stable, although the relative emphasis on each 
of them may change over time, according to the prevailing 
market environment. The current emphasis appears to be on 
increasing producer returns. 
Over the last fifty years, the effective powers of 
marketing agencies in the dairy industry have also 
remained relatively stable, although the price-determining 
function was removed from the marketing authority to an 
independent pricing authority (Figure 2.3). These 
agencies have been empowered to acquire and market all 
dairy produce, and have been responsible for ancillary 
services such as product handling, pooling, transport and 
storage, and for insurance, processing, packagi ng, 
promotion and research. These agencies have never had the 
legislative authority to control the level of industry 
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output, although it has been implied by industry leaders 
that such powers might be desirable. 
Although, as noted above, the long-term objectives of 
agencies operating in the dairy industry have remained 
stable over time, economic policies through which such 
objectives 
conditions 
demand and 
acti vi ti es, 
intervention, 
may be achieved have altered as market 
in the industry 
supply-shifting 
have changed. Initially, 
activities and co-ordinating 
which are policies involving mi ni mum 
were considered adequate for increasing 
returns and stabilizing prices. However, with the onset 
of global depression, more direct methods of achieving 
these objectives 
price scheme. 
were employed through the guaranteed 
More recently, with the build-up of 
international stocks and restricted access to traditional 
markets, emphasis has been placed on exploiting demand 
opportunities more fully through market 
policies. 
segmentation 
2.4 THE EVOLUTION OF STATUTORY STRUCTURES IN THE MEAT 
INDUSTRY 
2.4.1 The Market Environment and Statutory Institutional 
Activities 
2.4.1.1 Prior to 1921 
Statutory involvement in the export sector of the New 
Zealand meat industry began with the Slaughtering and 
Inspection Act 1900, which provided for the establishment 
of abbatoirs and the licensing of meat export 
- - .. ; 
, ~.' , : .. ! 
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s la ught e rhous e s. The primary purpose of the Act was to 
ensure that sanitary conditions of slaughter were being 
observed. 
Until 1915, a free enterprise system of marketing 
operated in the meat industry. However, price falls in 
the United Kingdom market in 1909 led to industry attempts 
in New Zealand to form a regulatory marketing institution, 
but the proposals were defeated. 
For a five year period from 1915 to 1920, all meat 
available for export from New Zealand was purchased by the 
United Kingdom Government under the Imperial Commandeer. 
This meant a secure protected market for producers, where 
all export meat was sold at fixed prices. Over this 
period, production increased, but shipping difficulties 
led to a build-up of stocks in New Zealand. 
2.4.1.2 1921 to 1939 
The return to free enterprise marketing in 1921 
coincided wi.th low prices on the United Kingdom market. 
These were a result, in part, of two seasons' New Zealand 
production arriving on the British market simultaneously. 
This price fall, along with rising production and shipping 
costs, led to renewed calls for statutory intervention in 
the market. 
As a result of these pressures, the Meat Export 
Control Act 1921-1922 was passed. This led to the 
establishment of the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board, 
which appeared to be vested with power to control exports 
and to approve export slaughtering facilities. .r twas 
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further empowered to act as sole agent in negotiating 
shipping contracts, and to organize grading, pooling, 
storage, disposal, insurance and advertising of New 
Zealand export meat. Its operations were to be financed 
by a levy charged on all exported meat. This Act, subject 
to Amendments subsequent to 1922, remains in force at 
present. 
Despite the fact that the newly-established Meat Board 
appeared to be authorized to export meat, it did not 
initially, and major marketing exercise such authority 
functions continued to be carried out by private firms, 
with the Board maintaining a watch-dog attitude towards 
the slaughter and export costs of meat. In addition, the 
Board established and supervised grading standards, 
negotiated freight reductions, regulated meat export 
flows, initiated overseas market surveys and statistical 
recording, and carried out advertising. 
During the Depression, market prices for meat were 
low, and, 
import s 
economic 
in the latter half of the 1930' s, 
into the United Kingdom were 
climate led to suggestions 
quotas on meat 
in force. This 
of greater 
intervention in the meat industry, first with the 1934 
Agriculture (Emergency Powers) Act, and then with the 1936 
Primary Products Marketing Act. However, this latter Act 
was not activated with respect to meat products initially. 
In 1939, the Meat Act was passed, which superseded the 
1900 Act, and, in addition to hygiene, introduced economic 
criteria for approving applications for the extension of 
export works. The successors to this 1939 Act, along wi th 
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the 1922 Meat Export Control Act and the successors to the 
1955 Meat Export Prices Act, provide the current statutory 
authority to intervene in the meat industry. 
2.4.1.3 1939 to 1954 
With the outbreak of war, the 1936 Primary Products 
Marketing Act was invoked and the marketing of export 
meat, under the bulk purchase agreement with the United 
Kingdom, became the responsibility of the Primary Products 
Marketing De~artment. This reduced the Board's activities 
to the supervision of grading and maintaining a watch-dog 
role on slaughtering costs on behalf of producers. At the 
conclusion of the war, the bulk service contract was 
extended until 1954, and in 1948, the Board took over the 
administration of the agreement. 
In the ear1y years of the contract, price increases 
were negotiated with the United Kingdom Government. The 
Primary Products Marketing Department then paid a fixed 
f. o. b. contract price to exporters, who in turn paid 
producers the corresponding schedule price. However, 
in the early years, these were not fully returned to 
producers. Instead, as part of the Government's economic 
stabilization policy measures, increases in price were 
credited to the Meat Industry Stabilization Account (later 
renamed the Meat Industry Reserve Account). This account 
continued to accumUlate reserves, thereby resulting in 
producer dissatisfaction, and from the early 1950' s no 
further price increases were paid into it. It was then 
used to make loans to fertilizer, 
topdressing companies. 
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meat processing and 
With the expiration of the bulk purchase contract, 
export meat trading reverted to its previous basis of 
independent selling, 
functi ons. 
with the Board resuming its pre-war 
2.4.1.4 1954 to 1971 
From the conclusion of the bulk purchase contract 
until the 1970' s, export meat marketing remained in the 
hands of private enterprise, with the New Zealand Meat 
Producers' Board maintaining its watch-dog role of 
schedule monitori~g and advising producers to sellon own 
account or through the pools if it felt the meat 
exporters' schedule was unrealistic. 
Towards the end of the bulk purchase agreement, the 
Board began to press for minimum prices for export meat 
which would utilize the meat industry reserve funds. This 
led to the Meat Export Prices Act 1955, which resulted in 
prices being set pre-seasonally by a Meat Export Prices 
Commi ttee. Criteria used when setting prices were 
previous prices, market prospects, other farm costs, and 
the cost of living index. 
deficiency payments scheme, 
stabilization one. 
The scheme was envisaged as a 
rather than as a price 
At the beginning of this period, concern had begun to 
mount over the dependence on the United Kingdom market, 
and the lack of diversification towards other markets. 
This led to the setting-up of the Meat Export Development 
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Company (NZ) Ltd, or Devco as it is commonly known, in 
1960. This Company was given, and still retains, the sol.e 
rights to market frozen sheepmeat to the North American 
market. Its existence was facilitated by the 1959 and 
1962 Amendments to the 1922 Act, which clarified the 
Board's powers to control exports by limiting them to 
areas of market development. During the 1960' s, the 
financial losses of Devco generated considerable 
controversy. However, it appears that the diversion of 
supply from the United Kingdom to the North American 
• 
market resulted in a strengthening of U. K. prices 
(Edwards, 1970). 
A further attempt to accelerate the diversification of 
exports was made with the 1966 Amendment to the Meat 
Export Control Act. As a result of this, a Market 
Development Committee was constituted, and this Committee 
set diversification targets for lamb exports. 
Diversification penalties and bonuses were introduced to 
encourage individual companies to attain targets. This 
scheme was eventually discontinued in 1980. 
A further development during this period occurred with 
the passage of the Meat Act 1964, which consolidated the 
1939 Act. Under this Act, export slaughter-houses were 
granted licences only on the condition that they adopt an 
open-door policy, whereby licencees were obliged to 
process all stock offered to them and, if necessary, to 
arrange for the marketing of the meat on the offerer's 
behalf. 
• 
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The Board also supported research activities during 
this period. In conjunction with the Freezing Companies 
Association, it financed the establishment of the Meat 
Research Institute whose aim was to foster, promote and 
undertake research in the meat and wool industry. 
2.4.1.5 1971 to 1982 
The 1970' s marked a period of selective intervention 
by the Board in the market. The first occasion was in 
1971, when the Board responded to a low opening lamb 
schedule by entering the market to trade in lamb. It did 
so with the authority of a 1971 Amendment to the 1922 Act, 
which overrode previous amendments, and allowed the Board 
to sell sheepmeats in any market. This authority was 
extended in 1974 to cover beef and veal. 
Since then, the Board has again intervened in the 
market on a number of occasions during market downturns. 
In 1974, it offered its own schedules for beef, ewe 'and 
lamb, which it was then able to increase and to guarantee 
for another season with the assistance of Government who 
established a Meat Income Stabilization Account with an 
initial grant. 
Board". Late in 
This account was to be administered by the 
1975, the Board again intervened, this 
time in the mutton market. The next occasion was in 1977 
in the London market, where the Board purchased carcasses 
for resale later in the season under the auspices of 
Meatmark Ltd. It also intervened in the mutton market in 
the next season. 
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During this period, the Board also consolidated its 
powers to control the conditions of export to specific 
destinations. A 1975 Amendment to the 1964 Meat Act give 
the Board power to impose conditions on meat exporters' 
licences, such as limitations on meat type and 
destination, with the aim of assisting orderly marketing. 
This Amendment was then used to restrict the number of 
exporters in the West German lamb market. The growth in 
importance of markets such as ~he USSR and the Middle East 
led to an increased role for the Boar~ in contract 
negotiation. In 1980, it signed a contract with Iran, and 
then appointed one exporter to manage this contract. 
Changes to the minimum prices scheme also occurred in 
the 1970' s. In 1976, through an updated Meat Export 
Prices Act, this scheme was transformed from a pure 
deficiency payment to one with deficiency payment and 
stabilization aspects. The criteria under which minimum 
prices were set were widened, and, in addition, a trigger 
price was set, above which levies were imposed. These 
were to be used to offset supplements payable when the 
market price was below the minimum price. The industry 
reserves were no longer available for supplementation. A 
further dimension to the Board's stabilization activities 
was added in 
administer 
scheme. 
1978, when it found itself required to 
the Government's supplementary minimum prices 
Further developments in the 
industry occurred in 1981, 
Meat Act, which delicensed the 
.. 
freezing sector of the 
with the passage of another 
industry. This allowed 
~ .. : 
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slaughtering facilities to be freely established, 
to open-door arrangements. 
subject 
2.4.1.6 1982 to 1985 
The sheepmeats industry faced a difficult year in 
1982. As a result, the Board intervened in the mutton 
market and eventually bought up 90 percent of the season's 
kill. Later in the season, the lamb schedule fell, and 
various intervention measures were taken including the 
Board taking responsibility for high-risk product, and 
reactivating Meatmark Ltd. 
As the crisis in the industry deepened, a Meat 
Industry Task Force was set up to enquire into the system 
of meat marketing. The Task Force stressed a greater 
emphasis on a marketing approach, and recommended that the 
Board act as the primary exporter of carcasses and primal 
cuts, and that private exporters be licensed to acquire 
carcasses and primal cuts for export and further 
processing in accordance with an 
( Meat Industry Task Force, 
recommended setting-up a Meat 
overall marketing 
1983). In addi ti on, 
Industry Council 
plan 
it 
to 
formulate an industry strategic plan and to formulate and 
monitor annual marketing plans with the Board. 
In the meanti me, the Board had purchased all 
sheepmeats that season at a schedule based on 
Supplementary Minimum Prices. This essentially reduced 
the exporters' role to that of commission agents for the 
Board. Market realizations in 1983 were so low that 
support levels for meat prices were a record. 
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The Board then implemented the proposals of the Heat 
Industry Task Force and refined earlier proposals to 
establish an export pools system of payment for sheepmeats 
under Board control. It initially assumed responsibility 
for the carcass and primal cut segment of the market, 
although after a short period, it then decided that lamb 
carcasses and primal cuts to be sold to specific regions 
would be handled by a group marketing structure (N. Z. Heat 
Producers' Board, 1985a). Under this scheme, five groups 
of exporters were formed with only one exPorter from each 
group being allowed to operate in each market. 
Also in line with the Task Force recommendations, the 
Board placed increasing emphasis on product development 
and promotion as components in its more market-led 
strategy. It continued its cost-reducing activities, with 
reviews of shipping costs and grading. This latter review 
resulted in a new grading system in 
Heat Industry Council 
1983/84. The 
newly-established also shdwed 
interest in cost issues, since it commissioned a report on 
cost competitiveness in export meat processing (N. Z. 
Producers' Board, 1985b). 
Heat 
Despite this experiment in Board control, it became 
obvious at the beginning of the 1985/86 season that the 
international sheepmeats market was very depressed. 
consequence, the Board announced correspondingly 
As a 
low 
prices to producers. However, at this time, the Board's 
trading operations were subject to criticism by the meat 
exporting companies, and pressure by the Government to 
return to private enterprise marketing. Therefore, in 
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late 1985, the Board announced its intention to hand the 
marketing 
exporters. 
of sheepmeats back to the private meat 
The current situation is highly uncertain, 
although it appears that rights to market to certain areas 
will be allocated to specific exporters or groups of 
exporters. 
2.4.2 Economic Policies of statutory Institutions 
The initial activities of the New Zealand Meat 
Board from 1921 to 1939 shows that its Producers' 
activities were largely focussed on supply-shifting 
economic policies through cost-reducing activities and its 
watch-dog role on processing and marketing costs. Minor 
demand segmentation was instituted through grading. In 
addi t ion, it sought to influence price by regulating the 
flow of meat onto the United Kingdom market. 
However, the emphasis changed from 1939 to 1954, when 
the Primary Products Marketing Department and, in the 
latter phases, the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board, had 
statutory responsi bi Ii ty. During this period, their 
primary economic policy was price-fixing through their 
negotiating roles in the bulk purchase contract and 
subsequent setting of prices to exporters. In addition, 
an income stabilization policy was imposed on the meat 
industry by Government and administered by these 
organizations. Hence, the policies pursued by statutory 
agencies over this period were much broader than those 
followed previously. However, the Board still continued 
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its supply-shifting policy through pursuing its watch-dog 
role on slaughter costs. 
During the period 1954 to 1971, the Board began to 
place greater emphasis on pricing policies. Its schedule 
monitoring was designed to influence export prices by 
precluding monopsonistic exploitation of producers by meat 
exporters. This policy was given a further statutory 
boost by the open door licensing policy, which safeguarded 
producer rights to export on own account. More directly, 
it attempted to boost overall returns to producers through 
its supply diversion strategies. Prices were further 
increased by the minimum prices scheme, which was 
essentially a deficiency payment. In addition, emphasis 
continued to be placed on supply-shifting cost-reducing 
policies by the Board, which now included its active 
support for research into the industry. 
In the fourth period under consideration, 1971 to 
1982, the Board continued its emphasis on pricing 
policies, albeit with stronger market instruments. Its 
selective intervention in the market, including its 
storage and resale activity, was designed to force up 
prices. Similarly, the restriction of competition 
between exporters in specific markets through licensing 
was expected to increase prices and reduce costs. 
Supply-shifting policies through cost-reduction in the 
industry were continued with delicensing in the freezing 
industry being for this reason. For the first time, a 
stabilization policy was enacted by the Board .with the 
transformation of the minimum prices scheme from a pure 
~ .... ~ .... -' 
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deficiency payment to a hybrid stabilization and 
deficiency payment scheme. 
Pricing policies continued to dominate the economic 
behaviour of the Board after 1982 and before the return to 
private enterprise in late 1985. However, over this 
period, it was felt necessary for the Board to assume 
entire control of the sheepmeats marketing system in order 
to arrest the fall in price to producers. Although this 
action was partly for long-term price-stabilizing reasons, 
it should be viewed basically as a deficiency payment, 
since Government supported prices through its 
Supplementary Minimum Prices Scheme. In its marketing 
strategy, the Board placed increasing emphasis on market 
segmentation policies, through 
development and the ability to 
promotion and product 
control the volume of 
product allocated to specific destinations. Its promotion 
strategies can also be interpreted as having a 
demand-shifting element. The Board also continued 'its 
long-standing interest in supply-shifting policies through 
cost-reducing strategies. 
The evolution of these economic policies is summarized 
in Figure 2.4. 
2.4.3 Objectives of Statutory Institutions 
The preamble to the Meat Export Control Act 1921-22 
stresses that the reason for setting-up the New Zealand 
Meat Producers' Board was the depressed market environment 
facing producers. Falling net returns had occurred 
because of falling prices and rising costs. This suggests 
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that the primary objective of the Board from 1921 to 1939 
was to increase returns to producers. The demand- and 
supply-shifting and price influencing policies 
subsequently followed by the Board over this period were 
designed to increase prices and reduce costs, and 
therefore, support this objective. 
During the war and the post-war reconstruction phase, 
the objectives of statutory institutions operating in the 
meat industry were influenced by Government's general 
economic objectives. Therefore, rather than aiming to 
increase producer returns, the objective of such 
organizations could be interpreted as attempting to 
maintain existing producer returns, while increasing 
industry returns which were to be redistributed to 
producers in the future. In the latter part of the period 
from 1939 to 1954, when transfers to the Meat Industry 
Reserve Account were discontinued, the primary objective 
once more appeared to be to increase existing producers' 
returns. 
From 1954 onwards, the policies followed by the Board 
confirm that its paramount objective was to increase 
producer returns. During the period 1954 to 1971, 
producers also showed some acceptance of ~ principle of an 
equitable distribution of aggregate market returns among 
them, since the meat exporters' schedule would not reflect 
the differential returns from markets which would result 
from supply diversion strategies. However, this was 
qualified by the extent to which more direct marketing 
options were available to them. 
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This question of equity assumed increasing importance 
during the period 1971 to 1982, when operations in 
specific markets became more restricted, but the benefits 
from such a policy were distributed over those producers 
participating in the schedule system of pricing by 
exporters. During this period 
price stabilization had assumed 
also, the objective of 
some importance through 
the Board's intervention activities. 
From 1982 to 1985, the emphasis on the princi pIe of 
equity was further accentuated by Board control of 
marketing, since collective industry 
distributed among individual producers. 
returns were 
However, the 
objective of increasing producer returns remained the 
primary concern of the Board, while the stabilization 
obj ecti ve, which had assumed some importance during the 
previous period, was de-emphasized. 
This evolution in the relative emphasis on these 
objectives is shown in Figure 2.4. 
2.4.4 Effective Powers of statutory Institutions 
Despite being endowed with powers to control the 
export marketing of meat, the New Zealand Meat Producers' 
Board chose not to activate these over the period 1921 to 
1939. Therefore, its effective powers at this time were 
restricted to those necessary for the co-ordinating and 
bargaining activities which reduced costs and influenced 
prices, and to promotion activities, all of which were 
financed by a levy on meat exports. 
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Over the period of the bulk purchase contract from 
1939 to 1954, the basic system of free enterprise 
marketing in the meat industry was abandoned, and replaced 
by statutory control of price and destination by the 
Primary Products Marketing Department initially, and later 
by the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board. Hence, 
exporters were eff~ctively reduced to commission agents. 
Therefore, the Department and the Board assumed most of 
the powers which originally appeared to envisaged under 
the Meat Export Control Act 1921-22. 
At the conclusion of the bulk purchase contract in 
1954, the effective powers of the Board reverted to the 
minimum intervention pre-war level. However, over the 
period from 1954 to 1971, these effective powers increased 
as it gained authority to control, to some extent, the 
volume of exports to specific destinations. 
This trend towards increasing control over export 
.marketing initiated in the 1960's continued during .the 
1970' s, with the intervention of the Board in the market 
on occasion, and with the increased use of licensing to 
control exports to specific destinations. With the 
assumption of powers to purchase the entire sheepmeat kill 
in 1982, and reallocating specific market segments to 
exporters under specific conditions, the Board effectively 
controlled the entire sheepmeats marketing process thereby 
allowing it to control the volume and destination of 
pr~duct as it thought fit. With the return of sheepmeats 
marketing to private enterprise, the current situation is 
very unclear, although it appears that the Board may 
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retain the privilege of allocating rights to certain 
market areas to specific companies, or that the companies 
may attempt to do this voluntarily. 
The development of these effective powers over time is 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
2.4.5 Summary of Objectives, Effective Powers and Economic 
Policies of Statutory Institutions 
From Figure 2.4, it is obvious that the primary focus 
of the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board has always been, 
and still is, to increase returns to producers. In more 
recent years, stabilization of prices appears to have 
become a secondary objective. In addition, the recent 
period of Board intervention in the market suggests that 
the concept of an equitable distribution of market returns 
among producers had also become an accepted objective by 
that stage. 
The effective powers of the Board have varied a great 
deal over the period of its operation. This is shown in 
Fi gure 2. 4. Although it initially engaged in minor 
intervention activities, its powers increased during the 
period of the bulk purchase. Following the conclusion of 
that contract in 1954, its powers effectively reverted to 
:.;." ' .• ,.... .-. ~'l the minimum levels prevailing previously. However, these 
effective powers have gradually increased in the last 
thirty years, as a result of activities such as the 
control of product flow to specific markets, selective 
intervention, and more recently, virtually complete 
control of sheepmeats marketing. Although the current 
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situafion is unclear, it appears that the Board may, to 
some extent, retain control of the flow of Product to some 
destinations through the allocation of rights to operate 
in these markets. 
As noted with the dairy industry, the predominant 
long-term objective of the New Zealand Meat Producers' 
Board has remained stable over time. but the economic 
policies which it has adopted in order to achieve this 
objective has altered with changes in the market 
environment facing the industry . 
• The focus was initially on supply-shifting policies 
and minor demand segmentation through grading, although a 
price-Eixing function was added to this during the bulk 
purchase contract. However, aft er the war, a s hi rt in 
policies began to occur with price-increasing strategies 
through schedule monitoring, and price-support policies 
through the minimum prices scheme being adopted. In 
addition, attempts were being made to manipulate demand 
more fully with supply diversion. 
These policies have continued since then. but more 
direct methods such as intervention, and more recently, 
acquisition, have been applied in an attempt to force up 
prices although thi s latter policy has now been 
abandoned. Recently. increasingly sophisticated 
techniques of market segmentation have been employed to 
further exploit demand opportunities. 
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2.5 THE EVOLUTION OF STATUTORY STRUCTURES IN THE HOOL 
INDUSTRY 
2. 5. 1 
2. 5. 1 . 1 
The Market Environment 
Institutional Activities 
Prior to 1936 
and Statutory 
Before 1916, unregulated free enterprise typified the 
sale of New Zealand wool. From 1916 to 1920, the Uni ted 
Kingdom purchased the New Zealand cli~ under the Imperial 
Commandeer, which was administered by the New Zealand Hool 
Commi ttee. 
At the conclusion of the Commandeer, considerable 
stocks of Australian and New Zealand wool remained on 
hand. Therefore, the British Australia Hool Realisation 
Association Ltd (BAWRA) was formed in 1921 to dispose of 
these stocks. By 1924, this had been achieved at a profit 
to producers by controlling the flow of wool onto the 
market with price reserves on 
Wool Committee assisted in 
all lots. The 
this orderly 
New Zealand 
di sposal . by 
scheduling auction quantities of new season wool from 
1921. BAWRA was wound up in 1924, and the industry 
returned to an essentially free-enterprise system until 
the onset of World Har 2. 
2.5.1.2 1936 to 1945 
During the Depression however, international wool 
prices began to fall. This led to moves by the major 
wool-exporting countries and the United Kingdom to 
stimulate research into wool production and the promotion 
of wool use. In New Zealand, this led to the 1936 Wool 
>:-~,: ::-.... . .. 
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Industry Promotion Act which provided for the 
establishment of the New Zealand Wool Council. Similar 
bodies were set up in Australia and South Africa, and the 
three national organizations established and financed the 
International Wool Publicity and Research Secretariat. 
The New Zealand Wool Council's role was 
funds, most of which were expended on 
Secretariat. 
to administer levy 
the International 
During the Second World War, an appraisal scheme, 
similar in principle to the Commandeer, was in operation. 
This was administer.ed by the Primary Products Marketing 
Department. Each year, a weighted average price for New 
Zealand wool was negotiated, and returns for different 
wool types were calculated from this. In the latter war 
years, negotiated price increases were siphoned into 
stabilization accounts as part of government's general 
stabilization measures. 
In 1944, a New Zealand Wool Board was established, 
which replaced the Wool Council. The Board took over the 
Council's fUnctions of wool promotion and wool 
improvement. 
2.5.1.3 1946 to 1952 
By 1945, an international wool stockpile, equivalent 
to two season's production, had amassed. Following the 
example of 1921, an international 'Joint Organisation', 
with subsidiaries in producing countries, was set up. Its 
aim was to dispose of the U. K. stockpile and current 
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production in an orderly manner through reserve price 
operations. 
The New Zealand subsidiary was known as the New 
Zealand Wool Disposals Commission, and began operation 
from 1946/47. The Commission's operating costs were 
covered by a levy on producers. However, over the period 
of the stockpile, prices rose and levy receipts exceeded 
operating costs, with the result that, by 1951, when the 
Joint Organisation was wound up, 
a~cumulated substantial reserves. 
the Commission had 
During this period, the Wool Board continued to levy 
producers to support international wool promotion. 
2. 5. 1. 4 1952 to 1972 
With the winding-up of the Joint Organization, much 
discussion took place on the possibility of setting-up and 
administering an international reserve price scheme for 
the wool industry. However, international support was 'not 
forthcomi ng, so New Zealand decided to develop a minimum 
prices scheme to stabilize New Zealand wool prices alone, 
utilizing the profits of the New Zealand Wool Disposals 
Commi ssi on. 
The minimum price scheme was put into operation 
through the Wool Commission Act 1951. This Act 
facilitated the establishment of the New Zealand Wool 
Commission, which inherited the reserves of the New 
Zealand Wool Disposals Commission and New Zealand's share 
of the Joint Organization profits. 
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The Commission operated by setting minimum prices for 
each grade of wool at the start of the season. When 
necessary, it would bid its minimum price on individual 
auction lots, and stockpile any wool acquired in this 
manner. The stockpile would then be released onto the 
market during buoyant trading conditions. 
Until 1966, market prices were generally above minimum 
price levels. In a few seasons where this was not the 
case, only small quantities of wool were bought, and these 
were quickly cleared. However, in 1966/67, wool prices 
fell dramatically, and the Commission purchased over 
one-third of the wool offered at auction. Prices were 
still low in the next season, with the result that the 
Commission adopted a two-tier scheme whereby it entered 
the auction at a lower buying-in minimum price, but 
supplemented growers' receipts to a higher price leve1. 
The stockpile was gradually disposed of between 1968 
and 1973. Until 1972, much of it was sold at a loss, ·but 
a rapid price rise in 1973 allowed a small gross profit to 
be made on overall sales. However, this was more than 
offset by stockpile expenses, and, in addition, further 
losses resulted from supplementation. 
While the major function of the New Zealand Wool 
Commission over this period was to operate the minimum 
pri ces sc heme, minor functions included participating in 
the Wool Auction Sales Committee, assembling and 
disseminating statistical information, and collecting 
grower levies which financed Wool Board operations. The 
"".-::': 
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Wool Board was responsible for research and promotion 
functions. 
2.5.1.5 1972 to 1977 
In the late 1960' s, concern was expressed over price 
fluctuations, cost inefficiencies and falling market share 
in the wool industry, leading to speculation on the 
appropriateness of the current wool marketing structure. 
This culminated in two Reports (Wool Marketing Study 
Group, 1967i Battelle, 1971>. The first of these 
suggested that the New Zealand Wool Commission should have 
power to acquire all wool at guaranteed prices, which 
would then be sold through traditional channels. The 
later Battelle Report recommended direct selling by an 
aggressive marketing corporation. It supported the 
phasing out of the auction system through competition with 
existing channels rather than by acquisition. 
In response to the recommendations in these Reports, 
the New Zealand Wool Marketing Corporation Establishment 
Company was set up which further recommended that the 
pending Corporation ultimately assume power to acquire and 
market the entire clip. However, grower support for an 
organization with such wide-ranging powers was not 
manifest, and the Wool Marketing Corporation Act of 1972 
allowed acquisition only where a referendum of growers 
showed a majority of them to favour such a move. However, 
support for acquisition strengthened although no 
referendum was held, and the then Labour Government 
amended this provision in the Act in 1974, allowing the 
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New Zealand Wool Marketing Corporation to acquire the 
national clip without a referendum of growers, although 
grower support still needed to be manifest. For a 
discussion of this 'acquisition debate', see Chudleigh 
(1978). 
The Wool Marketing Corporation continued the minimum 
prices scheme of its predecessor. In 1974, it introduced 
a policy of market intervention to replace its two-tier 
pri ce scheme. This meant that its bidding level could now 
be above or below the grower minimum levels. In addition, 
more finely tuned intervention, known as strata-price 
control, could be used to prevent a drastic price decline 
in any particular sale. 
For 18 months from 1975, price supplements were funded 
by Government grant. In mid-1976, however, they were 
funded by a levy on all wool sold above minimum price 
levels, following the introduction of the Wool Income 
Stabilization Regulations. In addition, all wool sold in 
excess of a specific trigger price attracted a 50 percent 
levy on the excess. 
In 1976, the Corporation also introduced the 
, Extra-Choi ce' scheme, whereby it would blfy certain 
classes of wool at current market prices less the 
estimated cost of resale, and feed these purchases into 
the auction system at a later date. During this period, 
the Co~poration also encouraged efficient marketing by 
subsidising new sample selling methods. In the latter 
part of its existence, it provided credit and wool storage 
assistance to New Zealand mills. 
~. _ .. 1 
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The Corporation' s cou~terpart organization, the New 
Zealand Wool Board, continued to concentrate on promotion, 
research and development of wool and wool products, and 
efficiencies in production and distribution. 
2.5.1.6 1977 to 1985 
The Wool Industry Act of 1977 amalgamated the New 
Zealand Wool Marketing Corporation and the New Zealand 
Wool Board into a reconstituted New Zealand Wool Board. 
This legislation currently remains in force. 
Stabilizing wool prices through its minimum prices 
scheme remains the predominant activity of the present 
Wool Board. Mi ni mum pri c es are set annuall y, wi t h re gard 
being paid to market conditions, levels of reserves, the 
maintenance of production, and the previous minimum price. 
The Board may achieve minimum prices either by 
supplementing returns, or by intervening directly in the 
market. Although basic intervention price levels may be 
altered, this tends not to be done very frequently. 
Retention levies continue to be applied when the adjusted 
weighted average sale price exceeds the trigger price. In 
addition to its own pricing scheme, the Board administered 
the Government's supplementary minimum prices scheme while 
this was in operation. 
Since 1977, the Board has also engaged in cost-
reducing activities such as fostering sale by sample and 
by description, and negotiating freight rate reductions. 
The IWS continued its international promotion 
activities on behalf of member producers. However, its 
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promotion activities are becoming less general, with 
increasing emphasis being placed on market research to 
identify demand trends and market niches. Co-ordinated 
promotion and product development strategies are then 
pursued in accordance with these market requirements. 
2.5.2 Economic Policies of statutory Institutions 
From 1921 to 1924, the objective of BAWRA's orderly 
disposal of accumulated stocks was to prevent the drastic 
pr'ice decline which would have occurred if all wool had 
been released onto the market in 1921. The refore, BA WRA 
could be said to have been pursuing an economic policy of 
medium-term price stabilization. During this period, the 
New Zea1and Wool Committee sought to do the same on a 
shorter-term basis through its auction scheduling 
procedures. During the remainder of this period until 
1936, the industry reverted to a free enterprise 
marketing system. 
However, during the next period considered, 1936 to 
1945, further statutory bodies arose. As an initial 
response to the low wool prices prevailing in the 
Depression, the New Zealand Wool Council, and its 
successor, the New Zealand Wool Board, assisted in an 
aggregate demand-shifting policy through the promotion 
activities of an international cartel. In addition, 
during the period of the Second World War, the Primary 
Products Marketing Department was engaged in an economic 
policy of price-fixing through the annual negotiated 
bareme weighted average price. 
"0'>-'.' • 
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From 1946 to 1952, the major economic policy of the 
then statutory body, the New Zealand Wool Disposals 
Commi ssi on, Ii ke that of BAWRA twenty-five years 
previously, was medium-term price stabilization through 
the international price reserve buffer stock scheme which 
assisted in the orderly disposal of stocks. The Wool 
Board, on the other hand, continued to assist in a 
demand-shifting policy through international g.eneric· 
promoti on. 
During the period 1952 to 1972, the major economic 
• 
policy of the Commission was to support prices through the 
minimum prices scheme, which was operated by quasi-buffer 
stock activities. It was not a true buffer stock scheme 
to the extent that it only had a floor associated with it. 
Meanwhi le, the New Zealand Wool Board continued to 
participate in a demand-shifting policy through its 
association with the International Wool Secretariat. 
In 1972, the New Zealand Wool Marketing Corporation 
was established. Initially, the predominant economic 
policy of the new Corporation was to continue the price 
support scheme of its predecessor. However, ove~ the 
period 1972 to 1977, the scheme was transformed to a price 
stabilization measure. The Corporation 'also aimed to 
promote efficiency in the marketing system through the 
Extra-Choice scheme, thereby reducing peak pressures on 
the auction system. In addition, it was engaged in 
supply-shifting policies through supporting cost-reducing 
activities such as sample selling. During the period, the 
Wool Board continued its demand-shifting policies through 
.. " .... :····:1 
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promotion by the IWS, and also increased its interest in 
supply-shifting policies through concentrating on research 
and development, and production and distribution 
efficiencies. 
The New Zealand Wool Board and the New Zealand Wool 
Marketing Corporation were amalgamated in 1977. The new 
New Zealand Wool Board's major economic policy from 1977 
~ to 19'85 continued to be price stabilization, through a 
combination of both buffer stock and buffer price 
acti vi ti es. In addition, it continued to emphasize 
supply-shifting strategies like the Corporation before it, 
by concentrating on sale by sample and by description, and 
by negotiating freight reductions. The continuing 
promotion activities of the IWS were designed to shift 
demand. However, over the period, the emphasis seems to 
have changed from a pure generic shift in demand to more 
aophisticated techniques for segmenting the market. 
The evolution of these economic policies is summarized 
in Figure 2.5. 
2.5.3 Objectives of statutory Institutions 
Prior to 1936, the primary objective of statutory 
bodies operating in the wool industry appeared to be the 
medium-term stabilization of prices. However, from 1936 
to 1945, the objective of the demand-shifting policy of 
the New Zealand Wool Council was to increase producer 
prices and returns. Likewise, the objective of the 
Primary Products Marketing Department was also to 
increase, and later to maintain, producer prices through 
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its price-fixing behaviour. The emphasis slightly changed 
again from 1946 to 1952, when the primary objective of the 
Zealand Wool Disposals Commission, like BAWRA twenty-five 
years previously, was medium-term price stabilization. The 
fundamental objective of the Board over this period 
appeared to be to increase returns. 
The primary objective of the minimum prices scheme 
operated by the New Zealand Wool Commission from 1952 to 
1972 appears to have been to increase producer returns, 
although a secondary objective of such a scheme could be 
considered to be price stabilization. The objective of 
the demand-shifting promotion activities of the Board 
through the IHS continued to be to increase producer 
returns. 
From 1972 to 1977, the objective of the minimum prices 
scheme, now administered by the New Zealand Wool Marketing 
Corpora ti on, seemed to change. Instead of emphasizing an 
in~rease in. producer returns, its objective could more 
.. <".;- .... ',' .• ' accurately be seen as stabilizing producer prices. As was 
the case in previous periods, the other policies of both 
the Corporation and the Board continued to have the 
objective of increasing producer returns. 
As with the Corporation in its latter years, the major 
objective of the newly constituted New Zealand Wool Board 
from 1977 to 1985, seems to be to stabilize price through 
its price stabilization activities. The supply-shifting 
and demand-shifting policies adopted and supported by the 
Board were designed, as had been the case with its 
predecessors, to increase producer returns. 
.' -:1 
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The development in these objectives is noted in Figure 
2. 5. 
2.5.4 Effective Powers of statutory Institutions 
Over the period 1921 to 1924. BAWRA effectively 
acquired the Australian and New Zealand wool clip and 
stocks from the Commandeer period. Hence. through its 
price reserve system. it controlled the volume of supply 
flowing onto the international market. The industry then 
reverted to a private enterprise system until 1936. 
From 1936 to 1945. statutory powers in the wool 
industry were rather mixed. The powers of the New Zealand 
Wool Council and the predecessor of the International Wool 
Secretariat were those necessary to levy producers and 
conduct global generic promotion. During the period of 
the Second World War. the powers of the Primary Products 
Marketing Department were much more ·considerable. with 
Government power to set prices returned to producers. 'and 
to control the flow of wool exports to the United Kingdom. 
From 1946 to 1952. the Joint Organization acquired the 
total New Zealand clip, some of which it then sold to the 
trade. However. in later years. when the Commission 
bought stocks via reserve price operations. effective 
statutory powers were reduced to trading to facilitate the 
international buffer price scheme. 
This effective power to selectively intervene in the 
market continued during the period 1952 to 1972 when the 
New Zealand Wool Commission was in operation. Over the 
entire period from 1946 to 1972. the New Zealand Wool 
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Board retained its power to levy to support international 
promoti on. 
Although the 1972 New Zealand Wool Marketing 
Corporation had more substantial legislative powers to 
control wool marketing than did its predecessor, its 
effective powers from 1972 to 1977 differed very little 
from those of the Commission, with power to selectively 
intervene in the market to support its stabilization 
activities. In addition, both the Corporation and the 
Board had the necessary power to levy and conduct minimum 
intervention demand- and supply-shifting activities. 
With the amalgamation of the Board and the Corporation 
in 1977, the substantial legislative powers, including the 
power to control the sale, disposal and export of wool 
wi thout a grower referendum, remai ned unchanged. Howe vel', 
it has not fully utilized such authority and its effective 
powers from 1977 to 1985 have remained similar to those of 
the preceding period. 
The evolution of these effective powers is summarized 
in Figure 2.5. 
2. 5. 5 Summary of Objectives, Effective Powers and 
Economic Policies of Statutory Institutions 
The objectives over time of statutory institutions 
operating in the New Zealand wool industry are summarized 
in Figure 2.5. Over the years, the major objectives of 
such agencies have been to stabilize producer prices and 
to increase producer returns. However, the relative 
emphasis on each of these has varied according to the 
oj 
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market environment at the time, and currently, price 
stabilization appears to be the predominant objective of 
the two. 
Figure 2.5 also illustrates the effective powers of 
statutory institutions operating in the wool industry. 
Although those operating before 1924 acquired the New 
Zealand wool clip, institutions operating in the industry 
since then have had much more limited effective powers. 
Their intervention in the market has been at low levels, 
with selective trading to support minimum prices or 
stabilization schemes, and levy activities to finance 
promot i on and cos t - red uc i ng pol i c i es. The re fore, des pi te 
the fact that the New Zealand Hool Board currently has the 
power to acquire and dispose of the entire New Zealand 
wool clip, it is unlikely that it would do so. 
Over the last sixty-five years, the wool industry has 
been characterized by stable long-term objectives and low 
levels of effective intervention. In common with other 
industries studied, the economic policies adopted by the 
various agencies in order to achieve these objectives have 
varied over time, but not to the same extent as that noted 
in the dairy and meat industries. 
In general, price stabilization policies in one form 
or another have dominated agency activities. On occasion 
however, in times of national emergency or depressed 
market conditions, price-fixing 
activities have taken precedence. 
and 
A 
price support 
demand-shifting 
policy through promotion by an international cartel of 
producers also has a long his~ory. 
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In recent years, increasing emphasis has been placed 
on supply-shifting policies which reduce costs. These 
include fostering new technologies such as sale by sample 
and by description, and negotiating freight reductions. 
In addition, promotion efforts have recently become more 
sophisticated by exp10iting identified market segments and 
developing specific products appropriate to those 
segments, although no attempts appear to have been made to 
manipulate the level of output allocated to these market 
segments. 
2.6 THE EVOLUTION OF STATUTORY STRUCTURES IN THE PIPFRUIT 
INDUSTRY 
2.6. 1 The Market Environment and Statutory Institutional 
Activities 
2. 6. 1 . 1 1 924 to 1 939 
The first hint of grower organization in the New 
Zealand pipfruit industry occurred in 1916 with the 
formation of the New Zealand Fruitgrowers' Federation. 
The aim of this body was to assist the development of the 
industry, and it was financed by a levy on producers. 
In 1924, the Fruit Export Control Board came into 
existence. From 1926 to 1939, this Board was the sole 
legal exporter of pipfruit, and it handled growers' fruit 
on a 'trustee' basis. 
Growers received guaranteed payments for export fruit, 
although the mechanics of this guarantee varied over the 
period (New Zealand Frui t Export Control Board, 1928, 
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1931, 1933, 1935), and during its latter stages was not 
sufficient to cover production costs. (New Zealand Fruit 
Export Control Board, 1938). In addi ti on, the Frui t Export 
Control Board also exercised economies in preparation, 
transportation and marketing. 
An attempt at stabilization was made in the late 
1920' s, when it was suggested by Government that growers 
contribute towards a guarantee reserve fund which would 
initially be subsidized by Government, which eventually 
hoped to cease its guarantee. However, this scheme only 
remained in operation until the change of Government, when 
it was decided that the reserves accumulated should be 
dis t ri but e d. 
During the immediate pre-war years, the industry was 
beset by problems of rising costs, inadequate returns to 
growers and a shortage of shipping space for exports. 
Conseq ue ntl y, the government offered the industry a 
completely guaranteed price, provided the industry agreed 
to statutory control over the marketing of all pipfruit. 
There was also the suggestion that the government would 
withdraw the existing export guarantee if this offer was 
not accepted. Therefore, the industry requested the 
Government to take marketing control and to pay the 
industry a guaranteed price sufficient to cover production 
costs and to give the producer a fair standard of living 
(New Zealand Frui t Export Control Board, 1938). 
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2.6.1.2 1939 to 1948 
With the outbreak of war, export shipping space was 
further restricted to meat, wool and dairy products. The 
Internal Marketing Division of the Primary Products 
Marketing Department purchased the entire pipfruit crop 
and assumed responsibility for marketing. 
It attempted to dispose of the fifty percent of the 
crop, which had hitherto been exported, onto the domestic 
market. It did this by lowering retail prices and 
instituting gradi ng, cold storage and a national 
distribution system. 
Since Government now controlled the marketing of 
pi pfrui t, the New Zealand Fruit Export Control Board was 
reduced to advisory status only. 
2.6.1.3 1948 to 1985 
After the war, the New Zealand Frui tgrowers' 
Federation sought an arrangement which would ensure 
--'.". 
orderly marketing in both local and export markets. As a 
result, the Apple and Pear Marketing Act 1948 was passed, 
and the New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board came 
into operation in the same year. This Act was 
subsequently amended and consolidated in the Apple and 
Pear Marketing Act 1971. It has since been amended 
further. 
The Board is obliged to purchase all fresh apples and 
pears offered to it at set prices, subject to minimum 
grade standards and certain harvesting and packaging 
procedures. It is then required to market that portion of 
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the crop which it acquires on either the domestic or the 
export market. This accounts for the majority of 
producti on, since gate sales, despite being a cause of 
some concern to the Board in the past, do not account for 
a high proportion of the crop. The Board is also 
responsible for acquiring and marketing imported apples 
and pears. 
Before 1967, Government had set the guaranteed price 
on a cost of production basis. However, in that year, the 
Apple and Pear Prices Authority, established under the 
1948 Act, was charged with determining an average 
guaranteed price, taking into account market prices, past 
guaranteed prices, costs of production and marketing, the 
stability of the industry, industry reserves, and the 
capital needs of the Board. In 1979, these criteria were 
adjusted in order to remove the ten percent restriction on 
the movement of the guaranteed price. While the Authority 
set the average guaranteed pri ce, it was the 
responsibility of the Board to determine grower prices for 
individual grades, varieties and districts, which were 
consistent with the average price determinations of the 
Authori ty. 
From 1977 to 1980, industry reserves built up 
substantially, and in 1981, an Amendment to the 1971 Act 
introduced a stabili2ation element into Board activities. 
In addition to the guaranteed price set each year by the 
Authori ty, the Board announced a supplementary price, 
which is an average of last season's market return and the 
return estimated for tqe coming season. However, when the 
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stabilization funds are low, a price lower than this 
average may be announced. If the market price is less 
than the guaranteed price, growers receive the guaranteed 
price. If it lies between the guaranteed and the 
supplementary price, then growers receive the market 
return, adjusted for a capital charge to finance Board 
operations. Finally, if the market price is greater than 
the supplementary price, growers receive the supplementary 
price plus fifty percent of the difference between the 
two, with the balance being used to build-up reserves to 
finance years of inadequate market returns. 
With its longstanding ability to control the 
destination and end use of product, the Board has been in 
a position to exploit demand opportunities on behalf of 
producers, and there is evidence to suggest that its 
diversion of supply from the fresh to the process market 
has resulted in increased returns to producers (Rae, 
1978). 
In recent years, this exploitation of existing and 
potential demand outlets has become more sophisticated. 
During this period, the market environment has been 
charac~erized by increasing production from both New 
Zealand and its competitors, and by protectionist 
attitudes in major markets. The Board has responded to 
this situation by supplying a wide range of product to an 
increased number of markets, with emphasis on a high 
quality product. This demand-expanding strategy has been 
appropriatel¥ supported by promotion. 
~'-', ',' '! 
76 
The Board has also supported the introduction of 
cost-reducing technology such as palletization in shipping 
and co-ordinating freight schedules. In addition, it has 
expanded cool-store and packing facilities to cope with 
increased production, and is fostering efficiencies in 
prod uc t ion. 
2.6.2 Economic Policies of Statutory Institutions 
An important economic policy of the Fruit Export 
Control Board from 1924 to 1939 was price-fixing. In the 
• 
latter years of its existence, an attempt at price 
stabilization was made. However, this stabilization 
scheme was abandoned, and from 1937, a price-fixing policy 
based on a guaranteed price was in operation. During this 
period, the Board was also concerned with supply-shifting 
policies, through cost-reducing activities in the 
transporting and marketing of pipfruit. 
From 1939 to 1948, the Primary Products Marketing 
Department essentially continued the pre-war economic 
policies of the Fruit Export Control Board. That is, it 
fixed prices to producers, and continued with a 
supply-shifting policy through cost-reducing activities. 
When power was transferred from the Department to the 
Apple and Pear Marketing Board in 1948, this new statutory 
body continued its predecessor's price-fixing policy, 
through the guaranteed price scheme, where the fixed price 
was based on a number of factors. In recent years, 
however, this has been transformed to a price 
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stabilization policy with minimum and trigger prices. 
Over the period 1948 to 1985, the Board has continued the 
tradition of supply-shifting policies through 
cost-reducing techniques in production, transportation and 
processi ng. 
In recent years, it has also adopted demand 
manipulating policies such as supply diversion and market 
di versi fi cati on. T~hese pol i ci es, and its emphasis on 
exploiting a wide range of market niches suggests that 
market segmentation policies are being practised by the 
• 
Board. In addi ti on, demand-shifting policies through 
promotion have been undertaken in order to expand 
aggregate demand. 
Figure 2.6 summarizes this evolution of economic 
policies by statutory authorities in the pipfruit 
·industry. 
2.6.3 Objectives of statutory Institutions 
The price-fixing and supply-shifting activities of the 
Fruit Export Control Board which operated from 1924 to 
1939 suggest that its primary objective was to increase 
producer returns. The attempt at price stabilization in 
the early 1·930' s indicates that stable prices were seen as 
a desirable objective, but this only appears to have been 
of minor importance, since the scheme was soon abandoned. 
The Primary Products Marketing Department controlled 
pipfruit marketing from 1939 to 1948. Its activities 
suggest that its primary objective was to maximize returns 
to growers subject to the wartime constraints under which 
FRUIT EXPORT PRIMARY PRODUCTS APPLE AND PEAR 
CONTROL BOARD MARKETING DEPARTMENT MARKETING BOARD 
(1924-1939) (1939-1948) (1948-1985) 
INCREASE PRODUCER RETURNS MAXIMISE PRODUCER RETURNS INCREASE PRODUCER RETURNS 
STABILISE PRICES SUBJECT TO WARTIME STABILISE PRICES 
OBJECTIVES (A MINOR OBJECTIVE) CONSTRAINTS (A RECENT OBJECTIVE) 
EQUITY AMONG PRODUCERS EQUITY AMONG PRODUCERS 
POWER TO CONTROL POWER TO ACQUIRE AND POWER TO ACQUIRE AND 
EFFECTIVE MARKETING OF ALL EXPORT CONTROL MARKETING OF ALL CONTROL MARKETING OF ALL 
POWERS PRODUCE EXPORT PRODUCE EXPORT PRODUCE 
POWER TO SET PRICE POWER TO SET PRICE POWER TO SET PRICE (APPA) 
PRICE-FIXING PRICE-FIXING PRICE-FIXING BECOMING 
(GUARANTEED PRICE) (GUARANTEED PRICE) PRICE STABILISATION 
SUPPLY-SHIFTING SUPPLY-SHIFTING SUPPLY-SHIFTING 
ECONOMIC (COST REDUCTIONS IN MARKET DIVERSIFICATION 
POLICIES TRANSPORT AND MARKETING) MARKET SEGMENTATION 
PRICE STABILISATION DEMAND SHIFTING 
(EARLY 1930'S) . (PROMOTION) 
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the industry was operating. The principle of an equitable 
distribution of returns among growers appears to have 
gained industry support by that time. 
From 1948, the. New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing 
Board took responsibility for marketing the pipfruit crop 
and has continued to do so since then. Its supply and 
demand-shifting policies, and market diversification and 
segmentation suggest that increasing producer returns 
continues to remain a primary objective. 
In addition, the conversion of the guaranteed price 
soheme to a stabilization scheme suggests that price 
stabilization has now become an objective of the pipfruit 
industry. Once again, the principle of equity in returns 
among producers was accepted through the pricing system. 
These institutional objectives are shown in Figure 
2.6. 
2.6.4 Effective Powers of statutory Institutions 
From 1924 to 1939, the Frui t Export Control Board, as 
the sole exporter of pipfruit, effectively controlled the 
entire marketing process, including the destination of 
produce. These powers continued when the Primary Products 
Marketing Department assumed control of the acquisition 
and marketing of the pipfruit crop from 1939 to 1948. This 
situation remained unchanged when the New Zealand Apple 
and Pear Marketing Board took over in 1948. 
The Board, which has remained in operation for 
thi rty-se ven years, has effective control of all 
transporta ti on, processing and marketing activities. 
'"0-;-.-_::1 
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Another statutory agency, the Apple and Pear Prices 
Authority, has had the power to set prices since 1967. 
The development in these effective powers is traced 
out in Figure 2.6. 
2. 6. 5 Summary of Objectives, Effective Powers and 
Economic Policies of Statutory Institutions 
Figure 2.6 summarizes the perceived objectives over 
time of statutory agencies operating in the pipfruit 
industry. This indicates that the long-term objectives of 
such institutions have been to increase producer returns 
and to ensure equity among producers in returns. In 
addition, the objective of stabilizing prices has recently 
achieved some importance. The first two objectives have 
remained stable over time, while the stabilization 
objective was emphasized in the early 1930' s, then 
de-emphas i zed, and more rec e nt 1 y, has res urf ac ed agai n. 
During the last sixty years, the effective powers' of 
marketing agencies operating in the pipfruit industry have 
remained extremely stable. Agencies have been empowered 
to acquire and market all pipfruit offered to them, and 
have been responsible for associated market activities 
such as tramsportation, packing, storage, processi ng, 
promotion and research. As with other industries studied, 
these agencies have not had the authority to control the 
level of industry output. 
Until recently, the long-term economic policies 
practised by statutory agen~ies operating in the pi~-fruit 
industry have remained quite stable. These agencies have 
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concentrated on price-fixing through the guaranteed price 
scheme, and supply-shifting policies through cost 
reductions in the marketing channel. In the last few 
years, however, the current Board has extended its 
activities to include a price stabilization policy and a 
demand-manipulating policy. The aim of the latter policy 
is to shift demand, diversify the market and segment it. 
2.7 THE EVOLUTION OF STATUTORY STRUCTURES IN THE 
KIWIFRUIT INDUSTRY 
2. 7. 1 The Market Environment and Statutory Institutional 
Activities 
2.7.1.1 Prior to 1977 
The expansion of the kiwifruit industry in the Te 
Puke district in the 1960' s, led to fears that current 
markets could not take projected kiwifruit production. 
Therefore, in 1970, exporters and growers met and adopted 
a charter which set out the principles of a voluntary 
system of levies to finance kiwifruit promotion. Growers 
agreed to pay a levy of six cents per tray and exporters 
four cents per tray. The Kiwifruit Export Promotion 
- ---.. - .-:-.:;<: Committee, with grower and exporter representatives, was 
set up to decide how levy funds should be used. The levy 
was vol untary, in that it was not backed by legislation, 
so growers agreed not to supply any exporter who did not 
pay the levy, and exporters agreed not to take fruit from 
a grower in the same circumstances. 
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Initially, promotion efforts were amateurish, but as 
sales, and therefore levies incr-eased, effor-ts became mor-e 
pr-ofessi onal. The pr-omoters carved out a niche for- a new 
product with an image which was not too upper class to 
appear in supermar-kets, 
luxur-y price tag. 
yet up-mar-ket enough to carr-y a 
By the early 1970' s, producer-s were r-eceiving good 
prices for their product in the developing over-seas 
markets, and this was attracting both new exporters and 
producers. Existing exporter-s became dissatisfied, since 
new entrants were receiving the benefits of promotion to 
which they had made no contribution. In addition, they 
felt that these newer exporters were buying and putting 
onto the market low quality fruit which established 
exporters would not handle. In addition, expor-ters 
appeared 
markets. 
to be undercutting each other in over-seas 
Growers were also concerned with the pr-oblem of 
potential oversupply, and could perceive a situation 
where, with falling prices, exporters would exit fr-om the 
industry into new ventures, while growers would be locked 
into the industr-y with their considerable investment in 
vi nes. 
While these developments were occurring, the Promotion 
Committee had begun to assume responsibility for- matters 
beyond the scope of promotion. In 1973, it put forward a 
proposal to growers, which was accepted, that only the 
Hayward variety would be accepted for export. It also 
drafted recommendations on gradi ng, packaging methods, 
• 
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minimum fruit size and weight, and storage standards. In 
addi t ion, it tried to forecast export volumes, but was 
unsuccessful in this, since growers often forward sold 
their crop to several exporters. 
Industry demand for a marketing board began to emerge. 
It was envisaged that such an institution would be 
represented by growers and exporters, with sole authority 
to accredit exporters of kiwifruit, but no power to 
acquire 
met in 
fruit. A Steering Committee was 
June 1972, with the aim of 
set up and first 
converting the 
principles embodi~d in the Board proposal into a reality. 
However, the then Labour Government was not 
enthusiastic about the proposal. In addition, exporters, 
who by that time had formed into the Kiwifruit Exporters' 
Association, withdrew their support for the concept, 
fearing the imposition of a single-seller marketing system 
on the industry. Some growers, who linked poor returns in 
the pipfruit and citrus industries to the activities of 
the Apple and Pear Marketing Board and the Citrus 
Marketing Authori ty, shared these vi ews. As a 
consequence, the Steering Committee withdrew its support 
for the concept of exporter representation on the proposed 
Board. 
By 1976, a schism had emerged in the industry. On the 
one hand, most growers were seeking total producer 
control, while on the other, exporters supported by a 
group of growers, were demanding no interference. In late 
1976, the Minister of Agriculture made it clear to the 
Steering Committee that it had lost substantial grower 
- . - :1 
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support and must, therefore, compromi se. At the same 
time, he warned exporters that they would risk Government 
intervention if they continued to hold out against the 
establishment of some form of control authority. As a 
result, both parties agreed to the concept of a licensing 
authority with exporter representation. The Steering 
Committee was duly disbanded when the regulations were 
promulgated. 
2.7.1.2 1977 to 1985 
In 1977, the Kiwifruit Marketing Licensing Regulations 
came into force, thereby establishing the New Zealand 
Kiwifruit Marketing Licensing Authority, renamed the New 
Zealand Kiwifruit Authority in 1981. Authority for the 
Regulations emanated from the Primary Products Marketing 
Act 1953. 
As envisaged, the predominant role of the Authority is 
the licensing of exporters, with the objective of 
promoting orderly marketing such that quality is 
maintained and exporters do not undercut each other in 
their markets. In 1974, fourteen exporters were in the 
business, as well as some growers who were exporting on 
their own account. In the first year of operation of the 
Authority, nine export licences were granted, but by 1982, 
this number had been reduced to six, and in 1986, it will 
rise to seven. Initially, licences were granted for one 
year, but a revision of regulations in 1983 enabled the 
Authority to issue licences for up to seven years. 
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The Authority does not have the power to acquire fruit 
in its own right, although this power could be acquired by 
referendum if a substantial majority of producers 
supported such a move. 
The original Kiwifruit Export Promotion Committee 
became one of the several committees operating under the 
Authority. Its scope 
renamed the Kiwifruit 
was later widened, and it 
Marketing Planning Committee. 
was 
It 
concentrates on promotion, and sets sales targets based on 
market research information. 
The Authority and the Kiwifruit Exporters' Association 
established panels of agents in the main markets who, 
although operating independently, did so within a 
marketing plan. These agents report on trends in their 
market, the support needed to achieve sales targets, and 
realistic price levels. This information is passed back 
to the Authority and to producers. The Authority then 
arranges the promotion and other services necessary to 
achieve target price and offtake levels, while producers 
are expected to supply the right product handled in the 
right way to exporters. Exporters return an individual 
pool price to their own suppliers. Currently, different 
exporters' pool prices appear to be very similar (New 
Zealand Kiwifruit Authority, 1984). 
Recent concern has emerged over excessive dependence 
on the West German market. As a result of this, the 
Authority has encouraged diversification away from this 
market. It has done this by imposing maximum proportions 
of the crop which can go to larger markets such as Germany 
... 
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and Japan, and minimum proportions which must go to 
certain other markets, such as North America and 
I developi ng markets' (Brash, 1985). Promotional budgets 
have also been skewed towards new markets for the same 
purpose. 
One of the reasons for establishing the Authority was 
concern with poor quality fruit being sold on the export 
market. It was felt that this lowered wholesale prices 
and, consequently returns to growers producing 
high-quality fruit. When the Authority was set up, it was 
envisaged that it would have the power to control the 
quality of export fruit, but this provision was not made 
explicit until the 1983 revision of the Regulations. 
However, with increasing overseas production poorer 
quality fruit is once again finding its way onto export 
markets, with the result, the Authority believes, of 
depressing the price of quality fruit which does not 
appear to be well-differentiated . With this in mind, ~he 
Authority is seeking the co-operation of overseas producer 
groups, while at the same time investigating ways in which 
the New Zealand product can be differentiated from that 
of its ri vals. 
The Authority is also involved in production research 
aimed at reducing production costs, and is informally 
involved in product development through participation in 
processing activities. 
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2.7.2 Economic Policies of Kiwifruit Agencies 
The sole economic policy conducted by the Kiwifruit 
Export Promotion Committee which operated prior to 1977, 
was demand-shifting through generic promotion activities. 
Although it had no power to do so, it attempted to become 
involved in demand segmentation policies through its 
recommendations on grading, 
storage. 
quality, packaging and 
The New Zealand Kiwifruit Authority, which was given 
statutory authority in 1977, continued these demand-
shifting policies. Its other major policy appears to 
incorporate various aspects of market segmentation. For 
example, the primary objective of licensing is to 
facilitate a coordinated industry-style operation in the 
market place (New Zealand Kiwifruit Authority, 1984), and 
recently the Authority has encouraged market 
diversification by placing restrictions on certain 
markets. Ancillary activities which support demand 
segmentation include grading, packaging and participation 
in product development through processing. The Authority 
also conducts a supply-shifting policy through its 
involvement in research aimed at reducing production 
costs, and co-ordination of transport. 
These economic policies are summarized in Figure 2.7. 
2.7.3 Objectives of Kiwifruit Agencies 
of 
Through its activities, 
the Kiwifruit Export 
it appears that the objective 
Promotion Committee was to 
,;: 
KIWIFRUIT PROMOTION NEW ZEALAND KIWIFRUIT 
EXPORT COMMITTEE AUTHORITY 
(1970-1977 ) (1977-1985) 
OBJECTIVES INCREASE GROWERS' RETURNS INCREASE GROWERS' RETURNS 
EFFECTIVE TO DISBURSE VOLUNTARY LEVY FUNDS POWER TO INDIRECTLY CONTROL PRODUCT FLOW 
POWERS THROUGH PROMOTION POWER TO ENFORCE STANDARDS 
POWER TO LEVY AND DISBURSE FUNDS 
,- DEMAND-SHIFTING DEMAND SHIFTING 
(PROMOTION) (PROMOTION) 
DEMAND SEGMENTATION MARKET DIVERSIFICATION 
ECONOMIC (GRADING, QUALITY, PACKAGING, STORAGE) DEMAND SEGMENTATION 
POLICIES (LICENSING OF EXPORTERS, GRADING, 
PACKAGING, PROCESSING) 
SUPPLY SHIFTING 
(RESEARCH, CO-ORDINATED SHIPPING) 
FIGURE 2.7: STATUTORY MARKETING IN NEW ZEALAND'S KIWIFRUIT INDUSTRY 
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maintain or increase returns to those growers contributing 
to levy funds. 
The concern which led to the setting-up of the New 
Zealand Kiwifruit Authority, and the policies in which it 
engages, suggests that its primary objective was also to 
increase producer returns. The perceived aims of the 
licensing procedure also supports this objective. 
2.7.4 Effective Powers of Kiwifruit Agencies 
The Kiwifruit Export Promotion Committee had the power 
• 
to disburse levy funds for promotion purposes as it saw 
fit. However, it had no statutory authority to levy all 
growers and exporters of ki wi frui t, and was, 
cons eq ue nt I y, plagued· by free -r ide r probl ems. 
The New Zealand Kiwifruit Authority, which has 
operated since 1977, has indirect power to control the 
flow of product onto markets through its licensing 
function and industry marketing plan. In addition, it has 
the power to levy and to disburse levy funds through 
promotion and research activities, and to enforce quality 
standards through grading and packaging . 
2. 8 CONCLUSIONS 
2. 8. 1 The Evolution of Market Segmentation Policies 
Statutory authorities in the four long-established 
industries were set up in the early 1920' s, following a 
fall in prices after the First World War. A perusal of 
Figures 2.3 to 2.6 shows a broad common pattern in the 
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evolution of the economic policies pursued by these 
institutions. 
The initial emphasis was on raising producer returns 
or stabilizing prices through demand and supply-shifting 
policies, and price-fixing and stabilizing schemes. For 
e-xample, demand-shifting policies through promotion 
activities were initiated in the dairy, meat and wool 
Supply-shifting industries prior to World War Two. 
policies were instigated in the same period over the f9ur 
industries through research, by reducing transport, 
processing and marketing costs, by a watch-dog role on 
costs in the meat industry, and by co-ordinated shipping 
arrangements. Minor demand segmentation was facilitated 
through grading schemes. 
Various guaranteed pricing schemes came into operation 
in all four industries at one stage or another prior to 
1954. These schemes were designed to either fix or to 
stabilize prices, or to achieve a combination of both, and 
they involved price pooling arrangements for producers. 
In addi ti on, short-term price stabilization was 
facilitated by co-ordinated shipping in the dairy and meat 
industries, and by auction scheduling in the wool 
industry. 
After World War Two, concern began to mount about the 
dependence on the United Kingdom market. This led to 
supply diversion and market diversification programs, 
which were in operation in the dairy, meat and pipfruit 
industries by the 1960' s. These programs were forerunners 
! 
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to the more sophisticated marketing policies eventually 
adopted in all industries. 
By the late 1970' s, most industries faced a depressed 
international trading environment with over-supply, a 
build-up of stocks, and restricted access to traditional 
markets. In response to this situation, the dairy, meat 
and pipfruit industries have instigated sophisticated 
market segmentation policies aimed at exploiting available 
mar:ket niches. Despite being structured differently to 
thes~- other industries, the wool industry is also moving 
in this direction with product development and promotion 
aimed at specific market segments. 
The history of the kiwifruit industry differs to that 
of the other major industries considered. It became 
established in the 1970' s, and the New Zealand Kiwifruit 
Authority was set up in 1977 in response to a perceived 
threat of falling prices. Unlike the other institutions 
consi de red, this agency moved directly into demand 
management policies, by attempting to shift demand through 
promotion, and to segment the market through the operation 
of its exporter licensing arrangements. 
In conclusion, therefore, there appears to be a 
definite trend towards the use of market segmentation 
policies by agencies operating in the five major 
agricultural exporting industries. I n the dai ry, meat 
and pipfruit industries, these are directly pursued by the 
Boards themselves, whereas in the kiwifruit industry, an 
attempt appears to be made to achieve them in a more 
indirect manner through the licensing, and consequent 
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direction, of exporters. Although the current situation 
in the meat industry is uncertain, it seems likely that 
the Board may continue to allocate rights to operate in 
certain markets or that companies may pursue this policy 
voluntarily, thereby retaining the ability of the industry 
to practise the market segmentation policies which the 
Board has developed. The wool industry, on the other 
hand, has made only minor moves towards market 
segmentation policies through product development and 
associated promotion by the New Zealand Wool Board and by 
the International Wool Secretariat. 
2.8.2 Representative Objectives of Statutory Agencies 
From an examination of Figures 2.3 to 2.7, it becomes 
obvious that all statutory agencies have a producer 
orientation, and that the long-term objectives of such 
institutions operating in the dairy, meat and wool 
industries are to increase returns to producers, to ens~re 
equity among producers in receiving these returns, and to 
stabilize prices. However, the equity consideration is a 
relatively recent concern in the meat industry, and it is 
not certain that it will remain so, and price stability is 
a recent objective in the pipfruit industry. The 
kiwifruit industry appears to be primarily concerned with 
increasing producer returns, and does not seem to place 
any direct emphasis on price stability or equity at this 
stage. The wool industry tends to differ from other 
industries considered, since it does not emphasize this 
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equity objective. However, it stresses stabilizing prices 
and increasing producer returns. 
In all the industries considered, these long-term 
objectives appear to be relatively stable, although the 
current structure in the meat industry is unstable, which 
impinges on the stability of the equity objective in this 
industry. 
I nth e d air y, me at, pip f r u ita n d k i wi f r u i tin d us t r i e s , 
increasing producer returns appears to be the most 
important objective, with the principle of an equitable 
distribution of returns well-established in the dairy and 
pipfruit industries, although uncertain in the meat 
industry. Price stabilization appears to be either a 
secondary objective, or not considered to be of importance 
at all. However, the wool industry diverges from this 
pattern, since in this case, price stabilization is 
considered to be the primary objective. 
In conclusion, therefore, a representative set' of 
obj ecti ves for statutory agencies operating in New 
Zealand's major agricultural exporting industries would 
appear to be to increase producer returns, to ensure 
equity among producers, and to stabilize producer prices. 
Of these objectives increasing producer returns is most 
important, with price stabilization being a secondary 
obj ecti ve. These objectives and their relative importance 
are sufficiently robust to be considered as reasonably 
representative of all industries studied except wool, 
-. -: ...... --'-'-->: 
where any assessment of market segmentation policies based 
on these representative objectives must be interpreted 
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with caution. Since many emerging industries tend to 
model themselves on these major industries, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the above objectives and their 
relative emphasis would be applicable in these cases also. 
2.8.3 Representative Effective 
Agencies 
Powers of Statutory 
The effective powers of statutory agencies operating 
in the dairy and pipfruit industries, and until recently, 
the me a tin d us try, h a ve bee n qui t e con sid era b 1 e . In these 
cases, such institutions can acquire and market all 
product, thereby giving them control over the volume of 
product which can be directed to particular destinations 
or end uses. In effect, they have virtual control over 
the entire marketing process, including handling, pooling, 
transportation, storage, processing and packaging. They 
have the power to levy producers, and to disburse these 
levy funds for the purpose of promotion and research. 
In the above cases, either the agency itself, as in 
the meat industry prior to 
associated statutory bodies, 
the 1985/86 season, or 
as with dairy and pipfruit, 
set prices to be returned to producers. While these 
prices may be based on a number of criteria in the 
short-term, in the longer term they are linked to market 
realizations, thereby, in effect, returning a pooled price 
to suppliers. 
In none of the cases considered, do statutory agencies 
have any power to control the level of industry output. 
-.-.! 
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Unlike the above agencies, the New Zealand Kiwift"uit 
Authot"ity has no powet" to acquit"e product. Howevet", it 
can indirectly influence the flow of pt"oduct tht"ough the 
system of licensing e~pot"tet"s. It also has power to levy 
and to use such funds fot" pt"omotion and t"eseat"ch. In t hi s 
industry also, producers receive pool pt"ices from 
individual exportet"s, and it appears that such prices are 
si mi lar. 
Once agai n, the wool industt"y appears to be the 
exception. Despite having the powet" to acquire the wool 
cli p, the New Zealand Wool Board chooses not to utilize 
this power. Instead, it trades when this is necessary to 
stabilize producer prices. As with the other agencies 
considered, it has the powet" to levy fot" promotion and 
research purposes. In addition, it has the authority to 
negotiate cost reductions on behalf of the industry at 
various stages of the marketing process. 
The effective powers considered above can' be 
considered quite stable for the dait"y and pipfruit 
industries, where they have remained unchanged for over 
fifty years. However, in the case of the meat industry, 
the situation is uncertain. Although the Board t"ecently 
had effective control of the entire marketing procedure, 
it remains to be seen which of these powers it retains and 
whether any of them are effectively disbursed to the 
private companies. At the moment, the powers of the Board 
cannot be considered stable. On the other hand, the 
t"espective powers of agencies in the wool and kiwifruit 
industries can be considered t"easonably stable. 
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For the purpose of assessing market segmentation 
policies, 
have the 
a representative agency could be considered to 
power to direct specified volumes of product to 
specific destinations or end uses, and to return a pooled 
price to producers. It could also be considered to have 
the necessary power to acquire funds for promotion or 
product development, where this forms a necessary part of 
a market segmentation policy. However, it would not have 
the power to control the level of industry output. 
Such representative powers are applicable to the 
dairy, pipfruit and kiwifruit industries, although in the 
kiwifruit industry, the power to control the flow of 
product to specific destinations or end uses is an 
indirect one, and not a direct result of product 
acquisition as in other industries. These powers 
characterized the meat industry until recently, although 
the current marketing structure is too unstabl~ to 
d~termine whether it will effectively retain these po~ers 
in future. However, to consider such powers as 
representative of the wool industry presupposes radical 
industry reorgani za ti on, and therefore, must be 
interpreted with caution. Once again, it could be assumed 
that emerging industries may attempt to acquire the above 
representative powers, 
existing industries. 
given their propensity to emulate 
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CHAPTER 3 
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING MARKET SEGMENTATION POLICIES 
3. 1 I NTRODUCTI ON 
The increasing importance of market segmentation as an 
economic policy practised by institutions operating in New 
Zealand's major agricultural exporting industries was 
established in the previous Chapter. In addition, a 
representative structure and set of objectives were 
developed for an institution which would typically operate 
such policies. 
The objective of this Chapter is to establish a 
framework for evaluating market segmentation policies 
given this institutional structure and set of objectives. 
To this end, Section 3.2 expresses a market segmentation 
strategy in terms of an appropriate economic model. In 
Section 3.3, criteria for evaluating such a strategy are 
thep considered, and an appropriate concept for measuring 
producer returns is discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 
critically reviews the relevant literature on market 
segmentation by agricultural marketing institutions, and 
finally, Section 3.6 outlines how this framework will be 
further developed in following Chapters . 
.:-.-.-:-;.:.:-:-:.;- ~-:~ 
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3. 2 AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF MARKET SEGMENTATION 
3. 2. 1 Market Segmentation and Marketing Management 
In the previous Chapter, the term , market 
segmentation' was used to describe the practice by 
marketing institutions of seeking out and exploiting 
market niches for their product. Indications that such 
institutions were moving towards this type of policy were 
evident in their attempts to diversify markets, and to 
gear promotion activities and product development to 
specific market segments. The change in policy emphasis 
by these institutions reflects the increasing influence of 
the prescriptions of marketing management in agricultural 
marketi ng. 
Watson (1983) att.empts to chart this minor paradigm 
shift in the agricultural marketing literature. He notes 
the recognition by Breimyer (1973) of a 'market 
development' approach to agricultural marketing, where 
attempts are made to apply product development and 
.. 
promotion techniques developed for the industrial sector 
to problems of agricultural marketing. Bateman (1976) in 
his review of agricultural marketing literature, moves a 
stage further by attempting to emphasize the 
appropriateness of the' marketing concept' to agricultural 
marketing by farmer organisations. A more revealing 
example of the growing acceptance of marketing management 
concepts is cited by Watson (1983) when he notes the shift 
in orientation between different editions of a standard 
agricultural marketing text. For example, Kohls and 
Uhl (1980) place less emphasis on agricultural pric 
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analysis and government involvement in agricultural 
marketing, and more emphasis on the changing organisation 
of food markets and market development, than did their 
predecessors, Kohls and Downey (1972). Therefore, the 
managerial prescriptions of the marketing management 
perspective are becoming well-entrenched in both the 
principles and practices of agricultural marketing. 
When the general term' market segmentation' is used in 
the marketing management context, it tends to refer to the 
pract.ices of segmenting a market, targeting specific 
market segments, and positioning product in target 
segments. This product positioning requires developing a 
marketing mix for each target segment where the marketing 
mix is a particular blend of controllable marketing 
variables (Kotler, 1984) . These variables have been 
classified in various ways (Kotler, 1980), but the one 
most popularly used is that attributed to McCarthy (1960). 
He envisaged four variables in the marketing mix, these 
being product, price, place and promotion, commonly 
referred to as the "4 P's". 
Writers concerned with the overlap between the 
economics and marketing management disciplines have noted 
an analogy between the discriminatory pricing model of the 
economics literature and the management principles for 
market segmentation (Watson, 1983; Nagle, 1984). That is, 
the managerial prescriptions for market segmentation can 
be partially embodied into an economic profit-maximization 
model which attempts to optimize marketing mix variables. 
Once a market has been segmented and target segment 
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identified, optimal prices and product levels for each 
target segment (or' place') can be determined by applying 
the standard economic model of price discrimination. 
3.2.2 Price Discrimination Defined 
Price discrimination can be broadly defined as the 
sale (or purchase) of different units of a good or service 
at price differentials not directly corresponding to 
differences in supply cost (Scherer, 19BO; Phlips, 1983). 
Various techniques for doing this were originally 
identified by Cassidy (1946), and these have been extended 
and summarized by Machlup (1975). 
When .examining the theoretical basis for price 
discrimination, however, it has become customary to follow 
the classification of Pigou (1920), and to refer to price 
discrimination by a monopolist as being of a first, second 
or third degree type. Despite the misgivings of some 
writers as to the adequacy of this definition (Enke, 
1964), it is the generally accepted classification, and 
will be followed in this study. 
First-degree, or perfect, price discrimination occurs 
when each unit of a good or service is sold at its 
<i reservation pri ce; that is, the discriminator 
a ppropri at es all cons ume rs' s urpl us as prod uc e rs' s urpl us. 
Second-degree price discrimination is an imperfect variant 
of this. In this case, the demand curve is partitioned 
into a number of blocks, and a particular reservation 
price charged for each block. Therefore, the greater the 
number of blocks, the higher the proportion of consumers' 
--." -,-.- -'~-. -.-- -~--·I 
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surplus which is appropriated by the producer. I n the 
limit, second-degree price discrimination approaches the 
first degree variant as the number of blocks increase, and 
their individual areas decrease. 
Perfect (first-degree) price discrimination implies 
zero transaction costs on the part of the discriminating 
monopolist. However, when such transaction costs are 
positive, some monopolists might efficiently choose not t~ 
engage in perfect price discrimination (de Alessi, 1983). 
Pigou's case of third-degree price discrimination covers 
• 
this more realistic situation. Under these circumstances, 
it is assumed that the seller can divide customers into 
two or more groups, each with its own continuous demand 
function. If a set of appropriate pre-conditions exist, 
then the supplier can charge different prices for the same 
product in different markets. It is 'this classification 
of its market which most appropriately describes the 
situation facing marketing institutions operating in New 
Zealand export markets, and will therefore be investigated 
further. 
For this third-degree price discrimination to be 
successfully practised, the potentially discriminating 
fi.rm must have some monopoly poweri that is, it must face 
a downward-sloping demand curve in aggregate. It must 
also be in a position to segregate customers into market 
segments with differing price elasticities of demand at a 
common price, and an ability to constrain opportunities 
for arbitrage between these market segments. Robinson 
• 
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(1933) and Phli ps (1983) 
greater detail. 
discuss these conditions in 
3.2.3 The Third-Degree Monopolistic Price Discrimination 
Model 
The profit-maximizing condition associated with a 
third-degree price-discriminating monopolist can be 
deriv&d as follows. 
Assume a single-product firm which operates in two 
markets, 1 and 2 . It must therefore decide which output, 
Q, to produce, and how to allocate this output to markets 
1 and 2 in order to maximize profit. Let 
( 3. 1 ) 
be the total revenue function of the firm, where RI is the 
revenue function in the ith market, andQI is the output 
allocated to the ith market. Let 
( 3. 2) c = C( Q) 
where C is the total cost function of the firm, and 
( 3. 3) 
Therefore, the profi t functi on, 'Jr, may be wri tten as 
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( 3. 4) 
Associated with this profit function are the following 
first order partial derivatives 
(3.Sa) = Rt' ( Qt) - C' ( Q) 
6Qt 
and 
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( 3. 5 b) = R2 I ( (2) - C' ( Q) 
6Q2 
The first order conditions for profit-maximization are met 
when (3. Sa) and (3. Sb) are equated to zero. That is, 
( 3. 6a) Rt' ( Qt) = R2' ( (2) = C I ( Q) 
or, in more familiar t.erminology, 
( 3. 6b) MRt = MR2 = MC 
where MR. is the marginal revenue in the ith market and MC 
is the marginal cost. For the appropriate second-order 
profit-maximizing conditions associated with this model, 
see Chiang (1974). 
Therefore, the levels of output (or product) I Qt and 
Q2 I allocated to market segments (or place) 1 and 2 
.... :j respecti vely, are chosen such that the resulting prices, 
Pt and P2, lead to the equating of marginal revenue in 
each market segment with the marginal cost of the total 
profit-maximizing output, Q. 
The comparative statics nature of the above model 
abstracts from the adjustment path of variables to their 
price-discriminating equilibrium values. Despite this, it 
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would be appropriate to use a modified form of the model 
as a basis for examining market segmentation policies by 
agricultural marketing institutions, since the major 
objective of this study is to determine the conditions 
under which such policies are likely to be successful for 
producers, rather than to trace through their dynamic path 
adj ustments. 
However, there are problems associated with an 
unmodified application of this model. The first problem 
arises because the standard theory of price discrimination 
outlined above refers to a profit-maximizing monopolist, 
who optimizes the total output decision. However, it was 
established in Chapter 2 that marketing institutions 
operating in typical New Zealand agricultural exporting 
industries have the power to allocate output to 
alternative destinations, but not the power to control the 
aggregate level of output. 
A second problem is associated with the fact that 'the 
above model refers to the behaviour of a monopolist. 
However, New 
sole suppliers 
Zealand marketing institutions are not the 
in export markets for most of their 
products, and therfore, face the prospect of competitive 
responses to their pricing policies. 
Another problem associated with this model concerns 
the fact that it does not explicitly consider promotion, 
which is the fourth variable in the marketing mix outlined 
above. The ex~ent to which these issues have been 
addressed in the literature will be examined in Section 
3.5 below. 
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3.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA 
In the previous Chapter, a set of long-run objectives 
were determined for a statutory institution operating on 
behalf of producers in an agricultural exporting industry. 
These were to increase producer returns, to stabilize 
producer prices, and to ensure equity among producers. Of 
these objectives, increasing producer returns appears to 
be the most important, and would take precedence over 
other objectives if any conflict arose. Therefore, market 
segmentation policies can be evaluated by determining the 
extent to which they achieve these three objectives. 
The third objective of ensuring equity among producers 
is automatically met by the payment procedures of a 
typical marketing institution, since it allocates output 
to alternative market segments and returns suppliers a 
pooled price, which is the weighted average of returns 
from these markets. The second objective of stabilized 
producer prices can be evaluated under comparative statics 
analysis by comparing producer price variability under 
competitive pricing with that under discriminatory 
pricing. Li kewi se, the first objective of increasing 
producer returns can qe evaluated by comparing the returns 
which producers would have received under a competitive 
product allocation to alternative market segments with 
those accruing under product allocation with discriminatory 
pricing. 
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3. 4 THE CONCEPT OF PRODUCER SURPLUS 
In order to evaluate the relative returns to producers 
under alternative pricing schemes, a measure of such 
returns must be adopted. The most common measure used to 
determine the collective returns to a producer group 
resulting from policies instituted by government or some 
other agency, is producer surplus. This producer surplus 
is given by the area above the industry supply curve and 
below the product price, and is assumed to represent 
economic rent accruing to suppliers after the opportunity 
cost of resources used has been taken into account. 
Therefore, for an inverse industry supply curve 
( 3. 7) P = S( Q) 
where P and Q are product price and output respectively, 
then producer surplus, PS, is given by 
( 3. 8) PS = PQ - IS(QldQ 
However, there is some dissension in the literature as 
to how this measure of producer surplus should be 
interpreted. Such concerns focus on the short-run or 
long-run nature of the product supply curve, and hence on 
the rent concepts implied by the area traditionally 
referred to as i producer surplus'. 
In the short-run, cases can be identified where the 
area above the industry supply curve and below the price 
line can be, in a perfectly competitive industry, 
unambiguously interpreted as a measure of rent. This 
occurs when the output of one factor is fixed, and the 
- - ~-: -.,-J 
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prices of all variable factors are fixed; that is, their 
supplies are perfectly elastic to the industry (Currie, 
et aI, 1971>. In the case where land is the fixed factor, 
then this measure of producer surplus is equivalent to 
Ricardian rent, and where capital is fixed, it is 
equivalent to Marshallian quasi-rent (Mishan, 1982). In 
both cases, surplus accrues to owners of firms in their 
production and sale of the product, but the source of this 
rent is the ownership of a fixed factor of production. 
However, the situation faced with the long-run product 
supply curve is not quite so clear. In the long-run, the 
product supply curve is the locus of minimum average costs 
for each firm in the industry. In this case, no excess 
profits are made, and therefore, the interpretation of 
producer surplus as a rent payment is not so obvious 
(Mishan, 1968). However, these average costs include 
factor payments which are surpluses, and it then becomes 
possible to conclude that the area above the supply curve 
is a meaningful rent measure when the supply curve, in 
addition to being an average cost curve including rents, 
is a marginal cost curve excluding rent (Currie, et al, 
1971> . 
These conditions will be met in two circumstances. 
The first occurs when the long-run supply of land is 
fixed, but other factors are available at constant prices. 
The application of these variable factors to the fixed 
factor, land, leads to diminishing returns and an upward 
sloping supply curve, which may be interpreted as a 
long-run average cost curve including rent to land, but a 
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long-run marginal cost curve excluding rent to land. The 
second situation arises where one necessary factor has 
some inelasticity in supply, while 
elastic with respect to their supply. 
other factors are 
In this case, also, 
the long-run industry supply curve will be an average cost 
curve including rents, and a marginal cost curve excluding 
rents, with these rents amounting to the excess payments 
made for _intramarginal 
(Currie, et aI, 1971). 
units of the inelastic factor 
However, problems of interpretation arise where there 
are two variable inputs, neither of which is elastic with 
respect to supply. In this case, it can be shown that any 
increase in producer surplus is made up of gains to the 
intensive variable factor, less losses to the extensive 
variable factor (Mishan, 1982), and therefore, the supply 
curve cannot be interpreted as a marginal cost curve 
excluding factor rents (Currie, et aI, 1971). Hence, the 
e~onomic significance of the concept is questionable, 
since producer surplus cannot be taken as a gain to either 
factor, nor to both factors taken together. Shepherd 
(1970) disputes this, and argues that the relevant area 
represents excess earnings over the amount necessary to 
keep factors in their present occupation, and therefore, 
provides an accurate measure of a Paretian rent concept, 
where the product supply curve represents a marginal cost 
curve excluding rent. 
question of whether 
However, he does not address the 
this aggregate producer rent 
represents a net calculation of the sum of factor losses 
and gains, and leaves unchallenged the notion that an 
- - - ;.--.>~-:»:~ 
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aggregate measure such as this is a meaningless concept 
with respect to returns to factor classes. 
In summary, therefore, the concept of producer surplus 
provides a meaningful measure of returns to producers in a 
perfectly competitive industry in both the short and 
long-run, when one factor is in fixed or relatively 
inelastic supply to the industry, while the provision of 
other factors is elastic. In this study, it is assumed 
that the factor land is in relatively inelastic supply, 
and that the price of labour and capital is fixed over any 
increased output range induced by the introduction of 
market segmentation policies. Such assumptions appear 
reasonable, and are obviously implicit in the wide range of 
agricultural stUdies which utili2e the producer surplus 
concept for policy evaluation. 
3. 5 
3. 5. 1 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
In Section 3.3, the basic model of third-degree 
monopolistic price discrimination was described. However, 
a number of problems were identified with respect to an 
unmodified application of this model to an examination of 
market segmentation strategies by agricultural marketing 
i nsti tuti ons. 
Firstly, marketing agencies operating in typical New 
Zealand agricultural exporting industries do not have the 
power to control output. Therefore, when a marketing 
institution practises price discrimination by diverting 
:,',',:'.,'.- ":',-:j 
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output between market segments, and returns a pooled price 
to suppliers, then some sort of supply response can be 
expected, since this pooled price will be greater than the 
price received under a competitive allocation of product 
between market segments. 
Secondly, New Zealand marketing institutions are not 
the sole suppliers of their products in most export 
markets. Therefore, their pricing policies will generate 
a competitive response from alternative suppliers which 
must be taken into account when formulating these 
policies. 
The third problem arises from the fact that this 
simple discriminatory pricing model does not consider 
promotion as an explicit variable. Conceptually, two 
promotion effects could occur which would influence 
optimal segmentation policies. Firstly, product demand 
could be increased in particular market segments, and 
secondly, a New Zealand product could be differentiated 
from that of a competitor. 
The extent to which these three issues have been 
incorporated into models of price discrimination in the 
agricultural economics literature will now be reviewed. 
3.5.2 Own Supply Response to Discriminatory Pricing 
A number of authors have recognized that a supply 
response will occur when a marketing institution price 
discriminates between market segments and returns a pooled 
price to its suppliers. For example, in his study of 
supply diversion strategies by New Zealand's Apple and 
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Pear Marketing Board, Rae (1978) noted that, t.hrough 
discriminatory pricing, producers who supply the Board 
will be encouraged to expand production. Similarly, in 
her study of price-discriminating activity by the New 
Zealand Dairy Board between the butter and cheese segments 
of the United Kingdom market, Veeman (1972) cautions that 
the Board's activities will be constrained by the fact 
that it has no control over entry into the industry by 
s.uppli ers, nor over the volume of milk produced. 
Likewise, in his study of controlled allocation schemes 
for the United States apple crop, Piggott (1976) pointed 
out that increasing the net revenue for each year's apple 
crop may have the long-run effect of attracting resources 
into the industry. Howe ver, although these authors 
recognized that such a response could occur, they did not 
include it in their studies. 
A further group of studies, however, do incorporate a 
supply response i.nto their analyses. Freebairn and Gruen 
(1977) considered Australian beef export diversification 
schemes where non-uniform prices were charged across 
different markets, and a supply response was included. 
Reeves and Longmire (1982) did likewise when analyzing 
voluntary restraint in one of their export markets. 
Similarly, Banks and Mauldon (1966), in their analysis of 
the two-price scheme in the West Australian egg market, 
incorporated the response which results from returning 
suppliers an equalized price. Baritelle and Price (1974) 
also included a supply response in their analysis of price 
discrimination in the Washington state apple industry. 
112 
The manner in which this supply response has been 
incorporated into a price discrimination framework tends 
to vary between studies. For example, Baritelle and Price 
(1974) estimated a supply response function and demand 
functions for the alternative fresh and process markets. 
Given price-discriminating behaviour, simulations were 
then run for a time horizon of ten years, and the results 
noted. 
However, other authors have adopted a more analytical 
approach, utilizing combinations of graphical, geometric 
and algebraic techniques to derive results. Banks and 
Mauldon (1966) graphically illustrate their two-price 
scheme which they then translate into an algebraic model, 
thereby allowing them to make estimates of the effects of 
a price discrimination policy. However, since their model 
only includes two markets, one of which has specialized 
,,--- ~-. - -
demand conditions, it is of limited applicability to the 
more generalized problem of price discrimination among a 
number of export markets. 
Gardner (1983) makes the observation that price 
discrimination increases the farm price received for any 
given quantity of produce marketed, and therefore, has the 
same effect as a rightward shift in demand. This effect 
has been noted in other studies. For example, although 
Reeves and Longmire (1982) are not considering an optimal 
price-discriminating situation to the extent that they 
exercise voluntary restraint in one export market, while 
allocating the excess output to alternative export 
markets, they graphically illustrate the effective 
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rightward shift in demand resulting from this policy. 
They show a new price-quantity or 'demand' relationship 
which lies above a linear aggregate excess demand curve, 
and which asymptotically approaches this latter curve in 
the limit. Sieper (1982), in his illustration of price 
discrimination between two export markets facing 
downward-sloping linear demands, shows an average 
(price-discriminating) export revenue curve which appears 
to have similar properties. Therefore, it would be 
desirable to develop a model which would allow the 
characteristics of this price-discriminating average 
revenue curve and its relationship to the 
non-discriminating aggregate export demand curve to be 
investigated. 
In addition to noting that a supply response will 
occur under these conditions, some authors have commented 
on the effect of such a response on resource use and on 
producer returns. Concern has been expressed that such 
policies induce sub-optimal resource use. For e xampl e, 
Banks and Mauldon (1966) note that if producers received 
only the export price for their marginal production, a 
smaller number of eggs would have been produced. They 
therefore concluded that waste results from failing to 
restrict production to an output level where the cost of 
additional supply is equal to the export price. In their 
analysis of export diversification, Freebairn and Gruen 
(1977) reach a similar conclusion, commenting that 
production expansion effects are not likely to be 
beneficial in the sense that more resources would be drawn 
:--.• :_','. :.0_-.::; 
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from relatively low cost industries than from highly 
protected ones. The New Zealand Treasury (1984) has 
recently echoed this view, noting that problems are caused 
when the averaging of prices paid to producers calls forth 
production which costs more to achieve than it earns in 
the lowest paying' residual' markets. 
This supply response will also affect producer 
returns. Baritelle and Price (1974) expressed concern 
that initially higher returns would increase supplies, 
which would then reduce returns to their original level. 
e 
However, the results of their simulations suggested that 
the returns to growers were much higher under a 
price-discriminating policy than under a 
non-discriminating one, despite the fact that a 
substantial supply response had occurred. Weisenborn 
(1969) in his study of the allocation of Florida orange 
production also noted that when supply exceeded his 
estimated optimum, some form of abandonment or internal 
supply control would be necessary, thereby implying that a 
supply response could decrease producer returns. 
other researchers have tried to identify factors which 
influence the magnitude of producer returns under price 
discrimination. Gardner (1983) notes that as long as some 
farmer-owned production inputs are not perfectly elastic 
in supply, then producer surplus will increase under price 
discrimination without supply control. Reeves and 
Longmire (1982) concluded that export control schemes 
stimulate production, thereby leading to increased 
supplies in uncontrolled markets, which lowers the average 
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price. They noted that the extent to which exports in 
uncontrolled markets increase, and to which prices 
decrease, depends on the elasticities of export demand and 
export supply. Although Reeves and Longmire (1982) 
analY2e a voluntary restraint agreement rather than a 
price-discriminating situation, such agreements have 
discri.minatory elements, and their effects are therefore 
of relevance. 
I n summary, therefore, the issue of an own supply 
reaponse to discriminatory pricing is well recognised in 
the literature. Some studies have included it in their 
analyses, although these have tended to be rather 
speci ali 2ed, 
application. 
and consequently, are limited in their 
It appears that discriminatory pricing 
effectively leads to a rightward shift in aggregate 
demand; although factors influencing the extent of such a 
shift do not appear to have been investigated. The 
magnitude of the supply response, and its effect on 
producer returns, appears to be influenced by the price 
elasticity of supply and the price elasticity of export 
demand. 
3.5.3 Competitive Supply 
Pricing 
Response to Discriminatory 
The possibility that discriminatory pricing policies 
may generate a competitive response from alternative 
suppliers has concerned researchers investigating such 
policies. Rae (1978) notes that discriminatory pricing by 
the New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board will 
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encourage direct sales suppliers to expand production in 
response to increased domestic prices. 
Other authors have cautioned that' optimal' allocation 
policies are constrained by potential competition. For 
example, Banks and Mauldoon (1966) point out that domestic 
egg prices cannot be set at a higher level than the price 
which will induce eggs on to the local market from 
alternative supply sources. Edwards (1970), in his 
determination of an optimal allocation of New Zealand lamb 
exports between the UK and USA, noted that his results 
would be invalidated by reactions from other suppliers to 
these markets. Similarly, Weisenborn (1969) noted that 
the increased sales of fresh Florida oranges suggested by 
his model seemed unreasonable, given the competitive 
relationships existing between orange-producing States. 
Freebairn and Gruen (1977) go further than these authors, 
and suggest 
degree of 
that it may be 
co-operation with 
necessary to reach a high 
alternative exporting 
countries to counter this problem of a competitive supply 
response. 
Some authors who have recognised that marketing 
institutions may not be monopolists in their export 
markets have attempted to account for this in their 
analyses. Edwards (1970) and Veeman (1972) both discount 
the price elasticity of demand facing such an institution 
in a particular market by the market share which they hold 
in that market. This effectively means that such agencies 
face more price elastic demands for their product than 
suggested by the market elasticity. 
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However, as Edwards (1970) notes, while the above 
formulation acknowledges the presence of competitors, it 
assumes that these competitors will not react. Abel 
(1966), in a general study of price discrimination in 
world trade for agricultural products, commented on demand 
elasticities faced by exporters in importing countries. 
He noted that the price responsiveness of this import 
demand relationship depends on the price responsiveness of 
both demand and supply in these importing countries. 
However, he did not indicate how these demand elasticities 
facing exporters were altered by these factors. 
To summarize, a competitive supply response has been 
acknowledged by writers concerned with discriminatory 
pricing policies. It appears that the presence of 
competitors, and their price responses, influence the 
price elasticity of demand faced by exporters. Therefore, 
factors such as market share and competitors' price 
elasticities of demand and supply influence the magnitude 
of the competitive supply response. However, these 
features do not appear to have been explicitly modelled in 
the context of discriminatory pricing. 
., 
3.5.4 Promotion Effects 
The standard economic model of third-degree price 
discrimination does not explicitly consider promotion, 
which is the fourth variable in the marketing mix. That 
is, the model does not optimize the promotion decision. 
However, the general theory of optimal advertising has 
attracted a great deal of attention in the economics and 
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marketing literature. Schmalensee (1972), Lambi n (1976) 
and Koutsoyiannis (1982) review such research. Some of 
these reported studies include marketing mix optimization 
models, where a promotion variable has been incorporated 
(Claycamp and Massy, 1968; Lambin, 1976). 
However, despite this plethora of optimal promotion 
Ii terature, much of it, including the optimal marketing 
mix variants, is not directly applicable to agricultural 
industries. The reason for this is that such literature 
tends to concentrate on market structures with 
monopolistic or oligopolistic supply features, where 
optimal output decisions are determined in conjunction 
with optimal pricing and advertising decisions. Such 
market structures do not characterize the supply-side of 
agricultural markets, and therefore, an unmodified 
application of the above models to the agricultural 
situation is not possible. 
Despite this abundance of research dealing with 
imperfect market structures, the theory of optimal 
advertising in agricultural markets has been relatively 
neglected (Strak, 1983). Research which has been reported 
in the agricultural economics literature tends to focus on 
the Dorfman-Steiner theorem of optimal advertising and its 
extensions. Dorfman and Steiner (1954) optimized the 
advertising and product-price decisions for a monopolist 
operating in one market. This theory has been extended in 
its static form to include the advertising behaviour of a 
>.:"':':>-:':::-::! 
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1977), and to incorporate oligopolistic market structures 
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(strak and Gi 11, 1983) and market structures with 
competitive supply conditions (Ner'love and Waugh, 1961). 
The de Boer' (1977) study was specifically concer'ned 
with two-pr'ice schemes. By utilizing optimal 
discr'iminatory pr'icing conditions and the DOr'fman-Steiner' 
theorem of optimal advertising intensity, he was able to 
deduce r'elative optimal adver'tising intensities in both 
markets for a profit-maximizing, price-discr'iminating 
monopoli st. However', as he noted, his conclusions imply 
that industries have a significant degr'ee of. supply 
control. 
Nerlove and Waugh (1961) included a competitive supply 
r'esponse to promotion in their' study. They der'ived an 
optimal advertising decision r'ule for' institutions which 
sought to maximize pr'oducer' returns, and which were 
operating in industries without supply contr'ol, and 
therefor'e, the product-price decision was not optimized. 
Although the Ner'love-Waugh model has been criticized 
because of its simplistic single product, single market 
assumptions (Tisdell, 1976; Strak and Gill, 1983), it was 
a significant advance for' the literature on 
advertising in agricultural industr'ies, because it 
incor'porated the appropriate supply-side featur'es . 
. - --,-.:-« 
Attempts have been made to r'elax the r'estrictive 
assumptions noted above which ar'e implicit in the 
Nerlove-Waugh theor'em. For e xampl e, Thomps on and Ei 1 e r' 
(1977) extended the theorem to a managed domestic market 
of two sectors. However, only one of these market 
segments was subject to advertising. Other' authors 
120 
directly considered the allocation of advertising to 
multiple markets or products (McClelland et aI, 1971 j 
Tisdell, 1976), where consumer sales rather than producer 
returns were maximized, subject to a fixed advertising 
budget. 
However, although these latter studies relax the 
Nerlove-Waugh product and market assumptions, in order to 
do so, they introduce an alternative set of restrictive 
assumptions. For example, in both cases, price is 
implicitly assumed to be fixed and supply to be elastic. 
In addition, advertising levels are not necessarily 
optimal, but are merely allocated in an optimal manner. 
Therefore, despite their extension to a multiple market 
segment situation, the prescriptions of such research are 
not applicable to the present study, since they abstract 
from the product-price response to promotion activity. 
The literature indicates that the problem 
of how to determine the optimal level of advertising in 
multiple markets in which prices are linked either 
competitively or through discriminatory pricing, has not 
been adequately investigated, particularly where supply 
is uncontrolled. Consequently, there appears to be scope 
for investigating thi s issue further by deriving 
appropriate decision rules for promotion activity in 
multiple market segments for discriminatory pricing and 
for the benchmark competitive pricing where supply is 
uncontrolled in both cases. 
While such decision rules yield valuable information 
on the optimal direction of promotion effort, they would 
- -: ,~, -.:- --
:---:-~ .. -;.: ~-: . :.;.j 
1 21 
not, however, give any indication of the relative 
magnitude of producer gains from promotion activity in 
alternative market segments. Therefore, there would 
appear to be further scope for investigating the influence 
of advertising on producer returns. 
Conceptually, two promotion effects can be identified. 
The first increases product demand at all prices in 
particular market segments while the second differentiates 
product from that of a competitor in a particular market 
segment. 
effec ts, 
The distinction between these two promotion 
and their intermediate variants have been 
investigated by Schultz and Wittink (1976) and May (1977). 
Although the first effect is well recognized in the 
literature as a specific type of generic advertising 
effect, there does not appear to be a great deal of 
comment on how such advertising in individual market 
segments influences producer returns. 
With respect to the second effect, when a product can 
be differentiated from that of a competitor through 
advertising, demand for this product becomes less elastic 
than it would otherwi se be (de Boer, 1977; May, 1977). 
This is seen to be desirable in terms of producer returns, 
since it allows a firm or institution with the ability to 
manipUlate demand to extract greater monopoly rent from 
consumers than would have been possible otherwise (Parish, 
1963) . However, it has been noted that where price 
stability is a prime objective, then farmers may benefit 
from promotion which makes demand more price elastic, 
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since this will reduce price instability resulting from 
output variations (Waugh, 1959). 
There appear to be no studies reported in the 
agricultural economics literature which examine the gains 
to producers from differentiating demand from that of 
competitors, where pricing is discriminatory. However, 
when attempting to derive the export demand for a product 
facing New Zealand in a particular market, Vee ma n (1 972) 
and Edwards (1970) note that discounting the market price 
elasticity of demand by market share assumes that New 
realand's product and that of its competitors are perfect 
substi tutes. Product differentiation would, therefore, 
make this export demand less elastic. 
decrease any competitive supply response, 
~urther influence this demand elasticity. 
It would also 
which would 
Abel (1966) 
notes that trade barriers in their various forms have a 
similar effect to product differentiation in reducing 
export demand elasticities. 
In summary, there appears to have been very little 
research in the agricultural economics literature on 
theoretical aspects of increasing demand in particular 
market segments through promotion, or of differentiating 
demand from that of competitors. There seems to be scope 
for investigating optimal product promotion in multiple 
markets under appropriate supply conditions, and for 
determining factors which influence the magnitude of 
returns to producers from promotion which increases demand 
in alternative market segments. With respect to the 
promotion effect which differentiates a product from that 
.... 
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of a competitor and thereby alters the export demand 
elasticity facing a marketing agency for its product, it 
would appear to be useful to identify the conditions 
under which such a strategy would be successful, given 
discriminatory pricing. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter, the economic model of third-degree 
price discrimination was investigated as an appropriate 
framework for evaluating market segmentation policies by 
agricultural marketing agencies with those institutional 
features outlined in the previous Chapter. 
An own supply response to discriminatory pricing has 
been recognized in the literature, although it has not 
been analytically modelled for multiple export markets. 
Similarly, although a competitive supply response has been 
acknowledged, it has not been incorporated into 
discriminatory pricing models in any comprehensive sense. 
Although both of these issues have been dealt with at 
varying levels of sophistication by a number of authors, 
there appear to be no studies which simultaneously include 
both types of supply response to discriminatory pricing 
by marketing agencies. Consequently, a model will be 
developed in Chapter 4 which incorporates these features. 
The theory of optimal promotion in multiple market 
segments without supply control has not been adequately 
investigated in the literature under either competitive or 
discriminatory pricing. Therefore, there is' little 
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indication as to which market segments relati ve 
advertising effort should be directed under these 
alternative pricing regimes. In addition, there appears 
to have been little research on factors which influence 
the actual magnitude of producer returns when promotion of 
either a demand-shifting 01" product-differentiating nature 
in undertaken. Therefore, Chapter 5 considers such 
promotional issues. 
"',-." 
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CHAPTER 4 
A THEORETICAL MODEL OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
WITHOUT SUPPLY CONTROL 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
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With the exception of promotion, the marketing mix 
components of any market segmentation policy are 
in the standard economic model of encapsulated 
third-degree price discrimination. However, it was 
established in the previous Chapter that this model, in an 
unmodified form, does not consider an own supply response 
to discriminatory pricing, nor does it include any 
competitive supply response which might result from such a 
pricing policy. 
Therefore, the objective of this Chapter is to develop 
a general model of gains from price discrimination which 
incorporates these features. Such a model can then be 
used to evaluate whether market segmentation policies 
assist in achieving the primary objectives of agricultural 
marketing institutions, these being to increase producer 
returns and reduce price variability. 
Consequently, in Section 4.2, a basic competitive 
pricing model is developed, against which a discriminatory 
pricing model can then be evaluated. Section 4. 3 
establishes the condition which maximizes returns from 
price discrimination in multiple markets without supply 
126 
control. In Section 4.4, a general algebraic price 
discrimination model which incorporates this maximizing 
condition and which calculates immediate revenue returns 
to producers is developed. Section 4.5 then considers an 
own supply response to discriminatory pricing, while 
Section 4.6 includes the corresponding competitive supply 
response. In Section 4.7, the increased returns to 
producers from adopting a discriminatory pFicing policy 
are calculated, and finally, 
important features of the model. 
e 
Section 4.8 summarizes 
4.2 A COMPETITIVE PRICING HODEL WITH MULTIPLE MARKET 
SEGMENTS 
Since this model is concerned with the relationship 
between output (product)' and price in different market 
segments (place), let ceteris paribus conditions apply and 
allow the demand function in the ith market segment to be 
characterized by its inverse (price-dependent) form 
( 4. 1a) Pi = f(Qil 
where Pi and Qi are price and quantity, res pec t i vel y, 
in market segment i. 
To allow numerical examples or the model to be 
investigated, it is necessary to specify the functional 
form of this relationship. A linear function has been 
chosen for two reasons. 
Firstly, when linear demand functions in individual 
market segments are summed, the result is a linear demand 
relationship in aggregate. A linear aggregate demand 
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curve such as this has been used by Reeves and Longmire 
(1982) and Sieper (1982) when considering models with 
discriminatory pricing elements. In both cases, their 
graphical illustrations imply a new average revenue curve 
after price discrimination which has specific functional 
properti es. If linear aggregate demand properties are 
preserved in this model, then comparison with the above 
-studies becomes one method of validating the model. A 
second reason for choosing linear demand functions is that 
this eases the burden of algebraic manipulation which 
would arise if more complex functional forms were adopted. 
This reduces potential sources of algebraic error and 
retains clarity in the model. 
If it is intended to apply the model predictions to 
markets known to be characterized by non-linear demand 
relationships in market segments, then the model results 
0" 0"_-_.-.-: _ ~._._ 
will remain valid as long as changes in outputs and prices 
induced by applying discriminatory pricing to previously 
competitive markets are incremental. That is, only small 
changes from initial equilibrium values are involved. 
However, the use of linear relationships, and the above 
caveat on their use, are commonplace in agricultural 
stUdies (Wallace, 1962; Piggott, 1981>. 
.. , 
Therefore, allow demand Irj-the i th market segment to be 
more specifically represented by 
(4.1b) 
where Pi and Qt are price and quantity, respecti vely, 
in market segment i. 
,._", -'.',-.~.>:.:- .. ' 
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As a result, the aggregate inverse demand curve becomes 
( 4. 2) P. = a. - b.Q. 
where P. 
Q. 
a. = 
and b. = 
is the 
is the 
m at 
:E 
i =1 bt 
m 1 
:E 
i = 1 bt 
1 
m 1 
:E 
i = 1 b t 
competitive price 
total quantity demanded 
The derivations of a. and b. are shown in Appendix 1, as 
are all other proofs to equations presented in this 
Chapter. 
All market segments may not be functional at all 
ti meso That is, some market segments may have no output 
demanded in them at certain prices. For e xampl e, for a 
given level of equilibrium output, Qo, the corresponding 
competitive price, Po, can be determined from equation 
( 4. 2) . If n potential market segments are ranked such 
that at > a2 > ----- > at > ---- > an, then if at > Po, 
i markets will remain functioning unde~ the competitive 
price, Po. Let m denote the number of market segments 
which are functional at competitive equilibrium in the 
aggregate market. Therefore, equation (4.2) represents 
the segment of the linear aggregate demand curve for the m 
functional markets. 
--- :--::-:-:-:::-:--j 
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The supply side of the model can be similarly 
characterized in a linear inverse form by 
( 4. 3) PI = C + d QI j d > 0, c < a. 
Competitive equilibrium is then determined when 
( 4. 4) P. = PI 
At this point, the equilibrium price, Po, and output, Qo, 
are therefore given by 
(4.5a) Po = a. - b.[~J 
b.+d 
and 
a.-c 
(4.5b) Qo = 
b.+d 
Output sold in the ith market segment, Q i 0 , is 
determined by allowing Pi = Po in equation (4.1b), and 
then solving for the output level, QiO. The share of 
total output sold to market segment i 
Qt 0 
pricing, SiO, is then given by --
Qo 
output, Qo, is allocated to functional 
m 
That is, 1: QiO = Qo. 
i = 1 
under competitive 
Consequently, all 
market segments, 
By restating equation (3.8) in Chapter 3 in a more 
specific form, producer surplus under competitive pricing, 
PS c , is given by 
( 4. 6) 
Qo 
PS, = Po Qo - J (c + dQ) dQ 
x 
where x = 0 if c ~ 0 
c 
x = if c < 0 
d 
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This basic competitive pricing model with multiple 
markets segments may now be used as a benchmark to 
evaluate the discriminatory pricing model which will be 
constructed in later Sections. 
4.3 MAXIMIZATION OF RETURNS UNDER PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
WITHOUT SUPPLY CONTROL 
First-order profit maximization for a third-degree 
price-discriminating monopolist occurs when marginal 
revenues in individual markets are equal to each other and 
to the marginal cost of production. In general, 
( 4. 7) MRl = MR2 = --- = MRI = --- = MRn = MC 
where MRI is marginal revenue in the ith market 
and MC is marginal cost of production. 
However, as noted in Chapter 3, agricultural marketing 
in~titutions typica11y have the power to allocate output 
to alternative destinations, but not the power to control 
the aggregate level of output. That is, the 
output decision may not necessarily be optimal, 
aggregate 
but will 
be determined by suppliers in response to the price which 
they recei ve. Therefore, given this situation, it is 
necessary to determine the condition which maximizes 
returns to producers. 
A general measure of returns to producers, producer 
surplus, is given by the area under the price line and 
above the supply curve. For any given level of output, Q, 
this area is measured by total revenue, PQ, less the 
opportunity cost of resources used to produce this output. 
Therefore, given that this output, Q, has been produced, 
-. <-:..---'----:·:-:1 
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and an opportunity cost of resources incurred, producer 
surplus will be maximized when PQ, or total revenue, is 
maximized. 
If it is assumed that there are no costs associated 
with reallocating output among market segments, then a 
constrained maximization problem can be formulated as 
follows: 
m 
Maximize TR = t PtQI 
i = 1 
m 
subject to the constraint t Qt = Q 
i = 1 
where TR is total revenue 
Q is given output 
and PI and Ql are price and output, respecti vely, 
in market segment i. 
This problem can now be solved using the method of the 
Lagrange multiplier, and the producer surplus m~ximizing 
price and output levels determined. 
To facilitate this, a two market segment case will be 
considered. By substituting equation (4. 1b) into the 
maximization problem above, the Lagrangian function 
becomes 
( 4. 8) 
The first order conditions associated with this now 
unconstrained objective function are 
6Z 
( 4. ga) = at - 2b t Ql - A = a 
6Ql 
6Z 
( 4. 9b) = a2 - 2b2 Q2 - A = a 
6Q2 
• .' - ~. I 
( 4. ge) 
6Z 
6 A 
= Q - Qt 
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= 0 
By rearranging, this set of simUltaneous equations can 
be transfo~med to mat~ix notation as follows. 
2bt 0 1 
(4.10) o 2b2 1 = 
1 1 0 Q 
This can be solved for the vector {Qt 
Cramer's Rule. 
Q2 A } by applying 
This yields the Lagrange multiplie~. 
(4.11> A = a. - 2b.Q 
Substituting equation (4.11> back into equations (4. 9a) 
and (4. 9b) and rear~angi ng, gi ves 
( 4.12) at - 2bt Qt = a2 - 2b2 Q2 = a .. - 2b .. Q 
Now recall equation (4. 1b) 
(4.1b) 
Total revenue in this market segment, TRI, i s cal cuI a·t e d 
by multiplying this equation by output allocated to the 
market segment, Ql. The corresponding marginal revenue, 
MR1, is then derived by differentiating TRI with ~espect 
to QI. 
(4.13a) 
This gives 
MR 1 = a I - 2 b I Q i 
By similarly manipulating equation (4.2), marginal ~evenue 
in the aggregate market, MR., is given by 
(4.13b) MR. = a.. - 2b. Q. 
Therefore, equation (4.12) above is equivalent to 
(4.14a) MRt = MR2 = MR. 
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This can be generalized to 
(4.14b) MRt = MR2 = ---- = MRi = ----- = MR. 
where MRi is marginal 
segment 
revenue in the ith market 
and MR. is marginal revenue in the aggregate market 
Hence, this condition indicates that, if producer 
surplus is to be maximized, then any output produced must 
be allocated such that marginal revenues in each market 
segment are equa.ted to each other and to aggregate 
marginal revenue. Thi s is similar to the profit 
maximizing condition for a price-discriminating monopolist 
shown in equation (4.7) to the extent that marginal 
revenues in individual market segments are equated. 
However, the condition that they are, in turn, equated 
to marginal cost is not preserved. The functional form 
used in this model also allows the marginal revenues in 
individual market segments to be linked to marginal 
revenue in the aggregate market. As will be shown·in 
later Sections, this model feature has a great deal of 
analytical value. 
This Section has established the condition which 
maximizes returns from price discrimination in multiple 
markets without supply control. In the next Section, a 
general algebraic model of price discrimination will be 
developed which incorporates this maximizing condition and 
which calculates revenue gains from the pricing policy. 
:;1 
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4. 4 
4. 4. 1 
A GENERALIZED MODEL OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
Optimal Quantities and Prices in Market Segments 
The competitive pricing model with multiple market 
segments outlined in Section 4.2 will now be modified to 
incorporate discriminatory pricing. The optimal 
allocation of a given level of output to market segments 
is calculated, and the corresponding optimal prices in 
these segments are derived. 
It was established in equation (4.12) above that 
producer surplus will be maximized when output produced is 
allocated such that marginal revenues in each market 
segment are equated to each other and to aggregate 
marginal revenue. 
Rec.alling (4. 13a), marginal revenue in the ith market 
segment, MR1, was gi ven by 
(4.13a) 
Similarly, 
gi ven by 
marginal revenue in the aggregate market was 
( 4. 13b) MR. = a. - 2b. Q .. 
Now, by equating (4.13a) and (4.13b), and rearranging 
terms, the optimal price-discriminating quantity in the 
i th market segment, Qt d, becomes 
2b •. Q. + at - a. 
(4.15) Qid = 
2b t 
where Q. is the given output to be allocated among 
market segments 
It is of interest to note that, in the two market 
segment case, optimal price-discriminating output 
allocations to market segments 1 and 2, would have been 
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determined when solving equation (4.10) for the vector {QI 
Q2 A} in the previous Section. However, both of these 
resulting outputs, QI and Q2, were expressed in terms of 
the slopes and intercepts of each of the two markets. 
Therefore, they do not have the generality of equation 
(4.15) where output in a particular market segment, Q, d, 
is expressed in terms of slopes and intercepts in that 
market segment and the aggregate market. This more 
general formula means that optimal output can be easily 
calculated where more than two market segments exist. 
Consequently, the alternative formulations are not 
presented. 
The optimal price in market segment i, Pi d , can be 
determined by substituting ( 4. 1 5) into (4.1b) and 
rearranging terms. This gives 
( 4. 16) Ptd = ~(a, + a .. ) - b .. Q .. 
where Q .. is the given output to be allocated among 
market segments 
It was noted in the previous Chapter that some authors 
were attempting to relate returns from pricing with 
discriminatory elements to the magnitude of price 
elasticities of demand and supply (Reeves and Longmire, 
1982; Gardner, 1983; Abel, 1966). Therefore, equations 
(4.15) and (4.16), and subsequent model equations, will be 
transformed to include these variables. Such a technique 
has previously been used by Piggott (1981). 
Because demand equations in the model are linear, the 
slopes, b i , and the intercepts, a" can be transformed 
using the following equations. 
..... -':_,. 
(4.17a) 
(4.17b) 
a 1 = Pol [1 + 1 ] 
nl 
Pol 
b 1 = 
where Pol is the competitive price before 
discrimination 
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QI is the output allocated to market segment i 
before discrimination 
and nl is the price elasticity of demand (absolute 
value) at (Pol, Qt> 
Similarly, in the aggregate market, 
(4.17c) 
and 
Pol 
(4.17d) boa = 
Q.. n .. 
where Pol is the competitive price before 
discrimination 
Q .. is the given output 
and n .. is the price elasticity of demand (absolute 
value) in the aggregate market at (Pol, Q .. ) 
Therefore, using these transformations, the optimal 
price-discriminating share of output in each market 
segment, Sid, and the corresponding optimal price, PI d , 
can be expressed as follows. 
(4.18) Sid = ~ S 1 [~ + 1 ] 
n .. 
where SI is the share of given output in the ith 
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market segment at the competitive price, P a , 
before discrimination 
and other variables are as defined for (4.17) 
and 
(4.19) P i d = P.. + ~ p" [~ - _1_] 
ni n .. 
where variables are as defined for (4.17) 
Therefore, for a given output, Qa, a corresponding 
competitive price, P .. , the share of output allocated to 
individual market segments before discrimination, Si, and 
the price elasticities of demand at the competitive 
pricing solution, ni and n .. , it is possible to obtain a 
direct estimate of optimal discriminatory prices, Pi d, and 
optimal market segment shares, for any number of 
market segments. This generality of the model allows the 
economics of price discrimination across a large number of 
market segments to be investigated with computational 
ease. The analytical nature of the model also avoids the 
iterative techniques associated with satisfying the 
equality of marginal revenue condition, which are normally 
used in alternative simulation procedures (Edwards, 1970), 
and which can impose quite a computational burden as the 
number of markets increase. 
4.4.2 Revenue Gains from Price Discrimination 
If a marketing institution which allocates output to 
alternative market segments according to competitive 
pricing principles subsequently price discriminates 
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between these market segments t it in effect t 
increasing the average revenue per unit of output sold. 
In essence t the demand curve has been moved to the right t 
an effect which has been previously noted (Reeves and 
Longmire t 1982; Sieper t 1982; Gardner t 1983). 
This effect can be incorporated into the model as 
follows. From equation (4.2) t the average revenue for a 
particular level of output, Qa, under competitive pricingt 
is given by Pa • after price discrimination, 
average revenue, Pa d, for the same level of output, Q. t is 
• 
given by 
( 4. 20a) P. d = 
where Pi d is the optimal price a·ft er price 
discrimination in market segment i 
and Qld is the optimal output allocated to market 
segment i after price discrimination 
Al ternati velYt 
m 
( 4. 20b) Pad = E Pld Sid 
i = 1 
where Si d is the optimal proportion of output 
allocated to market segment i after price 
discrimination 
and other variables are as previously defined. 
Now, for each level of output, Qa, a level of average 
revenue after price di scri mi na ti on, can be 
identified, and this relationship can be mathematically 
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defined as follows. By substituting equations (4.15) and 
(4.16) into (4. 20a), and manipulating, equation (4.21> 
emerges. 
k 
( 4.21> P.d = a. - b.Q. + 
Q. 
where k = ~ [ 
i =1 
> 0 
Now after price discrimination, the number of market 
segments which remain functional may differ from that 
• under competitive pricing. Recall from Section 4. 2 that 
possible market segments may be ranked such that 
> > a •. If al > MR. after 
discriminatory pricing, then i market segments will remain 
functional. Si.nce the corresponding condition under 
competitive pricing was al > Po for i markets to reamin 
functional, it follows that, in some cases, the number of 
functional market segments under price discrimination Will 
be greater than under competitive pricing. That is, more 
elastic market segments, which could be ignored under 
competitive pricing, may be exploited under discriminatory 
pricing. However, rather than introduce a further 
complexity into the model, it will be assumed that, both 
before and after price discrimination, there are m 
functional markets. 
The discriminatory pricing model developed above will 
now be graphically illustrated in Figure 4.1. Recall 
( 4. 2) P. = a. - b. Q. 
This equation is represented by D, and equation (4.21) by 
-'~':.~'. -~.; ... ;.;::·:.I 
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D' . Let Q. represent a fixed level of output which has 
been produced. A non-discriminating marketing institution 
will be able to sell this output at the corresponding 
competitive price, P., thereby receiving total revenue of 
P.Q •.. On the other hand, a price-discriminating marketing 
institution will be able to receive a weighted aggregate 
price, P. d, for the same aggregate output, Q., whi ch wi 11 
return a total revenue of P.dQ •. 
Therefore, for a gi ven . out put, Q., a marketing 
institution can increse total revenue from price 
discrimination between market segments by the area 
(P.d-P.)Q. shown in Figure 4.1. 
This graphical illustration can be related to the 
algebraic model developed. ( P. d represents the 
difference between equations (4.21) and (4.2), which is 
k 
This represents the revenue gain from price 
Q. 
discrimination per unit of output. Therefore, the total 
revenue increase from price discrimination, (P.d - P.)Q., 
k 
is equivalent to Q. = k. Hence, total revenue gains 
fro m p ric e dis c r i mi nat ion, k, are con s tan t , and are not 
dependent on the level of output for this aglebraic model 
with its linear demand characteristics. 
Recall from the previous Chapter that under similar 
demand conditions, both Reeves and Longmi re (1982) and 
Sieper (1982) graphically illustrated a rightward shift in 
demand resulting from policies with discriminatory pricing 
elements. Both studies show an average revenue-quantity 
relationship after price discrimination which lies to the 
1 41 
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right of an original linear demand curve, and which 
approaches this curve asymptotically as output increases. 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the effective aggregate 
, demand' curve after price discrimination in this model 
has these properties, and the mathematical relationship 
between the two demand curves is described precisely by 
equations (4.2) and (4.21). 
The total revenue gains, k, identified above, can be 
transformed to incorporate elasticities by utilizing 
equations (4.17a) to (4.17d). The expression for k then 
becomes 
( 4.22) 
where Q. is the given output 
P. is the competitive price for Q. 
s, is the proportion of output, Q. , allocated to 
market segment i under competitive pricing 
n, and n. are the price elasticities of demand 
(absolute value) in market segment i and the 
aggregate market, respecti vely, at the 
competitive pric.e, P. 
The implication of different market characteristics for 
the magnitude of total revenue gains will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
To conclude this Section, the marginal revenue 
characteristics of the model will be examined. As noted 
above, total revenue gains from price discrimination are 
constant with respect to the level of output. This 
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implies that, for a given level of output, marginal 
revenue does not change after product has been reallocated 
among market segments in a discriminatory manner. This 
can be verified mathematically. As noted previously, if 
equation (4.2) is multiplied by output, Q., to give total 
revenue, and is then subsequently differentiated with 
respect to Q. to give marginal 
( 4. 13b) emerges. 
( 4. 13b) MR. = a. - 2b. Q. 
revenue, then equation 
where variables are as previously defined. 
However, if a similar procedure is followed for the 
price-discriminating average revenue relationship (4.21), 
then the same marginal revenue curve emerges. The 
equality of these two aggregate marginal revenue curves 
arises from the linear demand characteristics of the 
model, and will not necessarily be preserved when demand 
curves in market segments are non-linear (Schmalensee, 
1981; Robinson, 1933). 
This Section has identified an effective demand 
relationship for discriminatory pricing across any number 
of markets which determines the average revenue returned 
from such activity for any aggregate level of output. 
This allows the total revenue gains from price 
discrimination to be investigated, and these gains to be 
expressed in terms of a given output, the competitive 
price for that output, the proportion of output allocated 
to each market segment under competitive pricing, and the 
price elasticities of demand in each market segment and in 
the aggregate market under competitive pricing. The next 
-.-.-,1 
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Section conside~s the supply ~esponse of p~oduce~s to this 
inc~eased ave~age ~evenue which ~esults f~om price 
dis c ~ i mi nat ion. 
4.5 AN OWN SUPPLY RESPONSE TO DISCRIMINATORY PRICING 
A ma~keting institution which p~ice disc~iminates 
between ma~ket segments would no~mally ~etu~n the 
inc~eased ~evenue to p~oduce~s in the fo~m of a pooled 
p~i ce, and has been defined to do so in the context of 
this study. Since this pooled p~ice will be highe~ than 
the co~~esponding competitive (non-disc~iminating) p~ice, 
it will induce a supply ~esponse f~om p~oduce~s. 
is g~aphically illust~ated in Figu~e 4.2. 
This 
As in Figu~e 4.1, equation (4.2), the non-
disc~iminating demand cu~ve, is ~ep~esented by D, and 
equation (4.21>, the disc~iminating ave~age ~evenue cu~ve, 
is represented by D'. Recall from the competitive model 
developed in Section 4.2, that the supply curve was given 
by equation (4.3) as follows. 
( 4. 3) P. = c. + dQ. i d > 0, c < a& 
whe~e variables are as previously defined. 
This is represented by S in Figure 4.2. 
Competitive equilibrium is given by (Po, Qo) . This 
solution was given by equations (4. 5a) and (4. 5b). 
Now, if a ma~keting institution allocates the 
competitive industry output, Qo, acco~ding to 
discriminatory pricing p~inciples, it will be able to 
~eturn supplie~s a pooled price, This increased 
p~oduce~ price will induce an increased output f~om 
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suppliers. After adjustments resulting from this have 
finally been worked through, the price-discriminating 
equilibrium will settle at (Pd 1, Ql) shown in Figure 4.2. 
From this, it becomes obvious that the equilibrium 
price, Pd 1, will be greater than the original competitive 
price, Po, but less than the initial discriminatory price, 
PdO. It is of interest to note that, without price 
discrimination, the new equilibrium output level of QI 
would have returned producers a price of PI as opposed to 
The ch~nge in equilibrium industry output induced by 
discriminatory pricing, or the supply res ponse, is 
measured by (Ql - Qo) in Figure 4.2. 
These graphical observations can be incorporated into 
the algebraic model. Equilibrium is ensured by equating 
the discriminating average revenue, equation (4.21>, with 
supply, equation (4.3). This gi ves the pooled pri ce, Pd I, 
where 
(4.23a) 
[ 
a. - c + X
o
. ~] + 
2( b. + d) 
2k( b. + d) 
a. - c + XO • ~ 
and the price discriminating output, QI, where 
a. - c + Xo . ~ 
( 4. 24a) 
2( b. + d) 
where X = (a. - c) 2 + 4k( b. + d) in both cases 
These variables Pdl and Ql can be transformed into the 
expressions which incorporate the competitive equilibrium 
price and output, Po and Qo, and the price elasticities of 
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demand and supply at this equilibrium, n~ and e 
respecti vely. Before doing this, however, the intercept 
and slope of the supply curve, equation (4.3) must be 
transformed in a manner similar to that in equations 
(4.17a) to (4.17d). This gives 
(4.17e) 
and 
Po 
(4.17f) d= 
Qo e 
where variables are as defined above 
This gives 
Po Z 0.' k 
( 4. 23b) + 
Qo n. ~Qo 
and 
Qo 
( 4. 24b) 
2 
Q02 kQo 
where Z = + in bot"h cases 
4 
Po [_1_ + ~J 
n~ e 
and other variables are as defined above. 
The supply response, Qt - Qo, or 6. Q, is calculated by 
subtracting equation (4. 5b), which gives Qo, from equation 
(4.24), which gives Qt. 
( 4. 25a) 6.Q = 
2( b. + d) 
where X = (a. - c) 2 + 4k( b. +d) 
Once agai n, this can be transformed to competitive 
equilibrium values and elasticities to give 
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kQo 
( 4. 25b) 
Po [_1 + 
n. 
where values are as defined previously 
The implication of this own supply response for producer 
returns will be investigated in Section 4.7. Meanwhi Ie, 
the next Section investigates the implications of a 
competitive supply response in individual market segments 
for the above model. 
4.6 A COMPETITIVE SUPPLY RESPONSE TO DISCRIMINATORY 
PRICING 
As noted in the literature, a competitive supply 
response will be induced by unilateral discriminatory 
pricing by a marketing institution which operates in 
market segments where it does not have a complete monopoly 
( Rae, 1978; Banks and Mauldon, 1966; Edwards, 19.70; 
Wei senborn, 1969; Freebai rn and Gruen, 1977). 
Edwards (1970) and Veeman (1972) attempted to take 
account of this market characteristic by discounting 
market prke elasticities of demand by market share. This 
yields a price elasticity of demand f~cing a marketing 
institution in a market segment which is more elastic than 
the market price elasticity in that segment. Although 
such a formulation acknowledges the presence of 
competitors in these market segments, it does not 
'. ~ -;.',-.',' 
incorporate their responses to discriminatory pricing 
(Edwards, 1970). 
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How~ver, by adapting theoretical work on export demand 
elasticities (Tweeten, 1967; Cronin, 1979; Bredahl et aI, 
1979; Tweeten, 1977), such responses can be incorporated 
i n tot he mo deL The method reported here is adapted from 
that first developed by Tweeten (1967) and reported and 
utilized by Cronin (1979). It derives a formula which 
estimates the price elasticity of demand facing a 
marketing institution for its product in a particular (in 
this case, export) market segment. 
Begin with the identity 
n 
( 4.26) Xla - CI - (SI + L XIJ) i, j 1= a 
j = 1 
where Xla is the quantity of a product exported from 
country a to country i 
CI is consumption of the product in country i 
SI is the quantity of the product supplied by 
country i 
n 
and L X I J are the quantities of product imported into 
j:: 1 
country i from all other exporting 
countries, excluding country a 
Now, differentiate equation (4.26) with respect to 
country a's export price to country i, PI a 
6XI a 6 C I 
( 4.27) = 
6P I a 6 P I a [
6S1 
- 6Pla + 
n 
L 
j:: 1 
6 X I J ] 
6 P I a 
The export demand elasticity facing country a for the 
product in question in country i is defined by 
6XI a 
( 4. 28a) n. I a = 
6Pla Xla 
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By converting equation (4.27) to this elasticity form and 
re-arranging, it is possible to derive 
[~ . Pic 6 Pic P I a ~J ( 4. 28b) nx ! a = 
6P i c CI 6PI .. P! c X I .. 
[65, Pip 6P I p PI .. SI 
6P I p SI 6 PI .. Pip X I a 
n [6 X I J 
+ I: --. 
j=1 6PJ p X I J 6 PI .. ~J] X I a 
where Pic is the consumer price for the product in 
country i 
Pip is the producer price for the product in 
country i 
PJp is the producer price for the product for 
export in country j. 
Therefore, 
Ct n 
( 4. 28c) nx I .. = nl <1>1 .. 91 .. + I: e I J 
j = 1 
X I J J 9Ja--
XI .. X I .. X I .. 
where nl is the own price elasticity of demand for 
the product in country i 
el is the own price elasticity of supply for 
the product in country i 
elJ is the elasticity of exports from country j 
to country i with respect to changes in the 
export price of the product to country i 
from country a 
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$t& is the elasticity of consumer price in 
country i with respect to the export pr~ of 
the product to country i from country a 
9t& is the elasticity of producer price in 
country i with respect to the export price 
of the product to country i from country a 
9Ja is the elasticity of producer price for 
export product in country j with respect to 
the export price of the product to country i 
from country a 
X t a 
is the share of the market for the product 
Ct 
in country i held by country a 
Xt .. 
is the ratio of quantity supplied by country 
St 
a to country i to the quantity supplied to 
country i by its own suppliers 
X t .. 
and is the ratio of quantity supplied by cou~try 
Xi J 
a to country i to the quantity supplied to 
country i by all other exporters 
Ari alternative method of formulating this export 
demand elasticity, nx t .. , based on excess demand 
relationships, has been derived by Tweeten (1977) and 
Bredahl et al (1979), However, if the own price 
elasticity of excess demand (imports) in country i is not 
directly observable and has to be estimated from the 
underlying own price elasticities of demand and supply, 
then the calculation of nxt .. becomes more complex than 
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that reported in equation (4. 28c). Consequently, this 
alternative method is not reported. 
The above example has been formulated in terms of a 
marketing institution in one country exporting its product 
to a number of other countries. However, it is obvious 
that equation (4. 28c) need not apply only to spatial 
export market segments, but is quite general, and can 
refer to market segments created in any dimension. 
From equation (4. 28c), it can be seen that a wide 
range of factors influence the price elasticity of demand 
• 
for the product of a marketing institution which operates 
in a number of market s e gme n t s. These include market 
shares, a number of own-price elasticities of demand, own 
and cross-price elasticities of supply, and price 
transmission elasticities. As noted in the previous 
Chapter, some of these factors have been mentioned 'by 
authors concerned with a competitive supply response. For 
example, Abel (1966) noted that the price responsiveness 
of an import demand relationship will depend on the price 
responsiveness of both demand and supply in importing 
countries. 
It was noted above that Veeman (1972) and Edwards 
. , ."'~-;.! ( 1 970) attempted to account for the presence of 
competitors by discounting the market elasticity of demand 
in a market segment by the market share in that segment. 
That is, 
Ct 
( 4. 28d) n. t. = nt 
X t • 
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where n.ia is the export demand elasticity facing 
country a for a particular product in 
market segment i 
ni is the price elasticity of demand for the 
product in market segment i 
is consumption of the product in market 
segment i 
and X i a is expo~ts of the product from country a to 
market segment i 
It is obvious that 
• 
equation (4. 28d) is a truncated 
version of equation (4. 28c) where speciali2ed assumptions 
have been made. These assumptions, noted by Cronin (1979) 
are that there is no supply response from competing 
countries, product from anyone source is a perfect 
substitute for product from any other source, and no trade 
barriers exist, thereby allowing the product to be cleared 
on a free international market. Therefore, Veeman (1972) 
a~d Edwards (1970) have made some quite restrict)ve 
assumptions, although they acknowledge the first two of 
these. 
In summary, a competitive supply response to 
discriminatory pricing in individual market segments can 
be incorporated into the price discrimination model, 
developed in Section 4.5, through its effect on the price 
elasticity of demand, ni, facing a marketing institution 
for its product in each market segment. The next Section 
of this Chapter returns to this price discrimination 
model, and manipulates it in order to calculate returns to 
producers from price discriminating activity. 
"_'" .'_::.1 
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4.7 RETURNS TO PRODUCERS FROM PRICE DISCRIMINATION WITH 
SUPPLY RESPONSE 
4. 7. 1 Optimal Quantities and Prices in Individual Market 
Segments with Supply Response 
At this point, a review of the procedures so far 
modelled is in order. The algebraic model of price 
discrimination deve10ped has reallocated a given output 
among market segments according to discriminatory pricing 
procedures. This results in a higher price being returned 
to producers, who respond accordingly by increasing 
output. In addition, competitors in individual market 
segments respond to this altered pricing behaviour, 
thereby influencing the price elasticity of demand facing 
a institution in any particular market segment. Before 
the returns to producers which result from this procedure 
are calculated, consideration will be given to the optimal 
pric.s and outputs which result from reallocating the 
aggregate price-discriminating output. 
Initially, the 
any supply response 
given output to be reallocated before 
occurs is the output, Qo, which 
resulted under competitive pricing. However, after a 
supply response to discriminatory pricing has occurred, 
the aggregate output which results is Qt. This was 
calculated in equation (4. 24b) . Associated with this 
increased output, are a set of optimal prices and 
outputs in individual market segments, which differ from 
those calculated for the competitive output, Qo. 
prices and outputs will now be calculated. 
These 
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The equilibrium price-discriminating output, Qt, is 
optimally allocated among different market segments by 
applying equation (4.15) to this equilibrium level of 
output, Qt. That is, 
( 4.29) 
where Q1id is the price-discriminating equilibrium 
level of output allocated to market 
segment i 
This equation can be transformed to incorporate 
elasticities and converted to the optimal proportion of 
output allocated to individual market segments, S1 i d, 
all measured at competitive equilibrium, as follows. 
( 4.30) S 1 i d = 
n. 
where Ql is the price-discriminating equilibrium 
output 
Qi is the level of output allocated to market 
segment i under competitive equilibrium 
s, is the proportion of competitive output, Qo, 
allocated to market segment i under 
competitive equilibrium 
nt is the price elasticity of demand (absolute 
value) in ma~ket segment i at competitive 
equilibrium 
n. is the price elasticity of demand (absolute 
value) in the aggregate market at competitive 
,-... - ~--',-: :.: . , 
equilibrium 
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Corresponding optimal prices, in individual 
market segments under price-discriminating equilibrium can 
also be calculated in this manner. Take equation (4.16) 
for the equilibrium level of output, Qt. This gives 
(4.31a) 
where variables are as previously defined 
Once again this equation can be transformed to incorporate 
elasticities as follows. 
(4.31b) 
1 [~ -~J] Qo + + 2ni n. 
where Po and Qo are the competitive equilibrium price 
and output respectively 
and other variables are as previously defined 
Therefore, optimal prices and outputs in individual 
market segments can be calculated directly from 
competitive equilibrium data for the output which results 
after price discrimination by the use of the above 
formulae. The discussion will now turn to the total 
revenue gains which result from this allocation of output. 
4. 7.2 Revenue Gains from Price Discrimination with Supply 
Response 
An appropriate measure of returns to producers is 
producer surplus. As noted previously, there are two 
components of producer surplus, the total revenue received 
from the sale of a particular level of output, and the 
opportunity cost of resources employed in producing this 
-,,-. ,- .. ,--,', 
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output. This sub-Section considers the total revenue 
component of producer surplus, and determines how it 
changes when a marketing institution moves from 
competitive to discriminatory pricing. 
Such revenue gains will also be of interest to 
government, which allocates the rights to marketing 
institutions to control the flow of output to alternative 
market segments. When considering the allocation of such 
rights, therefore, government will be interested in 
whether such a policy increases export returns, as well as 
being concerned with producer returns. Therefore, total 
revenue, as a measure of export returns, is of interest in 
its own right. 
The total revenue gains from discriminatory pricing 
relative to competitive pricing are illustrated in Figure 
4. 3. Competitive equilibrium is given by (Po, Qo) , and 
consequently, total revenue from this pricing strategy is 
given by PoQo. Similarly, the price-discrimina~ing 
equilibrium is given by (Pd t, Qt) and total revenue from 
this strategy by Pdt Qt. Therefore, the change in total 
revenue, IJ. TR, 
is 'given by 
which results from discriminatory pricing, 
( 4. 32a) 
where variables are as defined above 
This increase in total revenue, IJ.TR, can be broken 
into two components. The first of these is the price 
discrimination component, or the static increase in total 
revenue which would result if a given level of output is 
allocated according to discriminatory rather than 
:-: : - ... ~ =.; • :..:.; . 
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competitive pricing. For the equilibrium price-
discriminating output, Qt, this is given in Figure 4.3 by 
(Pdt - PdQ1. 
It was established in equation (4.21) (Section 4.4.2), 
that this price discrimination component of the increase 
in total revenue was positive, and constant with respect 
to output. This price dis c r i mi nat ion effect was 
calculated in equations (4.21) 
by k. 
and (4.22) and denoted 
The second component of the total revenue change is 
the supply adjustmant resulting from the changed pricing 
policy. This is equivalent to the revenue change 
associated with a movement down the non-discriminating 
demand curve from Qo to Qt, and is shown in Figure 4.3 by 
(PtQt - PoQo). 
This 
negative, 
suPply adjustment may be 
depending on the price 
either positive or 
elasticity of the 
non-discriminating demand curve in the neighbourhood of 
the competitive equilibrium solution. When such demand is 
price inelastic at the competitive equilibrium, the supply 
adjustment will be negative, whereas it will be positive 
when demand is price elastic at the discriminating 
equilibrium. 
Therefore, by taking both of these components into 
account, the change in total revenue, 6 TR, can be 
expressed as 
(4.32b) 6TR = k + (PtQt - PoQo) 
where variables are as previously defined 
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The magnitude of these total revenue changes can be 
quantified by utilizing the competitive model developed in 
Section 4.2, and the price discrimination model developed 
in Section 4.4. Recall from these models that 
a. - c 
( 4. 5a) Qo = 
b. + d 
( 4. 5b) [a. 
+ 
cJ Po = a. - b. 
b. + d 
and 
a. - c + Xo ., 
( 4.24) 
2( b. + d) 
where X = (a. - C)2 + 4k(b. + d) 
and all variables are as previously defined 
Now, by substituting equation (4.24), which gives Qt, into 
equation (4.2), Pt can be derived. This gives 
( 4.33) b ~ [a. - c + X 0 • 'j_ Pt = a. - _ 
2( b. + d) 
where X = (a. - C)2 + 4k(b. + d) 
and all other variables are as previously defined 
By substituting equations (4. 5a), (4. 5b), (4.24) and 
(4.33) into equation (4. 32b), the following expression for 
the change in total revenue, 6.TR, is derived. 
( 4. 32c) 
( b. +d) [ a. XO ., -2b. k-a. ( a. -c) ] +b. ( ail -c) ( ail -c-X o .,) 
6. TR: k+--------------------------------------------------
2( b. + d) 2 
where X = (a. - C)2 + 4k(b. + d) 
and all other variables are as previously defined 
· .. _ . _ :~:--·I 
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This cumbersome algebraic expression can be re-formulated 
by using the transformations which incorporate the 
elasticities (equations (4. 17a) to (4. 17f). 
in 
This results 
( 4. 32d) 
Po Qo 
2 
- k 
+ PoQok 
_n.e-e]
0 
., 
n. + 
e 
n. + e 
where k denotes the total revenue gains from price 
discrimination for a given level of output 
Po and Qo are competitive equilibrium price and 
output respectively 
n. is the price elasticity of demand (absolute 
value) at (Po, Qo) 
and e is the price elasticity of supply at (Po, Qo) 
The price discrimination component of the change in 
total revenue, t. TR, is given by k, and the supply 
adjustment component is given by the remainder of the 
expression on the right-hand side of equation (4. 32d). 
The implication of differing values of the price 
elasticity of demand and supply, n .. 
for the change in total revenue, t.TR, 
Chapter 6. The next sub-Section 
and e respectively, 
will be discussed in 
will consider the 
producer surplus gains which result from discriminatory 
pricing relative to competitive pricing. 
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4.7.3 Producer Surplus Gains from Price Discrimination 
with SupplY Response 
Under price discrimination, returns to producers may 
be deduced by calculating producer surplus, PSd, at the 
price-discriminating equilibrium, (Pd t, Qt). 
equation (4.6), this is given by 
( 4.33) 
Qt 
PS. = P" Q, - f< c + dQ) dQ 
x 
where x = a if c ~ a 
c 
x = if c < a 
d 
By adapting 
and other variables are as previously defined 
The change in producer surplus, t.PS, which results 
from a move from competitive pricing to discriminatory 
pricing is calculated by subtracting equation (4.6) from 
equation (4.33). This gives 
( 4. 34a) 
Ql 
6PS = (P"Q, - P.Q.) - f<c + dQ)dQ 
Qo 
where Pdt and Ql are price-discriminating equilibrium 
price and output respectively 
and Po and Qo are competitive equilibrium price and 
output respectively 
This change in producer surplus is illustrated in Figure 
4.3 by the hatched area Po XYPd t 
There are two components to this increase in producer 
surplus. The first, (PdlQt - PoQo), is the change in 
total revenue, t. TR, which has been investigated in the 
--:·:_-:1 
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previous sub-Section. The second component, JQl (c + dQ) dQ, 
Qo 
is the opportunity cost of resources, l:;C, associated with 
the supply response, l:; Q. By expanding this term, l:; C 
becomes 
d 
( 4. 3 5 a ) l:; C = c ( Q 1 - Q 0) + -( Q 1 2 - Q 0 2 ) 
2 
where variables are as defined above 
Solution values for Qo and Ql were given by equations 
(4.5b) and (4.24) respectively. If these are substituted 
into equation (4. 35a) which is then rearranged, this gives 
3d 
2 ( b. + d) [ - c ( a. - c) + X 0 • , ] - -( a. - c) 2 c t d 
(4.35b) l:;C = 
4( b. + d) 2 
d 
+ d( a. - c) XO ., + -X 
2 
where X = (a. - c) 2 + 4k( b. + d) 
2 
and other variables are as previously defined 
By combining the change in total revenue, l:; TR, 
(equation (4.32c», with the opportunity cost of the 
supply response, l:;C, (equation (4. 35b», and simplifying, 
the change in producer surplus, l:;PS, becomes 
-de a. - c) 2 + d( a - c) Xo ., + 2dk( b. + d) 
(4.34b) l:;PS = 
4( b. ... d) 2 
where X = (a. - C)2 ... 4k(b .... d) 
and other variables are as previously defined 
This relationship can also be expressed in terms of 
elasticities through use of the appropriate equations 
(4.17a) to (4.17f). This gives 
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4e [~ +~J 
n.. e 
2k 1~Jlo'5 
- PoQo+lpo2Qo2+4kPoQo-------
[:. + e 
( 4. 34c) 6. PS = 
where k denotes the total revenue gains from price 
discrimination for a given level of output 
Po and Qo are competitive equilibrium price and 
output respectively 
n .. is the price elasticity of demand (absolute 
value) at (Po, Qo) 
and e is the price elasticity of supply at (Po, Qo) 
The implications of differing values of the price 
elasticity of demand and supply, n. and e respecti vely, 
for the change in producer surplus, 6. PS, which results 
from a price discrimination policy, will be discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
.::-: 1 4. 8 CONCLUSION 
The objective of this Chapter was to develop a general 
model of price discrimination which included both an own 
supply response and a competitive supply response to 
discriminatory pricing, which would then provide a basis 
for evaluating price discrimination policies in terms of 
producer objectives. This was done in a number of _steps. 
A competitive pricing model with multiple market segments 
was constructed as a benchmark against which to assess 
discriminatory pricing. The pricing decision which 
: ~ I 
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maximizes producer surplus was then derived. A 
generalized model of price discrimination which utilized 
this maximizing condition was constructed, with this 
model including the required own supply response and 
competitive supply response. By comparing this 
discriminatory pricing model with the competitive pricing 
model previously developed, returns to producers from 
adopting a discriminatory pricing policy were carculated. 
As part of this process, the model calculated a number 
of important variables. These included 
• 
( a) the total revenue gains, k, which result from 
reallocating a fixed output among alternative 
market segments according to discriminatory 
rather than competitive pricing principles 
(Equation 4.22, Section 4.4.2), 
( b) the discrimin~ting output level, which 
results after an own supply response to 
discriminatory pricing has occurred (Equation 
4.24b, Section 4.5), 
(c) the pooled price, Pd 1, received by producers as a 
result of discriminatory pricing after an own 
supply response has occurred (Equation 4.23b, 
Section 4.5), 
( d) the supply response, or increased output, 6. Q, 
which occurs as a result of discriminatory ~ricing 
(Equation 4.25b, Section 4.5), 
(e) the competitive supply response to discriminatory 
pricing, which alters the price elasticity of 
demand facing a marketing institution in a 
( f) 
( g) 
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particular market segment (Equation 4.28c, 
Section 4.6), 
the optimal proportion of the price 
discriminating equilibrium output allocated to 
each market segment, S1 i d (Equation 4.30, Section 
4.7. 1) , 
the optimal price in each market segment, 
given the price-discriminating equilibrium output 
(Equation 4.31, Section 4.7.1), 
(h) the change in total revenue after discriminatory 
(i) 
pricing, 6TR, which accrues after supply 
responses have been taken into account (Equation 
4.32d, Section 4.7.2), 
the change in producer surplus after 
discriminatory pricing, 6PS, which accrues after 
supply responses have been taken into account 
(Equation 4.34c, Section 4.7.3). 
With the exception of the competitive supply response, 
each of the above equations was expressed in terms of 
equilibrium price and output under competitive pricing, Po 
and Qo respectively, the share of output allocated to 
individual market segments under competitive pricing, Si, 
the price elasticities of demand (absolute value) in 
individual market segments and the aggregate market under 
competitive pricing, ni and n. respectively, and the price 
elasticity of supply under competitive pricing, e. 
Although such relationships are derived from a linear 
model, their transformation to these elasticity terms 
allows some generalizations to be made, since non-linear 
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relationships can be assumed to be linear over limited 
ranges. 
Equation (4.28c), which includes the competitive 
supply response expresses the price elasticity of demand 
facing an institution in a particular market segment in 
terms of the market demand elasticity in that s e gme nt, 
market shares of alternative suppliers in the segment, and 
a number of own- and cross-price elasticities of supply 
and price transmission elasticities. 
Therefore, a number of market characteristics 
influence results from discriminatory pricing. In Chapter 
6, the extent to which these market characteristics affect 
such results will be discussed. This will then make it 
possible to determine the conditions under which 
discriminatory pricing, as a major component of a market 
segmentation policy, is likely to be successful. 
" ... -,-'--.-·1 
-., -.".-.-,-.-.-.>' 
168 
CHAPTER 5 
ASPECTS OF PROMOTION WITH SUPPLY RESPONSE 
The modified third-degree price discrimination model 
constructed in the previous Chapter included most elements 
of a marketing mix. However, it did not consider the 
necessary promotional elements, and the objective of this 
Chapter is to incorporate promotion into the theoretical 
model of price discrimination without supply control. 
The Chapter is structured in the following way. In 
Section 5.2, optimal promotion models which are 
conventionally used in the analysis of agricultural 
industries will be considered, while in Section 5.3, 
optimal promotion policies will be investigated under 
demand characterized by multiple segments. Attention will 
then be turned to the actual magnitude of returns whIch 
producers receive from promotion in different market 
segments. To this end, the competitive benchmark model 
established in Chapter 4 will be extended in Section 5.4 
to include the influence of demand-shifting promotion. The 
discriminatory pricing model constructed will be likewise 
amended at this point. In Section 5.5 the effect on 
producer returns of product differentiating pro_motion 
under discriminatory pricing will be considered. Finally, 
in Section 5.6, the conclusions of the Chapter will be 
summari zed, and aspects of the effects of promotion to be 
discussed in Chapter 6 will be identified. 
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5.2 CONVENTIONAL MODELS OF OPTIMAL PROMOTION USED FOR 
AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES 
Few guidelines exist on how to optimally allocate 
advertising effort among market segments under appropriate 
agricultural supply-side conditions, and the literature 
review in Chapter 3 established that this topic has been 
inadequately investigated. Consequently, in the next two 
Sections, an attempt will be made to develop decision 
rules which are appropriate for these circumstances. 
One of the earliest models was that of Dorfman and 
Stei ner (1954) and this theorem of optimal advertising 
has provided the basis for the more complex advertising 
theorems developed for agricultural marketing (de Boer, 
1977; Nerlove and Waugh, 1961; Strak and Gill, 1983). 
Dorfman and Steiner (1954) were concerned with how 
much advertising effort a monopoly firm should direct 
towards its (aggregate) market. This problem can be 
mathematically modeled in the following manner. Let a 
downward sloping demand curve, Q, which shifts out with 
advertising be represented by 
( 5. 1 ) Q = Q( P, A) 
wbere P is price 
and A is advertising expenditure. 
The profit function, iT, is given by 
( 5. 2) iT = PQ(P,A) - C(Q) - A 
where C(Q) is the total cost of producing output Q 
When this profit function, iT, is maximized, it yields 
the optimal advertising decision rule 
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( 5. 3) 9 = BL 
where 9 is the advertising to sales ratio, A/(PQ) 
B is the advertising elasticity of demand 
and L is the Lerner index of monopoly power. 
The corresponding product-price decision rule is given 
by 
( 5. 4) L = 1/ n 
where n is the price elasticity of demand 
(absolute value) 
Obviously, these optimal product-price and advertising 
decision rules can be expressed in one equation which 
encapsulates both rules as follows. 
( 5. 5) 9 = Bin 
Equation (5.5) has become known as the Dorfman-Steiner 
theorem, and a convenient summary of the derivation of the 
theorem in the above format is given by Koutsoyiannis 
(1982). 
A monopolist would be optimally advertising when ~he 
ratio of advertising to sales is equal to the ratio of the 
advertising to price elasticities of demand. Obvi ously, 
advertising effort would be greater when, at equilibrium, 
the advertising elasticity is higher or the price 
elasticity is lower. 
Although the above model provides valuable insights 
into the optimal allocation df advertising effo~t, its 
prescriptions are appropriate only for an agency which is 
facing a single market and has the necessary power to 
.'_4 __ ._':':_:_:-
control the level of supply. 
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De Boer (1977) recognized the first of these 
limitations, and attempted to extend the Dorfman-Steiner 
theorem to consider optimal advertising behaviour by a 
price-discriminating monopolist operating in two market 
segments. His method for tackling this problem was to 
utilize optimal discriminatory pricing conditions and to 
substitute the Dorfman-Steiner theorem of optimal 
advertising into these. 
To elaborate, optimal pricing is practised when 
marginal revenues in marke~ segments are equal. For the 
two-segment case, this may be expressed as 
(5.8) r 1 l 1 Pill - - = P 2 [1 - -] 
nl J n2 
where Pi is price in market segment i 
and nl is the price elasticity of demand in i. 
De Boer (1977) then rearranged the Dorfman-Steiner 
condition and substituted this into (5.8), yielding 
02 - 13 2 P 1 13 2 
(5.9) = 
Now, if it is assumed that the optimal price is 
greater in market segment 1; that is, Pi ) P2, and that 
the advertising elasticities of demand in both market 
segments are equal, then according to De Boer (1977) it 
becomes obvious from equation (5.9) that 
(5.10a) 
That is, optimal advertising effort should be more 
intensive in the more price elastic market. (The full 
mathematical derivation of this and subsequent models is 
given in Appendix 2.) 
····-··--1 
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However, this result assumes that the advertising 
elasticities are less than the optimal advertising 
intensities, which would occur when both demands are price 
inelastic. If on the other hand, it is assumed that 
demands are price elastic (which implies that advertising 
elasticities are greater than optimal advertising 
intensities), then the opposite result emerges. That is, 
(5.10b) 
Furthermore, if the advertising e1astici~ies lie 
between the optimal advertising intensities, then one of 
the known positive variables must be negative, which is 
highly disturbing. In addition, there is no a priori 
reason to support the conclusion tha~ the relative 
intensity of advertising effort is dependent on the value 
of price elasticities of demand. 
As a consequence, de Boer's conclusion must be 
regarded as suspect. It must also be noted that the 
method of substituting the optimal prescriptions from one 
model into the optimal prescriptions from another model is 
a dubious procedure. Therefore, a model of advertising in 
two market segments was correctly specified, and optimal 
pricing and promotion decisions derived. The results of 
this model unambiguously indicated that when advertising 
elasticities are assumed equal, then 
(5.11a) 
In reality, it is probable that a high price 
elasticity of demand is associated with a high advertising 
elasticity of demand through cross-elasticity effects (de 
Boer, 1977; Parish, 1963). To elaborate, a high when high 
advertising demand elasticity could be expected to occur 
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is a modification of the Dorfman-Steiner theorem to 
incorporate agricultural supply-side conditions. 
In a simplified version of the Nerlove-Waugh model, 
demand in the aggregate market, Q, can be represented by 
(5.12) Q = D(P, A) 
where P is price 
and A is advertising expenditure 
and supply is given by 
(5.13) S = S(P) 
where S is output supplied at price P. 
Producer surplus, PS, can be represented by 
(5.14a) PS = P.D(P,A) - C(S(P» 
where C( S), the aggregate cost of production, is the 
area under the supply curve to the left of S. 
Ret urns to prod uc ers, R, are gi ven by 
(5.14b) R = PS - A 
or 
(5.14c) R :: P. D( P, A) - C( S( P» - A 
... 
where all variables are as previously defined. 
In order to derive optimal advertising conditions, this 
profit function, R, is maximized. However, this must be 
done subject to the constraint that excess supply is zero. 
That is, 
(5.15) D(P,A) :: S(P) 
In order to solve this problem, Nerlove and Waugh 
(1961) applied the then standard principles of comparative 
statics to the problem of the incidence of a shift in the 
demand schedule, which has been documented by Samuelson 
(1948), rather than the more direct analytical technique 
":-.:",1 
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of the Lagrange multiplier which ha~ more recently become 
the standard methodology for such problems. Proofs of 
solutions to the simplified version of the Nerlove-Waugh 
model presented above may be deduced from proofs presented 
in Appendix 2 for an analagous model presented in Section 
5.2.3. 
The solution to the Nerlove-Waugh model yields the 
following advertising 
advertising intensity, 9. 
a 
<5.16) 9 = 
I n I + e 
decision rule for optimal 
where e is the price elasticity of supply 
and other variables are as defined for the Dorfman-
Steiner model 
As with the Dorfman-Steiner theorem, optimal advertising 
intensity varies directly with the advertising elasticity 
of demand, and inversely with the absolute value of the 
price elasticity of demand. However, advertis'ing 
intensity also varies inversely with the price elasticity 
of supply. Note that where price response is completely 
inelastic or the supply response is suppressed, then the 
Nerlove-Waugh condition collapses to the Dorfman-Steiner 
theorem. 
The Nerlove-Waugh result represents a significant 
advance over the Dorfman-Steiner theorem and its 
derivatives, since it incorporates the required supply 
response by allowing the product-price decision to be 
determined by market forces. However, for the purposes of 
the current ~tudy, it is deficient in an unmodified form, 
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since its promotion prescriptions refer only to an 
aggregate market demand, rather than to promotion in 
individual market segments. Consequently, in the next 
Section, the Nerlove-Waugh theorem is extended to multiple 
market segments. 
5. 3 EXTENSIONS TO THE NERLOVE-WAUGH THEOREM 
5. 3. 1 Introduction 
An obvious extension to the Nerlove-Waugh theorem 
would be to generalize it out to multiple market segments 
under competitive pricing assumptions. That is, a single 
price would prevail in all market segments, and such a 
price would be market determined by the intersection of 
the total demand and supply curves. Such a model would 
provide a competitive benchmark against which optimal 
advertising expenditure under discriminatory pricing with 
the appropriate supply conditions could be evaluated. 
This particular generalization of the Nerlove-W~ugh 
theorem is presented below. 
5.3.2 Optimal Advertising in Multiple Market Segments 
under Competitive Pricing 
Assume two independent market segments 1 and 2, which, 
when combi ned, make up aggregate industry demand. 
.. J 
Individual demand functions in each market segment may 
then be characterized by 
(5.17a) Qt = DtC P, At> 
(5.17b) 
where P is price 
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QI is quantity in market segment i 
and AI is advertising in market segment i. 
Aggregate industry demand, Q, may then be represented by 
(5.17c) 
The industry supply function can be written as 
(5.18) Q = S( P) 
where variables are as previously defined. 
Market equilibrium requires that (5.17c) and (5.18) are 
equal. That is, 
( 5. 19) 
• 
Following the methodology of the Nerlove-Waugh theorem 
outlined above in Section 5.2.1, consider an appropriate 
measure of producer returns from advertising in each 
market segment. Let 
( 5. 20a) 
( 5. 20b) 
Rt = PS - At 
R2 = PS - A2 
where Rt is returns 
segment i 
from 
AI is advertising 
segment i 
and PS is producer surplus 
advertising 
expenditure 
Producer surplus, PS, may be represented by 
iii 
( 5. 21> PS = PQ - IS-'(QldQ 
o 
where P is price 
Q is quantity 
in market 
in market 
and s-t (Q) is the inverse of the industry supply 
curve. 
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Now consider the effect of a change in advertising in 
market segment 1 on returns to producers. This is found 
by differentiating Rt with respect to At. This gives 
6Rt 6 P 
( 5. 22a) = Q - 1 
6At 6At 
Similarly, the effect of a change in advertising in market 
segment 2 on returns to producers is gi ven by 
6R2 6P 
( 5. 22b) ~ = Q - 1 
6A2 6A2 
6P 
It is now required to fi nd expressions for and 
6 At 
6P 6P 
Consider Differentiate equations (5.18) and 
6 A t 
( 5.19) wi th respect to At. This gives 
6Q 6 Dt 6P 6P 6 D t 
(5.23a) --- = 
6 At 6P 6A t 6P 6 At 6 A 1 
6Q 6S 6P 
(5.23b) --- = a 
6At 6P 6 At 
Solving the simultaneous equations (5. 23a) and (5. 23b) for 
6P 
gives 
6At 
6Dt 
6P 6 A t 
( 5. 24a) = 
6At 6S [~ + ~J 
6P 6P 6P 
6p 
By a similar procedure, can be found to be 
: .. ~ J 
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602 
6P 6A2 
( 5. 24b) = 
6A2 63 [~ + ~J -
6P 6P 6P 
Equations (5. 24a) and (5. 24b) can then be substituted 
into equations (5. 22a) and (5. 22b) to give 
60t 
6Rt 6 A t 
( 5. 25a) = Q - 1 
6At 63 [~ + ~J 
6P 6P 6P 
and 
602 
6R2 6 A2 
( 5. 25b) = Q - 1 
6A2 63 [~ + ~J 
6P 6P 6P 
Take equation (5. 25a). By multiplying the right-~and 
side by [:]1 r:] and manipulating, this can be restated in 
Q Q 
elasticity terms as 
6Rt CCt 
( 5. 26a) = - 1 
6At e - (ntst + n.2.sl..) 
where c:q is the marginal gross revenue from 
market 1 from increased advertising in that 
marke t, hol di ng pri ce cons t ant 
e is the price elasticity of supply 
nl is the price elasticity of demand in market 
segme nt i 
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Q1 
and S1 is the shar'e of output, sold in market 
Q 
segment i. 
Similarly, 
6R2 0:2 
( 5. 26b) = - 1 
6A2 e - ( nt s t + n2 S2 ) 
wher'e variables ar'e similarly defined. 
The condition for fir'st-or'der maximization of r'etur'ns 
to producer's r'equir'es that equations (5. 26a) and (5.26b) 
be set to zero. That is, when r'eturns are maximized, 
O:t 
( 5. 27 a) = 1 
e - (ntst + n2s2) 
( 5. 27b) = 1 
Consider' the aggregate adver'tising intensity, 9. Then 
A 
( 5. 28a) 9 = 
PQ 
wher'e A is total advertising expenditure 
P is pr'ice 
Q is total output 
This can be decomposed into 
( 5. 28b) 9 = 
PQ PQ 
wher'e A1 is adver'tising expenditure in market 
segment i 
and 91 is defined to be the r'atio of adver'tising in 
market segment i to total sales. 
Now, 9 is opt i mal when 9 t and 92 are opti mal. 
Return to the optimality condition given in equation 
1 81 
( 5. 27a) above. Now, by definition, 
6 D t 
( 5. 29a) o::t = P • 
6 At 
After manipulation. this becomes 
PQ 
( 5. 29b) o::t = St • At 
At 
where At is the advertising elasticity of demand in 
market segment i 
and other variables are as previously defined. 
By substituting (5. 2gb) into (5. 27a) and multiplying 
At 
both sides by 9t may be derived. 
PQ 
At s t 
( 5. 30a) 9t = 
Si mi larly, 
( 5. 30b) 
where, in bot h cas es, var i abl e s are as def i ned above. 
Now, equation (5. 28b) allows equations (5. 30a) and (5. 30b) 
to be aggregated, which gives a measure of the optimal 
intensity of advertising for the total market, 9, where 
(5.31a) 9= 
where variables are as defined above. 
This optimal r~tio of aggregate advertising to 
aggregate sales, 9, can be generalized from the 
two-dimensional market situation considered above to an 
n-dimensional case. In these circumstances, 9 becomes 
( 5.31 b) 9 = 
n 
L 13ls1 
i = 1 
n 
e - L niSI 
i = 1 
where variables are as defined above. 
This can be further simplified, since 
n 
( 5. 32) n... = L nl s I 
i = 1 
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where n ... is the price elasticity of demand in the 
aggregate market 
and other variables are as previously defined. 
Therefore, the optimal aggregate advertising intensity, 9, 
can be restated as 
( 5. 31 cJ 9 = 
n 
L 13lsl 
i =1 
e + I n ... I 
where variables are as previously defined. 
This optimal aggregate intensity, 9, which is 
applicable to a marketing agency operating in multiple 
market segments, can be compared with that which emerges 
under the Nerlove-Haugh theorem where a single aggregate 
market is characterized. Equation (5. 31c) indicates that, 
as with the Nerlove-Haugh theorem, the optimal aggregate 
advertising intensity, 9, will be greater when the price 
elasticity of demand (absolute value) and of supply are 
relatively low. However, the aggregate advertising demand 
elasticity of the Nerlove-Haugh theorem has been replaced 
by advertising demand elasticities in individual market 
, . _ >~:1 
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segments weighted by the p~opo~tion of output allocat~d to 
that ma~ket segment. 
Note that equation (5.31c) collapses to the 
Ne~love-Waugh theorem when individual market segments are 
not differentiated from each other. In such a case, the 
advertising elasticities of demand in individual market 
segments, the 131' s, could each be viewed as being equal to 
the aggregate advertising elasticity of demand, B. By 
substituting this into equation (5. 31c), the Nerlove-Waugh 
condition emerges. That is, 
13 
(5.31d) 9 = 
e + I na I 
where variables are as previously defined. 
The analysis to this point has extended the 
Nerlove-Waugh theorem to multiple market segments were the 
same price prevails in each segment, and this price is 
market-determined by the intersection of the supply curve 
with the 
result 
aggregate 
to emerge 
demand curve. The 
has been a measu~e 
aggregate advertising intensity for 
most impo~tant 
of- t he opt i mal 
the multiple 
market-segment case. The analysis will now be extended to 
consider the optimal allocation of this advertising 
expenditure to alternative market segments. 
The ratio of optimal advertising in market segment 1 to 
total aggregate sales, 9t, was given in equation (5. 30a). 
In general, 
B 1 S 1 
( 5. 30c) 91 = 
e + I na I 
where variables are as previously defined. 
. . : - .' .:~ -; '~:-. 
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Now, the optimal proportion of advertising allocated to 
market segment i, ri, is given by 
Ai 
( 5. 33a) 
A 
where variables are as previously defined. 
By dividing equation (5. 30c) above 
(5.31c), this optimal 
expendi ture, ri, emerges. 
( 5. 33b) 
B is i 
n 
I Bisi 
i =1 
proportion 
by 
of 
where variables are as previously defined. 
equation 
advertising 
That is, the optimal proportion of advertising allocated 
to market segment i, is given by the ratio of the 
advertising elasticity of demand weighted by the share of 
output allocated to that segment to the sum of all such 
weighted average advertising elasticities. In essence, 
the more res.ponsive a market segment is to advertising, or 
the more important a segment is in terms of output 
allocated to it, the greater the proportion of total 
advertising allocated to it. 
In the above analysis, the advertising intensity in a 
particular market segment i, 9i, has been defined as the 
ratio of advertising in that market segment, Ai, to total 
sales, PQ. This advertising intensity can be redefined in 
terms of sales in market segment i, PQi, as follows. 
( 5. 34a) 
Therefore, by multiplying equation ( 5. 30c) by the 
.1 
·.c·.·.· .. ·; ·.···1 
- ';"-':! 
reciprocal of the share of output allocated 
1 
to 
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a 
particular market segment, --, the optimal advertising 
St 
intensity in that market segment, 8i', is given by 
I3t 
( 5. 34b) 8t' = 
e + I n. I 
where variables are as previously defined. 
That is the ratio of optimal advertising to the actual 
value of sales generated in a particular market segment is 
directly related to the advertising elasticity of demand 
in that segment, and inversely related to the aggregate 
price elasticity of demand (absolute value) and the price 
elasticity of supply 
A further useful extension to the above analysis is to 
directly compare the optimal allocation of advertising 
effort to two market segments. In this case, 
81 • 131 
(5.35a) = 
where variables are as previously defined. 
Hence, the ratio of optimal advertising per unit sales 
in market segment 1 to that in market segment 2 is 
equivalent to the ratio of the corresponding advertising 
elasticities of demand. 
In summary, the above sUb-section has extended the 
Nerlove-Waugh theorem of optimal advertising from a single 
market to multiple market segments, where the same price 
prevails in each market segment. Four basic conditions 
emerge from this model as follows. 
( a) The optimal aggregate advertising intensity is 
identical to that under the Nerlove-Waugh 
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theorem, with the exception that the advertising 
demand elasticity for the Nerlove-Waugh aggregate 
market case is replaced by the sum of advertising 
elasticities in i ndi vi dual market segments 
weighted by the share of output allocated to 
these segments. 
(b) The optimal allocation of advertising expenditure 
to an individual market segment is given by the 
ratio of the advertising elasticity of demand in 
that segment weighted by the share of output 
allocated to that segment to the sum of all such 
weighted averages. 
( c) The optimal ratio of advertising to sales 
generated in a particular market segment is 
identical to that for the Nerlove-Waugh aggregate 
market theorem with the exception that the 
Nerlove-Waugh advertising elasticity is replaced 
by the advertising elasticity in the relevant 
market segment. Note therefore, that the opti mal 
advertising intensity in any particular market 
segment is dependent on the aggregate price 
elasticity of demand and not on the price 
elasticity of demand in the particular segment in 
question. 
(d) Finally, the ratio of optimal advertising per 
unit sales in market segment i to that in market 
segment j is equivalent to the ratio of the 
corresponding advertising elasticities of demand. 
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These results indicate how advertising effort may pe 
directed when the aggregate market is disaggregated into 
individual segments, and as such, provide a significant 
advance over the prescriptions of the Nerlove-Waugh model. 
They have intuitive economic appeal, since they indicate 
that more advertising effort should be directed towards 
those market segments where demand is more responsive to 
advertising, or where a relatively large proportion of 
output is sold. Since the same price is charged in all 
market segments (that is, no attempt is made to exploit 
any monopoly advantage in individual market segments). it 
is not surprising that the aggregate price elasticity of 
demand rather than these individual demand elasticities, 
influences the intensity of advertising effort. 
5.3.3 Optimal Advertising under Discriminatory Pricing 
with a Competitive Supply Response 
The model presented above extends the Nerlove-Waugh 
theorem to multiple market segments, where one price 
prevails in all segments and is determined by the 
intersection of the aggregate demand curve with the supply 
curve. However. where an institution has control over the 
allocation of output to alternative market segments, it is 
in a position to optimize the pricing decisions in these 
segments. 
Therefore, a further extension to the Nerlove-Waugh 
theorem would involve investigating optimal advertising 
,.,~, _ '. :-~~- ~.i under discriminatory pricing for the situation where 
producers are free to respond to the pool price which they 
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receive from this pricing policy. Since it includes the 
appropriate supply-side conditions, such a model would 
provide more appropriate prescriptions for optimal 
advertising than the de Boer (1977) model outlined in 
Section 5.2. 
This discriminatory pricing model will now be 
outli ned. Its prescriptions will then be compared to 
those emerging from the Nerlove-Waugh extension developed 
in Section 5.3.1 above, since this provides a competitive 
pricing benchmark against which optimal advertising under 
discriminatory pricing can be evaluated. 
Consider a market which can be divided into two 
segments. Ins u c hac as e , de ma n d . can be rep res e n ted by 
where, as previously, 
Qi is demand in the ith segment 
Pi and Ai are price and advertising, respectively, 
in the ith segment 
'.',<",-,",' 
and Q is total demand. 
Supply is given by 
(5.36) S = S(p*) 
where p* is the return per unit of output, or the pool 
pri ce, received by the producer. (Note that 
the pool price was denoted in general terms 
by Pad in the algebraic model. p. is 
identical to Pad). 
This pool price, P*, is calculated as 
( 5.37) p. = 
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Following the Nerlove-Waugh theorem, aggregate returns 
to producers are given by 
where C( S) is the aggregate cost of production, and is 
represented by the supply curve to the left 
of S 
and other variables are as previously defined. 
As with the extension to the Nerlove-Waugh theorem 
considered above, a marketing agency is constrained to 
adopt policies such that it sells all the output supplied 
at the price producers receive; in this case, the pool 
price, p •. That is, 
( 5. 39a) 
or, al ternati vely, 
( 5. 39b) 
That is, excess supply, x, is required to equal zero. 
Explicitly, the marketing agency solves 
( 5. 40) max 
The mathematical solution to this problem has been derived 
by Martin et al (1986). This publication is reproduced as 
Appendix 4, in order to allow proofs to the equations 
presented below to be verified. 
Let Abe the Lagrange multiplier associated with the 
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constraint in ( S. 40 l . The Lagrange equations can be 
written in the form 
6R 6R 6R 6R 
6PI 6P2 6 A I 6A2 
(S.41al = = = = A 
6x 6x 6x 6x 
6 P I 6P2 6At 6A2 
or, alternatively, 
[PI 6C] 
6Qt 
[P2 ~J 6Q2 Qt + - Q2 + -
65 6Pt 65 6P2 
(5.41b) = 
65 ~p" 6QI 65 6P" 6Q2 
-- - -- -
6P" 6 P t 6PI 6 p. 6P2 6 P2 
[p I -~J 6QI [P2 6C] 6Q2 - 1 - - 1 
65 6 AI 65 6 A2 
= = 
65 6P" 6Ql 65 6P" 6Q2 
-- -
6p· 6 A I 6At 6 p. 6A2 6A2 
After mani pula t ion, these first-order conditions for 
the maximization of aggregate producer returns can be 
expressed in the following form. 
PI m P2 m 
( 5.42) = -- + 
I nt I Qt I n2 I Q2 
AI A2 
- m + m 
:.; I 3t 32 
= = 
AI E A2 E 
Ql - Q2 -
31 p. 32 p. 
nt is the price elasticity of demand in market 
segment i 
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Bt is the advertising elasticity of demand in 
market segment i 
E is the price elasticity of supply 
and other variables are as defined above. 
Optimal advertising policies given optimal pricing can 
now be determined by making the appropriate pairwise 
comparisons between equations in (5.42). By considering 
the first and third such equations in (5.42), the optimal 
advertising intensity in market segment 1, 
deri ved. 
( 5. 43a) 91 = 
p. ( I n 1 I + e ) - I nil (1 + e) (1 - -) 
PI 
,91, can be 
where 91 is defined as the ratio of advertising in 
market segment 1 to producer returns from 
that segment (Al/p·Ql) 
and other variables are as defined above. 
Similarly, in the second market segment, 
( 5. 43b) 
In general, 
( 5. 43c) 9t = 
p. ( I n 2 I + e) - I n 2 I (1 + e) (1 - -) 
P2 
p. ( I n t I + e ) - I n t I (1 + e) (1 - -) 
PI 
where variables are as defined above. 
The formula presented in (5. 43c) collapses-to the 
...... , .. :::.j 
1 92 
Nerlove-Waugh theorem when a single aggregate market is 
assumed. That is, 
p. 
P I = p", sol n I I (1 + e)( 1 - -) dis a p pea r s , 
PI 
nl = n ... That is, (5. 43c) is reduced to 
/3 
(5.31d) 9= 
e + I n .. I 
/3i = /3, 
where variables are as previously defined. 
and 
A comparison will firstly be made between the 
advertising prescriptions which emerge from this model and 
those of the Nerlove-Waugh model. 
Assume that the price elasticity of demand in the 
first market is less than that in the second market. That 
is, 
( 5.44) In11 <ln21 
Given optimal (discriminatory) pricing, this implies that 
( 5. 45) 
or 
(5.46) P1 > p. >P2 
Substituting (5.46) into (5. 43a) and (5. 43b) implies 
that 
/31 
( 5. 47a) 9t > 
I n1 I + e 
and 
/32 
( 5. 47b) 92 < 
I n2 I + e 
That is, a price-discriminating marketing agency 
should choose advertising policies such that in the market 
segment with the lower (higher) price elasticity of 
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demand, the ratio of advertising to producer payments 
should exceed (be less than) the ratio of the advertising 
elasticity in that market to the sum of the demand and 
supply elasticities in that market. That is, relatively 
more (less) advertising effort (as measured by the ratio 
of advertising to producer returns) would be directed to 
the less (more) price elastic market segment than would be 
the case if this was the only market faced by the agency 
(that is, the Nerlove-!olaugh situation). 
Finally, a comparison will be made with the 
prescriptions which arise from this di$criminatory pricing 
extension to the Nerlove-!olaugh model, and the single 
(competitive) price extension considered in the previous 
sub-Section. 
Recall ( 5. 47a) and ( 5. 47b) above. Under the 
convention ( 5.44) that I n t I < I n2 I ' these imply that 
At 1 1 A2 
( 5. 48) > > > 
P·Qt3t I nt I + e I n2 I + e p. Q2 32 
That is, 
At A2 
( 5. 49a) > 
Qt 3 t Q232 
or 
( 5. 49b) > 
That is, the ratio of advertising per unit sales in 
the less price elastic market to that in the more price 
elastic market exceeds the ratio of the corresponding 
advertising elasticities. 
Now recall equation (5. 35a) from the previous Section, 
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where pricing across market segments was competitive. In 
this case, 
9t ' 13t 
(5.35a) = 
where variables are as previously defined. 
This implies that 
13t 
( 5. 35b) = 
under these pricing assumptions. That is, the ratio of 
advertising per unit sales in one market segment to that 
in the other market segment equals the ratio of the 
corresponding advertising elasticities. 
Therefore, under optimal pricing, relatively more 
(less) advertising effort (as measured by advertising per 
unit sales> is directed to the less (more) price elastic 
segment than under uniform pricing across these segments. 
At this point, it is appropriate to summarize this 
sub-section. The Nerlove-Waugh theorem of optimal 
advertising has been extended from a single market to 
multiple market segments, where optimal (discriminatory) 
pricing policies are practised in these segments. 
Three conclusions emerge from this model. 
( a) The formula for the optimal aggregate advertising 
intensity in a particular market segment is 
similar to that which emerges under the aggregate 
Nerlove-Waugh theorem. 
of this expression in 
However, the denominator 
the above extension 
includes a second term which is a function of the 
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price elasticity of demand in the market segment 
in question, the price elasticity of supply, and 
the ratio of the pool price to the optimal price 
in the market segment. 
(b) For a two-segment case, the optimal advertising 
intensity in the less price elastic segment is 
( c) 
greater than it would be had that segment 
constituted the 
Ner1ove-Waugh case). 
aggregate 
Conversely, 
price elastic market segment, 
market ( the 
for the more 
this intensity 
would be correspondingly less than it would be 
under Ner1ove-Waugh aggregate market assumptions. 
Assuming two market segments once agai n, 
relatively more advertising effort is directed to 
the less price elastic market segment under 
discriminatory pricing than would be the case 
under competitive pricing across these two market 
segments ( the 
considered in 
extension 
Section 
to 
5. 3. 2) . 
Ner1ove-Waugh 
Conversely, 
relatively less advertising effort is directed to 
the more price elastic segment. 
5.3.4 Summary of Ner1ove-Waugh Extensions 
The inclusion of a supply response in models of 
optimal promotion with multiple market segments does not 
appear to have been investigated in the agricultural 
economics literature. Therefore, the objective of this 
Section was to consider models with this feature. 
FIGURE 5.1: MODELS SHOWING OPTIMAL ADVERTISING INTENSITIES UNDER 
DIFFERENT MARKET CONDITIONS 
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The Nerlove-Waugh theorem of optimal advertising was 
extended to multiple market segments under two sets of 
pricing assumptions. The first model considered uniform 
while the second pricing across market segments, 
incorporated discriminatory pricing between such segments. 
The results of these alternative models are 
summarized in Figure 5. 1. This Figure also indicates 
their relationships to the conventional models employed in 
the analysis of optimal advertising in agricultural 
industries, which were reviewed in the previous Section. 
The conclusions which emerge from these Nerlove-Waugh 
extensions would seem to be supported by intuition. That 
those is, more advertising effort is directed towards 
market segments where demand is more responsive (as 
represented by higher advertising elasticities), and where 
pricing policies are also optimal, more advertising effort 
is directed to those segments where greater potential 
exists for appropriating consumer surplus (that is, de~and 
is less price elastic). 
These results enhance the general understanding of how 
advertising effort might be more profitably allocated 
under market assumptions which are more realistic than 
those conventionally employed to prescribe the direction 
of advertising effort in typically structured agricultural 
industries. 
As with the discriminatory pricing model developed in 
the previous Chapter, it would be desirable to incorporate 
these optimal promotion formulae into a fUll marketing mix 
model where actual producer gains are calculated. 
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Appropriate market conditions such as price elasticities 
of demand and supply and advertising elasticities of 
demand could then be varied to determine the conditions 
under which the full range of market segmentation policies 
are likely to yield high returns to producers. The 
possibility of constructing such a model will now be 
investigated. 
5.4 THE INFLUENCE OF GENERIC PROMOTION ON PRODUCER 
RETURNS 
5. 4. 1 Introduction 
In the previous Section, the optimal ratio of 
advertising to producer returns in a particular market 
segment was calculated for discriminatory pricing policies 
and for the competitive pricing benchmark. These optimal 
ratios were expressed in terms of appropriate 
elasticities. 
Researchers working with analogous models (Nerlove and 
Waugh, 1961 ; Strak, 1983) have attempted to comment on 
whether producer agencies were over-advertising or 
under-advertising by using such formulae in the following 
way. Existing elasticities were used to calculate an 
, optimal' advertising to sales ratio. This' optimal' 
ratio was then compared to the actual ratio, and on the 
basis of this comparison, comment was then made on whether 
advertising effort should be more or less intensive. 
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While such an approach gives an indication of whether 
current advertising effort is desirable, it should be used 
with some caution. This is because the formulae for 
optimal advertising intensities which are derived from 
such models are expressed in terms of elasticities which 
prevail when all variables are in equilibrium. However, 
the elasticities which are actually used to calculate 
these ratios are the observed elasticities, which will not 
necessarily be identical to those prevailing at the 
equilibrium. 
Ideally, the present study requires an estimate of 
optimal advertising expenditure which could be 
incorporated into the demand side of the model, which 
would then be used to calculate producer returns from 
opt.imal marketing strategies. However, it would be unwise 
to attempt to derive optimal promotion expenditure on the 
basis of the formulae developed in the previous Section 
because of the above caution. Therefore, the linkage 
between any given, as opposed to optimal, level of 
advertising expenditure and increased output which may 
result from this will be considered. 
The linkage between these variables may be envisaged 
by the following relationship. 
( 5. 50a) V I = . 6. A I 
6AI 
where VI is the increase in output in market segment 
i associated with increased advertising 
expenditure 
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denotes the responsiveness of output to 
advertising expenditure in segment i 
and 6. AI is the increase in advertising expenditure 
in segment i. 
Equation (S. SOa) may be alternatively expressed as 
( S. SOb) 
where BI is the advertising elasticity of demand at 
( A I, Q I) ins e gme n t i 
AI is advertising expenditure in segment i 
Qt is output in segment i. 
and other variables are as previously defined. 
For equation (S. SOb) to be used with plausibility, 
the response of advertising to sales in segment i, 
6 Q t 
which is embedded in the advertising elasticity, BI, 
6At 
muat be assumed constant over the range of increased 
output, Vt. However, empirical evidence suggests that .the 
response of sales to advertising decreases as advertising 
levels increase ( Si mon and Arndt, 1980). Such an 
assumption was implicit in the calculation of optimal 
advertising intensities undertaken in the previous 
Sections, since if this were not the case, then producer 
returns could always have been increased by further 
ad ve r tis i n g. Appropriate restrictions on the behaviour of 
the sales response to advertising would presumably have 
been revealed by the second-order conditions, which were 
not calculated in the previous Sections. This task would 
have been very complex mathematically, and such an 
2 a 1 
omission appea~s to be standa~d p~actice 
optimal fo~mulae of this type. 
when de~iving 
In p~actice, however, very little empirical 
info~mation exists on these sales ~esponses to adve~tising 
in agricultural indust~ies (St~ak, 1983) and in fact, not 
a g~eat deal is known about the adve~tising elasticities 
themsel ves in this sector (Quilkey et aI, 1986) . 
Therefo~e, it may not be possible to inco~po~ate the above 
quantity change into an app~opriate model and to draw 
meaningful infe~ences on the influence of alte~native 
advertising elasticities and levels of adve~tising 
expenditu~e on p~oduce~ ~etu~ns. 
Ins tea d , a mo ~ epa ~ t i a 1 a p p ~ 0 a c h wi 11 be ado pte d , and 
the influence on producer returns of a given change in 
demand which results f~om promotion expenditu~e wi 11 be 
investigated. In o~de~ to do this, the components of any 
demand change f~om adve~tising will be defined. 
Promotion could conceivably influence demand in two 
ways. The fi~st is by inc~easing output at any given 
price, and the second is by alte~ing the p~ice elasticity 
of demand facing a marketing agency at this given p~ice. 
In the literature, the first effect is gene~ally te~med a 
generic 
to as 
promotion effect, whereas the second is ~efer~ed 
a p~oduct-diffe~entiating effect. These 
distinctions will be p~ese~ved in this study, and will be 
considered sepa~ately to ensu~e that results which eme~ge 
can be ~elated in a comparable manne~ to those eme~ging 
f~om othe~ studies which have ~ecognised this 
between p~omotion effects. 
distinction 
. , 
-.j 
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However, it must be emphasized that when the term 
, generic' is used in the context of this study, it refers 
to the ability of a marketing agency to increase demand at 
all price levels in a particular market segment. This 
contrasts to the more conventional definition of the 
term, which infers that demand for product from all 
sources, including competitors, is increased by this type 
of advertising. Schultz and Wittink (1976) and May (1977) 
discuss a range of intermediate variants 
conventionally defined advertising effects . 
• 
of the 
In the remainder of this Section, the influence on 
producer returns of a given generic shift in demand which 
results from advertising in alternative market segments 
will be investigated. This will be done under 
discriminatory pricing, and under benchmark competitive 
pricing assumptions by incorporating generic promotion 
into the discriminatory and competitive pricing models 
developed in the previous Chapter. 
5.4.2 A Competitive Pricing Model with Generic Promotion 
Consider the competitive pricing model developed in 
the previous Chapter. Recall that demand in the ith 
market segment was represented by 
(4.1b) 
where Pi and Qi are price and quantity respectively, 
in market segment i. 
Assume that a fixed amount of promotion in market 
segment i yields a generic effect and increases demand by 
at all price levels. As noted by Edwards (1984), a 
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parallel shift in demand such as this implies that each 
consumer is willing to pay an identical increased price 
for the product, and this increased price applies to all 
quantities on each consumer's demand curve. 
It has been pointed out by researchers dealing with 
analogous supply shifts that the effects of such shifts on 
benefits to producers and consumers may be quite 
sensitive, in certain circumstances, to the type of shift 
assumed (Lindner and Jarrett, 1978i Rose, 1980, Edwards 
and Freebairn, 1984). However, concern is focused in 
this Section on returns from generic promotion under 
different pricing regimes. Even if the magnitude of 
producer returns is influenced by whether a promotion-
induced demand shift is convergent, divergent or parallel, 
it seems reasonable to assume that the relative 
relationship between returns from competitive or 
discriminatory pricing will not be altered where an 
identical type of demand shift is assumed under either 
pric i ng regi me. 
Such an assumption acquires further plausibility when 
an analogous 'neighbourhood' assumption to that outlined 
in tije previous Chapter is invoked. That is, if 
equilibrium changes induced by promotion are essentially 
incremental, the resulting solution under an assumed 
parallel demand shift will still be a reasonable 
approximation of the actual solution when the true demand 
shift is not parallel. 
In addition to the above considerations, 
demand shift also has computational appeal, 
a parallel 
since the 
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algebra involved under alternative demand shifts is quite 
burde ns ome, particularly for the discriminatory pricing 
model. 
Hence, demand in the ith market segment after generic 
promotion may be represented by 
(S.S1a) 
is output in market segment i 
is the absolute increase in demand after 
~eneric promotion in the ith market segment 
and Pip is the price in market segment i after 
generic promotion. 
Therefore, demand in the aggregate market is given by 
(S.S1b) P .. P = a .. - b.Q. + b .. V .. 
where Q. is output in the aggregate market 
n 
V .. = L Vi, which is the sum of the increase in 
i = 1 
demand after generic promotion in each 
market segment 
and P. P is price in the aggregate market after 
generic promotion. 
That is, generic promotion effects are essentially 
captured in the intercept term. 
:-: ! From Section ( 4. 2) of the previous Chapter, recall the 
supply curve. 
( 4. 3) P. = c + dQi d > 0, c < a ... 
where P. and Q are supply price and output 
respecti vely. 
Therefore, after generic promotion in a market segment or 
segments, equilibrium is given by 
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( 5. 52) Pol P = P. 
This yields the following equilibrium price, Po p, and 
output, QoP. 
( 5. 53a) 
[
a .. - c + b. V • ] 
PoP = a. - b.. + b .. V .. 
b .. + d 
and 
( 5. 53b) _ [a . - c + b .. V .. ] Qo p -
b. + d 
The model is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.2. 
The initial equilibrium solution is given by (Po, Qo). 
Recall from Section 4.2 of the previous Chapter that 
( 4. Sa) 
[
a.. - Cd] P. = a .. - b .. 
b .. + 
and 
a .. - c 
(4.5b) 
b .. + d 
Generic promotion in an individual market segment or 
segments induces the aggregate demand shift, Va. The 
increase in producer surplus which results from this 
,."- - - ---:--1 activity can be represented by P.XPYPP QP , which is the 
hatched area in Figure 5.2. 
By adapting equation (4. 34a) in the previous Chapter, 
this change in producer surplus can be incorporated into 
the algebraic model. Now, the increase in producer 
surplus, 6PS, is given by 
PRICE 
Pop 
Po [[8 JIIIlTIIT[OlD. 
Qo Qo p 
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FIGURE 5.2: PRODUCER SURPLUS GAINS FROM GENERIC PROMOTION 
UNDER COMPETITIVE PRICING 
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( 5.54) 6 PS = 6 TR - 6 C 
where 6TR is the change in total revenue 
and 6C is the opportunity cost of resources 
associated with the increased output, (Qap - Qa). 
The change in total revenue, TR, is given by 
(5.55a) 6TR = P.pQ.P - P.Q. 
By substituting equations (5. 53a), (5.53b), ( 4. 5a) and 
( 4. 5b) into equation (5. 55a), the following equation 
emerges. 
b.V. 
[ 2a. -c-2b" [~J + b .. V. [1 - ~J] b .. +d b.+d ( 5. 55b) 6TR = b.+d 
The opportunity cost of additional resources used to 
produce the increased output associated with promotion, 
6C, is given by 
( 5. 56a) 
That is, 
( 5. 56b) 
Q. p 
~C = r e + dQ) dQ 
Q. 
6C = c ( Q. p - Q.) + 
d 
2 
Once again, by substituting equations (5. 53b) 
into equation (5.56b), the following expression 
b.V. [e d(a.-c) d ( 5. 56c) 6C = -- + + b"V" b,,+d b,,+d 2( b. +d) 
and (4. 5b) 
results 
] 
Therefore, by subtracting equation (5. 56 c) from 
equation (5. 55b), producer surplus gains from generic 
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promotion under competitive pricing, f:, PS, can be 
calculated as follows. 
b. V. [ (5.57) f:,PS = ---- 2(a.+c) 
b.+d 
+ b.V. [ d ]] 
2( b. +d) 
The above expression will not be transformed to 
elasticities as was done in the previous Chapter, since 
the resulting equations are more cumbersome than 
illuminating. 
In summary, when a generic promotion effect occurs in 
individual market segments, the result is a demand shift 
in the appropriate segment. The influence of such demand 
shifts on producer surplus under competitive pricing 
assumptions is given in equation (5.57). This expression 
will be used as a benchmark in later Sections of ihis 
study when comparisons are made on the relative returns 
from this type of promotion under discriminatory pricing. 
~ :-; J 5.4.3 A Discriminatory Pricing Model with Generic 
Promotion 
Having established the competitive pricing benchmark 
in the previous Section, the next step is to construct a 
model with the same promotional effects, but under 
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discriminatory pricing assumptions. Such a model is 
outlined below. 
As with the competitive pricing model, assume that a 
fixed amount of generic promotion in market segment i 
increases demand by VI at all price levels. That is, 
recall equation (5. 50a). 
( 5. 50a) 
where QI is output in market segment i 
VI is the increase in demand after generic 
promotion in market segment i 
and PI p is the price in market segment i after 
generic promotion 
Alternatively, 
( 5. 50b) Pip = al 
whe rea I' = a I + b I Vi 
By recalling the discriminatory pricing model 
developed in the previous Chapter, average revenue in the 
aggregate market after generic promotion and assuming 
discriminatory pricing, P.dp, is given by 
where Q. is aggregate output 
~: .-: '. -: = a. + b. V .. 
n 
wi t h V. = LVi 
i = 1 
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Recall once again the supply curve. 
( 4. 3) PI = C + dQi d > 0, c < a. 
where PI and Q are supply price and output 
respecti vely. 
Therefore, after generic promotion under discriminatory 
pricing, equilibrium is given by 
(5.59) P.dp = PI 
This yields the following equilibrium price, 
output, Qlp. 
( 5. 60a) P d 1 p = C + d [a.' - c + X' ° . 5] 
2(b. + d) 
where X' = (a.' - C)l + 4k'(b. + d) 
and other variables are as defined above. 
a .. - c + XO. 5 
( 5. 60b) 
2( b. + d) 
where variables are as previously defined. 
The model is illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
and 
The initial 
price-discriminating equilibrium solution is given by 
(Pdt, Qt>. Recall from the previous Chapter that 
a. - c + XO • 5 
( 4. 24a) 
2( b. + d) 
An alternative formulation of Pdt is given by 
( 4. 23c) 
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where, in both cases, variables are as previously 
defined. 
Therefore, after the demand shift, Va, the increase in 
producer surplus from generic promotion under 
discriminatory pricing is given by Pd1XdYdPd1p, which is 
t. h e hat c he dar e a i n Fig u r e 5. 3. 
Recall equation (5.54) which gives producer surplus, 
t. PS. 
( 5. 54) t.PS =t.TR - t.C 
where t.TR is the change in total revenue 
and t.C is the opportunity cost of resources 
associated with the increased output, (Q1 p - Q1). 
This change in producer surplus, t.PS, can be evaluated 
in a similar manner to that used in the previous Section. 
(5.61a) 
where varia.bles are as previously defined. 
Substituting equations (5. 60a), (5.60b), ( 4. 24a) 'and 
.... 
(4.23c) into this gives 
(S.61b) t.TR = 
2( b a + d) 
2d [[ ( a •. 2 -aa 2) -2c( a •. -aa) ] +[ ( a' X· o. -aX o . ') ctd 
<-' + 
4( b a + d) 2 
where variables are as previously defined. 
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FIGURE 5,3: PRODUCER SURPLUS GAINS FROM GENERIC PROMOTION 
UNDER DISCRIMINATORY PRICING 
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Similarly, 
d 
( 5. 62a) 6.C = c ( Q 1 p - Q 1) + 
2 
Substituting (5. 60b) and (4. 24a) into this gives 
( 5. 62b) 6.C = 
2( b.. + d) 
d[ ( a .. ' 2 -a .. 2) -2c( a .. ' -a .. ) +( a .. ' X' 0.' -a .. Xo .,) -c( X' 0.' -Xo .,) ] 
+ 
4( b.. + d) 2 
Therefore, subtracting (5. 62b) from (5. 61b) gives 
d [[ 2 ( b .. ·+ d) ( k' - k) ] + [ ( a .. ' 2 - a .. 2 ) - 2 c ( a .. ' - a .. ) ] c t d 
( 5.63) b.ps = 
+ [( a .. '.X' 0.' -aX o .,) -c( X' 0.' -Xo .,)] ] 
4( b.. + d) 2 
To conclude, a generic promotion effect in individual 
market segments results in a demand shift in the 
appropriate segments. The influence of these demand 
shifts on producer surplus under discriminatory pricing 
assumptions is given in equation (5.63). Comparison of 
this equation with the measure for increased producer 
surplus which results from identical demand shifts under 
competitive pricing assumptions allows some assessment to 
be made of the relative returns from this type of 
promotion under alternative pricing regimes. 
5. 4. 4. Conclusion 
Since it was not possible to incorporate optimal 
promotion expenditure in alternative segments into a model 
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which showed the actual magnitude of producer returns from 
such promotion given optimal rather than competitive 
pri ci ng, models were constructed which allowed such 
returns to be calculated from a given demand shift. It 
must be acknowledged however, that the models abstract 
from the magnitude of advertising expenditure required to 
produce such demand shifts, although such a mechanism was 
i n ve s t i gat e d. 
In Chapter 6, these models will be utilized to 
determine whether returns from promotion expenditure 
• 
result in greater gains for producers under optimal 
pricing than they do under uniform pricing. 
5. 5 THE EFFECT OF PRODUCT 01 FFERENTI ATI ON ON PRODUCER 
SURPLUS UNDER DISCRIMINATORY PRICING 
In addition to a generic promotion effect in 
individual market segments, the second conceptual 
promotion effect which has been noted in the literature 
occurs when a product can be differentiated from that of a 
competi tor. Such product differentiation has the effect 
of making demand for a product less elastic than it might 
otherwise be (de Boer, 1977; May, 1977). Such an effect 
can be incorporated into the price discrimination and 
competitive pricing models developed in the previous 
Chapter. 
Recall equation (4. 28c), which gives the export demand 
elasticity facing a marketing institution in a particular 
market segment, nx i •. 
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Ct 
[ •• e •• 
St 
n x"j ( 4. 28c) n. t • = n I <l>t • -- - -- + .L eIJ9J .. --
XI. X i a J = 1 X 1 a 
where nt is the own price elasticity of demand in i 
el is the own price elasticity of supply in i 
etJ are the appropriate cross elasticities of 
supply 
X t • 
is a's market share in i 
Ct 
Xi .. X t .. 
and are measures of a's importance as 
X t J 
a supplier to i 
and <1>1 .. , 9ta and 9Ja are measures of the appropriate 
price transmission elasticities. 
For simplicity, these price transmission elasticities 
can be assumed equal, and equation (4. 28c) then becomes 
( 4. 28d) 
[ 
Ct 
nxta = <l>ta nt--
X t a 
[ 
SI 
el--
X I a 
+ n XtJJ] .L eIJ--
J=1 Xla 
where variables are as previously defined. 
Now when price transmission is perfect, <l>t a is 1, and 
when no price transmission occurs, <I> 1 a is zero. 
Therefdre, when country a's product is differentiated from 
that of its competi tors, <I> i a falls since price 
transmission becomes less perfect. From (5. 28d) , it 
becomes obvious that as <I> I a falls, the export demand 
elasticity, nx i .. , also falls. Therefore, the competi ti ve 
supply response is reduced. 
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Therefore, the effect of differentiating a product 
from that of a competitor in any or all market segments 
can be ascertained through its effect on the appropriate 
demand elasticities. This in turn influences the 
magnitude 
pricing. 
of producer surplus under discriminatory 
Competitive returns will obviously remain 
. unchanged, since altering the elasticity of demand in 
.. 
individual market segments will not alter the competitive 
equilibrium solution. This implies that purely product-
differentiating promotion makes 
competitive pricing procedures. 
little sense under 
Within the agricultural economics literature, there 
appear to be no studies which specifically deal with 
linkages between advertising expenditure and changes in 
price transmission elasticities. As a consequence, the 
influence on producer returns of given changes in demand 
elasticities, which result from product-
differentiating promotion will be investigated. This 
allows the relative effect of such advertising in 
alternative market segments under discriminatory pricing 
to be determined. However, as with the generic promotion 
case, it must be borne in mind that such an analysis 
abstracts from the advertising expenditure required to 
produce these changes in demand elasticities. 
5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The broad objective of this Chapter was to investigate 
aspects, of promotion in multiple market segments where a 
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supply response by producers occurs in response to any 
increased price which they receive from this promotion 
activity. 
It was ascertained that optimal decision rules for 
promotion in multiple market segments under these supply 
conditions had not been developed under either competitive 
or discriminatory pricing procedures. As a consequence, 
such decision rules were developed by appropriate 
extensions to the Nerlove-Waugh theorem of optimal 
advertising for an aggregate market with supply response. 
The first such extension incorporated uniform pricing 
across market segments, and the following four conclusions 
emerged from the model. 
(a) The optimal aggregate advertising intensity is 
identical to that under the Nerlove-Waugh 
theorem, with the exception that the advertising 
demand elasticity for the Nerlove-Waugh aggregate 
market case is replaced by the sum of the 
advertising elasticities in individual market 
segments weighted by the share of output 
allocated to these segments. 
( b) The optimal allocation of advertising 
expenditure to an individual market segment is 
given by the ratio of the advertising elasticity 
of demand in that segment weighted by the share 
of output allocated to that segment to the sum of 
all such weighted averages. 
( c) The optimal ratio of advertising to sales 
generated in a particular market segment is 
'«:-C" ,", "," :1 
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identical to that for the Nerlove-Waugh theorem 
with the exception that the aggregate market 
Nerlove-Waugh advertising elasticity is replaced 
by the advertising elasticity in the relevant 
marke t s egme nt. 
(d) The ratio of optimal advertising per unit sales 
in market segment i to that in market segment j 
is equivalent to the ratio of the corresponding 
advertising elasticities of demand. 
The second extension to the Nerlove-Waugh theorem 
incorporated discriminatory pricing between market 
segments. Three conclusions emerged from this model. 
(e) The formula for the optimal aggregate advertising 
intensity in a particular market segment is 
similar to that which emerges under the aggregate 
Nerlove-Waugh theorem. However, it includes an 
additional term in the denominator which is a 
function of the price elasticity of demand in'the 
market segment in question, the price elasticity 
of supply, and the ratio of the pool price to the 
optimal price in the market segment. 
(f) For a two-segment case~ the optimal advertising 
intensity in the less price elastic segment is 
greater than it would be under Nerlove-Waugh 
prescriptions. .Conversely, for the more price 
elastic market segment, this intensity would be 
correspondingly less than it would be under 
Nerlove-Waugh assumptions. 
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( g) In the two-market segment case once aga in, 
relatively more advertising effort is directed to 
the less price elastic market segment under 
discriminatory pricing than would be the case 
under competitive pricing across market segments. 
Conversely, relatively less advertising effort is 
directed towards the more price elastic segment. 
The above decision rules enhance our general 
understanding of how advertising effort might be more 
profitably allocated under market assumptions which are 
more realistic than those conventionally employed to 
prescribe the direction of advertising effort in typically 
structured agricultural industries. 
However, it was not possible to incorporate such 
formulae into a marketing mix model which indicates 
returns to producers from optimal pricing and promotion 
policies. Therefore, the influence of given, rather than 
optimal, promotion effects on producer returns was 
considered. 
In order to do this, it was necessary to incorporate 
promotion effects into the competitive and discriminatory 
pricing models previously developed. To facilitate this, 
two conceptual promotion effects were considered. The 
first, termed a 'generic' promotion effect, refers to the 
ability of a marketing agency to increase demand for its 
product at all price levels in a particular market 
segment. The second effect considered was a 'product-
differentiating' effect, which occurs when a marketing 
agency manages to alter its demand curve in a particular 
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segment by diffe~entiating its p~oduct f~om that of its 
competi to~s. 
Gene~ic p~omotion effects we~e inco~porated into the 
competitive and discriminatory pricing models constructed 
in Chapter 4. This allowed expressions to be derived for 
the changes in producer su~plus which result f~om this 
type of promotion in selected market segments under each 
of these pricing regi meso Si mi 1 a~l y, product-
diffe~entiating promotion effects can be incorporated into 
the discriminatory pricing model through an appropriate 
adjustment to the demand elasticities facing the marketing 
institution. 
In Chapter 6, the formulae emerging f~om these gains 
models will be evaluated, and numerical simulations will 
be conducted to determine the relative influence of 
promotion in alternative market segments unde~ alternative 
pricing regimes. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET CHARACTERISTICS AND 
THE OUTCOMES OF MARKET SEGMENTATION POLICIES 
6. 1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous two Chapters, the operation of market 
segmentation policies in typically structured agricultural 
industries has been modelled. Expressions have been 
derived which ~an now be used to evaluate the impact of 
market characteristics on the outcomes of market 
segmentation policies. 
This Chapter uses these relationships to isolate those 
market characteristics which are of significance, and to 
explore the sensitivity of market segmentation outcomes to 
changes in these variables. 
In Section 6.2, such variables are isolated and a 
numerical example which can be used as a basis for 
simulation exercises is developed. Section 6.3 considers 
those variables which influence the short-run outcomes of 
such segmentation policies, while variables affecting 
long-run returns are considered in Section 6.4. 
These long-run variables are, however, influenced by a 
further set of variables, which are investigated in 
Section 6.5. Since most discussion has concentrated on 
the influence of market segmentation policies on producer 
returns, the secondary producer objective of reducing 
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producer price variability will be considered in 
Section 6.6. 
Finally, in Section 6.7, the market segmentation model 
is applied to the New Zealand sheepmeats industry. This 
allows the actual magnitude of returns which may be 
expected in a particular industry to be assessed. 
6.2 BASIC MODEL FEATURES 
6.2.1 Variables Influencing Segmentation Outcomes 
Market segmentation policies have both a short-run and 
a long-run impact on the primary producer objective of 
increasing producer returns. 
The short-run effects were modelled in Chapter 4, and 
are represented by the immediate returns, k, from 
reallocating a given output according to discriminatory 
pricing principles. This was given by the expression 
( 4. 22) 
where 
n 
k = ~ Po Qo ~ 
i =1 
Qo is the gi ven output 
Po is the competitive price at 
S1 is the proportion of total 
Qo 
output allocated 
to market segment i under competitive pricing 
n1 and n. are the price elasticities of demand 
(absolute value) in market segment i and the 
aggregate market, respecti vely, at the 
competitive price, Po. 
The longer-run impact on producer returns of market 
segmentation policies as measured by producer surplus 
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gains, 6PS, was encapsulated in expression (4. 34c) which 
incorporates the appropriate supply responses to 
discriminatory pricing. 
1 2k 
( 4. 34 c) 6P S = 
4e [_1 + ~J 
n. e 
p, Q, + [p" Q,' +4kP, Q, [_1_ 
n. 
where e is the price elasticity of supply at (Po, Qo) 
and other variables are as defined above. 
In addition, expressions were derived for the various 
total revenue components of this producer surplus change, 
and the own supply response to altered pricing policies. 
Effectively, the long-run generic promotion elements 
in a market segmentation policy were incorporated into the 
discriminatory pricing model by intercept shifts in the 
demand equations. That is, 
( 6. 1 ) a, = a, + b, V, 
where V, represents the increase in demand at all 
pri ce levels. 
Expressions for increased producer returns which resulted 
from generic promotion were then derived. 
Similarly, any long-run product-differentiating 
promotion effects in individual market segments were 
incorporated through a change in the price elasticity of 
demand, nt, facing an institution for its product in 
individual market segments. 
However, some of the variables which appear in the 
above expressions are themselves influenced by other 
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vari abIes. For exampl e, the pri c e elasticity of demand 
in the aggregate market, n., can be calculated from the 
corresponding elasticities in the individual market 
segments, ni, and the share of output allocated to these 
market segments, Si. Tha tis, 
n 
( 6. 2) n. = :E niSi 
i =1 
Similarly, the long-run price elasticity of demand 
facing an agency for its product in individual market 
segments, ni,. can be calculated by amending equation 
(4.28c) to give 
( 6. 3) Si "] - eii --
Xi .. Xi .. 
where CPi represents all consumer and producer price 
transmission elasticities which are assumed 
equal 
nll is the market price elasticity of demand in 
market segment i 
eil is the price elasticity of supply for 
competitors and is assumed to be equal for 
all supply sources 
is the market share of the product held by 
the marketing agency in country i 
S 1 " 
is the ratio of product supplied from all 
XI .. 
other sources to that supplied by the 
marketing agency. 
The product-differentiating influence referred to 
previously is made explicit in this equation, since it 
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effective~y alters the price transmission elasticities, 
4l I • 
Similarly, an expression which gives an approximation 
to the demand shift from generic promotion in any market 
s e gme nt, V I, is give n by 
( 5. 50 b) 
AI 
where Ai is the initial advertising level 
is initial demand 
6A, is increased advertising expenditure 
and Bt is the advertising elasticity of demand at 
From the above summary of the important model 
features, a list of variables which influence the outcomes 
of market segmentation policies can be deri ved. These 
variables can be classified according to whether they are 
influential in the short-run or the long-run. 
The comparative static nature of the model developed 
implies that the incorporation of promotion effects is 
essentially a long-run phenomenon (Nerlove and Waugh, 
1961>. Therefore, the relevant short-run variables are 
those which determine the outcome of a short-run 
reallocation of a given output according to discriminatory 
pricing principles. 
The appropriate long-run variables are those which 
influence the long-run model outcomes where promotion has 
been incorporated. However, in the interests of clarity, 
it is useful to consider those factors which influence the 
outcomes from long-run discriminatory pricing, and then to 
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consider variables which relate to long-run discriminatory 
pricing under various promotional strategies. 
The basic influential variables are summarized in 
Table 6.1. In following Sections, each of these variables 
will be varied in turn, and the impact of this shock on 
model outcomes will be evaluated. In Table 6. 2, the 
factors which in turn influence the long-run variables are 
also listed. These will likewise be varied to determine 
their influence on the magnitude of the appropriate 
long-run variables, and ultimately, on market segmentation 
outcomes. 
6. 2. 2 A Base Model 
In order to investigate the impact of the above 
variables, a basic two-segment version of the model which 
assigns specific values to the above variables has been 
developed. The numerical features of this base model are 
outlined in Table 6.3. 
The objective of the simulation exercises is to 
determine the relative influence of particular variables 
on model outcomes, rather than to simulate the actual 
performance of market segmentation policies in a given 
industry. 
represent 
The 
any 
above 
specific 
characterize agricultural 
parameters do not purport to 
although they industry, 
conditions to the extent that 
this is possible. The base price and output parameters 
are essentially mid-range estimates 
five major agricultural industries. 
from New Zealand's 
A representative 
supply elasticity is difficult to choose, since this 
227 
TABLE 6.1 
BASIC VARIABLES WHICH INFLUENCE THE OUTCOMES OF MARKET 
SEGMENTATION POLICIES 
========================================================== 
SHORT-RUN: 
LONG-RUN: 
S i 
Po, Qo • 
Price elasticities of demand facing 
an agency in 
segments 
individual ma~ket 
Shares of output allocated 
individual market segments 
Initial 
output 
equilibrium price 
to 
and 
The above variables 
n. 
e 
Price elasticity of demand facing 
an agency in the aggregate market 
Price elasticity of supply 
Demand shift from generic promotion 
in individual market segments 
========================================================== 
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TABLE 6. 2 
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE MAGNITUDE OF LONG-RUN VARIABLES 
=~==================================================== ==== 
VARIABLE 
e i i 
6.Ai 
Ai 
3i 
FACTORS 
Market price elasticity of 
demand in market segment i 
Market share of product 
segment i 
in }TIarket 
Competitive supply elasticities in 
market segment i 
All price transmission elasticities 
with respect to market segment i 
Initial level of output 
segment i 
in 
Proportionate increase 
market 
in 
advertising expenditure in market 
segment i 
Advertising elasticity of demand in 
market segment i 
========================================================== 
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parameter is influenced by the nature of the product, 
alternative land-use possibilities, and the time horizon 
in question. In the base example, a longer-run 
perspective is focused on with some inelasticity in supply 
still remaining. There is some degree of arbitrariness in 
setting the base demand parameters, since these are likely 
to vary according to the type of the product and the 
dimension, whether spatial, temporal or product form, in 
Mhich segmentation is undertaken. 
6. 3 VARIABLES INFLUENCING SHORT-RUN OUTCOMES 
6. 3. 1 The Competitive Equilibrium Position 
Short-run market segmentation outcomes are influenced 
by the magnitude of the competitive equilibrium price and 
output, Po and Qo. From equation (4.22), it is obvious 
that short-run producer returns vary directly and 
proportionately with these variables. 
However, it may be more relevant to consider the 
relative, rather than the absolute, increase in producer 
returns; that is, the percentage increase in immediate 
k 
total revenue, measured by In this case, a given 
Po Qo 
percentage increase in either the base price or the 
quantity would lead to the same percentage increase in 
producer returns. 
6. 3. 2 P ric eEl as tic i tie s 0 fOe ma n d 
The magnitude of the short-run producer gains, k, is 
influenced by the magnitude of the price elasticities of 
demand in the individual market segments. However, it is 
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TABLE 6.3 
BASE MODEL PARAMETERS 
========================================================== 
Po $1000/t 
Qo 250, OOot 
nt O. 5 
n2 1 . 5 
8t O. 5 
82 O. 5 
e 1. a 
========================================================== 
.. -1 
c • _ :~.<, - . -.-' , 
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not obvious from equation (4.22) how such gains might vary 
when price elasticities in alternative market segments 
vary. 
Numerical simulations on the base model were therefore 
conducted. In the first instance, the price elasticity in 
the relatively less price elastic segment, n1 , was 
increased from 0.5 until it reached the value of n2, 1 . 5, 
and was then decreased from 0.5 until it was very low. 
The values of all other model variables were held constant 
during this exercise. The results of these simulations 
are presented in Table 6.4. 
These indicate that when demand in both segments is 
isoelastic, short-run revenue gains are zero. As n1 falls 
from this value, both the absolute value of the short-run 
revenue gains, k, and the relative increase in total 
revenue, LlTR.(%), increase at an increasing rate. In an 
attempt to explore this observation more closely, 
appropriate relationships between the individual market 
segment elasticities and the aggregate elasticity were 
noted and are shown in the last three columns of Table 
6. 4. The effect of the falling n1 is to widen the 
divergence between the individual elasticities, (n2 - n1), 
and to decrease the value of the aggregate elasticity, nil. 
Obvi ously, this divergence as a proportion of the 
[
n2 - n1 J ' 
aggregate elasticity, increases as n1 falls. 
n" 
•. -<-:--
TABLE 6.4 
THE INFLUENCE OF VARYING LEVELS OF nl 
ON SHORT-RUN PRODUCER RETURNS 
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========================================================= 
[n2 - nl] nl k( $M) 6TR I ( %) ( n2 - n 1 ) n. 
n. 
-------- -------------------- ---------------------------
O. 125 193. 9 77.6 1 . 38 O. 81 1. 70 
O. 250 74. 4 29. 8 1 . 25 O. 88 1. 42 
O. 500 20. 8 8.3 1 . 00 1. 00 1. 00 
1. 000 2. 1 O. 8 O. 50 1. 25 O. 40 
1. 250 O. 4 O. 1 O. 25 1. 38 O. 18 
1. 500 0.0 0.0 O. 00 1 . 50 O. 00 
========================================================= 
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The demand elasticity in the relatively price elastic 
market, n2, was then varied in a similar manner. It was 
first decreased from its base value of 1.5 to the value of 
nl, 0.5, and then increased beyond its base value until it 
was very high. The results are presented in Table 6.5. 
As n2 increased, both absolute and relative short-run 
producer gains rose. This increase in gains coincided 
with increased values for the aggregate elasticity, n~, 
the divergence between these elasticities, (n2 - nl), and 
[
n2 - nlJ. 
a relative measure of this divergence, 
nil 
A comparison of Tables 6.4 and 6.5 indicates that 
relatively large increases in producer gains are 
associated with reducing levels of nl, and hence, nil. 
However, relatively smaller increases in these gains are 
associated with increasing levels and as a 
consequence, nil. In both cases, the divergence between 
the individual elasticities increased. 
These relationships between producer returns, the 
aggregate elasticity, and the ·divergence between 
individual elasticities will now be investigated more 
precisely. In the first instance, both demand 
elasticities, nl and n2, are varied above and below their 
base values in a manner which holds the absolute 
divergence between them constant. This effectively varies 
the aggregate elasticity. These simulations are presented 
in Table 6.6, and indicate that, for a given divergence, 
producer returns decrease as the value of the aggregate 
elasticity,. n~, increases. This implies that the ability 
to increase total revenue through exploiting demand in the 
TABLE 6.5 
THE INFLUENCE OF VARYING LEVELS OF n2 
ON SHORT-RUN PRODUCER RETURNS 
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========================================================== 
[n2 - nlJ nl k( $M) ~TR.( %) ( n2 - n I ) n. 
n. 
-------- -------------------- ---------------------------
O. 5 O. 0 O. 0 0.0 O. 50 O. 00 
1 . 0 10. 4 4. 2 0.5 O. 75 O. 67 
1. 5 20.8 8.3 1 . 0 1. 00 1. 00 
2. 5 33.3 13. 3 2. 0 1. 50 1 . 33 
5. 0 46.0 18. 4 4. 5 2. 75 1 . 64 
10. 0 53.7 21. 5 9. 5 5. 25 1 . 81 
========================================================= 
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relatively less price elastic segment is greater when 
monopoly power in that segment, and in the total market 
itself, is greater. 
Individual segment elasticities were then varied in an 
alternative way. In this case, the divergence between n1 
and n2 was varied in a manner which held the aggregate 
elasticity, n .. , constant. Table 6.7 illustrates these 
results. In this case, for a given value of na, producer 
returns increase as the divergence between individual 
elasticities, (n2 - nt), increases. 
In conclusion, therefore, short-run producer returns 
will be relatively large in both absolute and relative 
terms, when, at the competitive equilibrium, the 
divergence between demand elasticities in market segments, 
(n2 - n1), is relatively large, and these elasticities are 
such that the aggregate demand elasticity, n .. , is 
relati vely low. Since the price elasticity of demand for 
agricultural products is known to be relatively low, it 
seems obvious that the application of market segmentation 
policies might appear superficially attractive to 
marketing agencies operating in these industries. 
6. 3. 3 Shares of Output Allocated to each Segment 
The final variable which influences the short-run 
returns from market segmentation policies will now be 
cons i de red. This is the share of output allocated to 
individual market segments under competitive allocation 
procedures, and is denoted by Sl. From equation (4.22), 
TABLE 6. 6 
THE INFLUENCE OF VARYING LEVELS OF nl AND n2, 
WITH CONSTANT DIVERGENCE, (n2 - nl) 1 
ON SHORT-RUN PRODUCER RETURNS 
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========================================================== 
nl n2 k( $M) t.TR.(%) n .. 
------------------ ----------------------- ---------------
0.25 1. 25 66. 7 27. a o. 75 
O. 50 1 . 50 20. 8 8. 3 1. 00 
0.75 1. 75 9. 5 3. 8 1. 25 
1. 00 2. 00 5. 2 2. 1 1 . 50 
1. 50 2. 50 2. 1 O. 8 2. 00 
2. 50 3. 50 O. 6 O. 2 3. 00 
5. 00 6. 00 O. 1 O. a 5. 50 
=====================================================~ ==== 
1. The divergence, (n2 - nl) is assumed to equal its base 
value, 1.0. 
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TABLE 6.7 
THE INFLUENCE OF VARYING LEVELS OF nt AND n2, 
WITH CONSTANT n. t, ON SHORT-RUN PRODUCER RETURNS 
========================================================== 
k( $M) flTR. ( %) 
------------------ -----------------------
O. 13 1 . 88 1 9 4. 8 77. 9 1 . 75 
O. 25 1 . 75 80. 3 32. 1 1 . 50 
O. 50 1 . 50 20. 8 8. 3 1. 00 
O. 75 1 . 25 4. 2 1 . 7 O. 50 
1 . 00 1. 00 O. 0 O. 0 O. 00 
========================================================== 
1 . The aggregate elasticity, nil, is assumed to equal its 
base value, 1. O. 
- -." ~.--: ~.: >: 
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it is not obvious how producer returns vary with changes 
in this parameter. Therefore, a range of simulations were 
unde rt ake n. The value of St was initially decreased from 
its base value of 0.5 and then increased beyond this. The 
value was correspondingly varied. The results of 
this simulation are shown in Table 6.8. 
This shows that when the share of output allocated to 
the less price elastic segment under competitive pricing, 
SI, falls, then the increase in producer returns, both in 
absolute and relative terms, also falls. Note that this 
fall is associated with increasing values of the aggregate 
demand elasti ci ty, n •. 
However, when St rises beyond its base value, thereby 
inducing a fall in n .. , producer returns do not increase 
beyond the base level but remain static and then decrease 
as S1 rises and S2 consequently falls. 
A possible explanation for this result might be that 
as St continues to rise, the more elastic segment is 
dwarfed by the inelastic segment in this particular 
example. A reallocation of output from the inelastic to 
the elastic segment will increase total revenue from the 
inelastic segment. However, the increased output in the 
relatively elastic segment may be so great relative to the 
size of the segment, that it results in demand in that 
segment moving from a price elastic situation to a price 
inelastic situation. As a result, total revenue in this 
segment may not increase to the extent which might be 
expected if output moved from one price elastic point to 
another price elastic point on the demand curve. 
TABLE 6.8 
THE INFLUENCE OF VARYING PROPORTIONS OF OUTPUT 
ALLOCATED TO INDIVIDUAL SEGMENTS, S1 AND S2, 
ON SHORT-RUN PRODUCER RETURNS 
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========================================================== 
St S2 
------------------
o. 125 O. 875 
O. 250 0.750 
0.500 O. 500 
0.750 O. 250 
O. 875 O. 125 
k( $M) llTR. ( %) 
-----------------------
6. 6 2. 7 
12. 5 5. 0 
20. 8 8. 3 • 
20. 8 8. 3 
14. 6 5. 8 
n .. 
1. 375 
1. 250 
1 . 00 
O. 750 
O. 625 
========================================================== 
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On the basis of these results, it would not seem wise 
to draw firm conclusions on the relationship between the 
observed share of output in individual market segments 
before market segmentation and the magnitude of producer 
gains which result from market segmentation. 
6.3.4 Conclusion 
~In this Section, variables which influenced short-run 
returns from market segmentation outcomes were analyzed 
using the linear model which was developed. A number of 
conclusions were drawn on the basis of either analytical 
or numerical observation. 
Firstly, short-run revenue returns will be high, in 
absolute terms, when the size of the industry is large 
before price discrimination, and the corresponding 
competitive price is high. However, in relative terms, 
returns from market segmentation do not vary with respect 
to these variables. 
In addition, in both absolute and relative terms, 
short-run returns will be large when, in competitive 
equilibrium, the aggregate demand elasticity is low, and 
the divergence between individual demand elasticities is 
large. 
6.4 VARIABLES INFLUENCING LONG-RUN OUTCOMES 
6.4.1 The Aggregate Price Elasticity of Demand 
The short-run variables considered above influence the 
long-run returns from market segmentation in a similar 
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manner to that already described. However, in the 
long-run, the individual elasticities, nl, are themselves 
influenced by a further set of variables, which will be 
discussed in the next Section. 
Despite the fact that the aggregate elasticity, n., is 
itself composed of some of the variables discussed above, 
its i nfl uence on long-run producer returns will be 
evaluated. This is because equation (4. 34c) indicates 
that this composite elasticity influences these returns 
directly, as well as through the short-run returns, k, 
which have already been considered. 
In doing this, the divergence between the individual 
demand elasticities was assumed to remain constant as the 
aggregate elasticity initially fell from its base value of 
1 . a and then rose from this base value until it was 
relatively high. The various total revenue components of 
producer surplus were calculated, as was the long-run own 
supply response by producers. The results of this 
exercise are presented in Table 6.9. 
As the aggregate demand elasticity, n., rises, then 
for a given divergence between segment elasticities, (n2 -
nt), long-run producer surplus returns fal1. Consider the 
total revenue component of these long-run producer surplus 
returns, 6TR. This consists of short-run revenue returns, 
k, and the long-run quantity adjustment to total revenue, 
discussed in Chapter 4, 
( 6TR - k). 
As noted previously, 
which can be calculated as 
this short-run component, k, 
decreases as the aggregate demand elasticity increases. 
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The quantity adjustment to this short-run revenue may be 
either negative or positive. When the 
elasticity is price inelastic at 
equilibrium then this adj ustment will 
aggregate demand 
the competitive 
be negative and 
dissipate short-run gains. On the other hand, when this 
elasticity (as measured on the demand curve after supply 
response) is greater than one, this adjustment will be 
positive, and therefore enhance short-run gains. 
aggregate demand elasticity rises, this 
adjustment becomes a relatively more important 
of total revenue gains. 
As the 
quantity 
component 
Producer surplus gains, L\PS, demonstrate a similar 
pattern with respect to the aggregate demand elasticity, 
with returns becoming rapidly smaller as demand becomes 
As a result, the supply response, L\Q, also more elastic. 
declines as the demand elasticity rises, since increased 
returns from market segmentation policies are 
correspondingly lower. 
6.4.2 The Price Elasticity of Supply 
A variable which is of some importance in determining 
the magnitude of the own supply response to discriminatory 
pricing is the own price elasticity of supply. 
It is obvious from the previously calculated total 
revenue equation (4. 32d), that long-run revenue gains are 
equal to the short-run gains, k, when the supply 
elasticity is zero. That is, 
( 6. 4) L\TR = k when e = O. 
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TABLE 6. 9 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE AGGREGATE DEMAND ELASTICITY, n~, 
ON LONG-RUN PRODUCER RETURNS 
========================================================== 
n1 n2 n. k 6TR 6PS 6Q 
( $M) ( $M) ( $M) ( , Ooot) 
-------------------- ----------------------------- -------
O. 01 1 . 01 O. 51 3, 033. 4 1 , 420. 8 710. 4 396. a 
o. 50 1 . 50 1 . 00 20. 8 20. 4 10. 2 10. a 
1 . 00 2. 00 1 . 50 5. 2 6. 2 3. 1 3. 1 
1 . 50 2. 50 2. 00 2. 1 2. 8 1 . 4 1 . 4 
2. 00 3. 00 2. 50 1 . a 1 . 5 O. 7 O. 7 
4. 50 5. 50 5. 00 O. 1 O. 2 O. 1 O. 1 
9. 50 10. 50 10. 00 o. a o. a o. a o. a 
========================================================== 
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It is not intuitively obvious how these revenue gains 
behave as supply becomes more elastic, although an 
analytical expression, equation (6.5), can be derived 
which shows the limiting value of 6TR as e approaches 
infinity. 
( 6. 5) 
[
P0 2 Q0 2 .. ]O.~ PoQo 
6TR = + Po Qo kn. ---
4 2 
when e -> co 
Proofs to equations (6.4) and (6.5) are given in Appendix 
3. 
Unfortunately, it is not obvious from equation (4. 34c) 
how producer surplus gains vary with the price elasticity 
of supply. However, intuition would suggest that such 
returns would range from the short run revenue gains, k, 
when the price elasticity of supply is zero, to zero when 
the price elas.ticity of supply approaches infinity. 
."---------":"--.,' Recall from the discussion on producer surplus in Chapter 
3, however, that this concept is only meaningful in the 
long-run when some inelasticity remains in the supply of 
one factor. 
Once again, a series of appropriate simulations were 
run. The results, illustrated in Table 6.10, clarify the 
above relationships between producer surplus returns and 
···1 
the supply elasticity. 
Obvi ously, short-run revenue gains, k, are constant 
with respect to the magnitude of the supply elasticity. 
However, for the base example illustrated in Table 6.10, 
the quantity adjustment revenue effect is negative, and 
increases (becomes more negative) as the supply elasticity 
, .. ' .. '. - . '. ~ 
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t"i ses. This is obset"vable tht"ough total t"evenue gai ns, 
6 TR, which dect"ease, but not mat"kedly so, as supply 
becomes mot"e elastic. By contt"ast, pt"oducet" sut"plus 
gains, which at"e equivalent to k when supply is completely 
inelastic, at"e t"apidly et"oded as supply becomes 
elastic. Similat"ly, the supply t"esponse by pt"oducet"s 
inct"eases mat"kedly undet" these conditions. 
6.4.3 Demand Shifts ft"om Genet"ic Pt"omotion 
As noted pt"eviously, the demand shift ft"om genet"ic 
pt"omotion in an individual mat"ket segment, Vi, was tt"e~ted 
as an intet"cept shi ft in thi s mat"ket segment. 
Consequently, the competitive pt"icing and disct"iminatot"y 
pt"icing models wet"e algebt"aically t"eworked to include such 
an effect. Unfortunately, it was not obvious from these 
amended models (equations (5.57) and (5.63)), how genet"ic 
pt"omotion in individual mat"ket segments influences 
producet" t"etut"ns undet" discriminatot"y pricing t"elative to 
the benchmat"k competitive pricing. Consequently, such an 
effect was numet"ically simulated under each pt"icing 
t"egi me, and a comparison made of the outputs from each of 
these models. 
It was assumed that a five percent increase in total 
demand occurt"ed at the competitive pt"ice as a t"esult of 
genet"ic pt"omotion. That is, V. is 12,500 tonnes in the 
base example. Demand shifts of altet"native magnitudes 
have cort"espondingly proportional influences on model 
outcomes and thet"efot"e, will not be considet"ed fut"thet". 
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TABLE 6.10 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE SUPPLY ELASTICITY, e, 
ON LONG-RUN PRODUCER RETURNS 
========================================================== 
e k ~TR ~PS ~Q 
( $M) ( $M) ( $M) ( , OOOt) 
--------- -------------------------------- ---------------
O. 01 20. 8 20. 8 20. 6 O. 2 
O. 10 20. 8 20. 8 1 8. 9 1 . 9 
O. 25 20. 8 20. 7 16. 5 4. 1 
.. 
- . - ~ 
O. 50 20. 8 20. 6 13. 7 6. 8 
1 ; 00 20. 8 20. 4 10. 2 10. 0 
1 . 50 20. 8 20. 3 8. 1 1 1 . 9 
2. 50 20. 8 20. 0 5. 8 14. 1 
5. 00 20. 8 19. 8 3. 4 16. 3 
10. 00 20. 8 19. 6 1 . 8 17. 7 
========================================================== 
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In the first instance, the entire shift was assumed to 
occur in segment 1 , whereas in the second case, it was 
assumed to occur in segment 2. A third possibility, where 
half of the demand increase occurs in each market segment, 
was also considered. The results are presented in Table 
6. 11 . In this Table, note that p', Q', S1 and S2 refer 
to the price, quantity and share of output allocated to 
market segments after generic promotion in the appropriate 
segment. Similarly, 6TR' and 6PS' refer to increased 
total revenue and increased producer surplus, 
respectively, from generic promotion given the appropriate 
pri ci ng regi me. 
Consider the influence of generic promotion under 
competitive pricing. When this occurs in market segment 
1 alone, both price and output increase with the result 
that both total revenue and producer surplus also 
increase. In addition, the share of this increased output 
allocated to segment 1 increases, while that in segment 2 
decreases. When an alternative demand shift is assumed in 
segment 2 alone, the same increase in price, output, total 
revenue and producer surplus is observed. However, unlike 
the first demand shift considered, the share of output 
-"-"._' .. --J allocated to segment 1 decreases, while that to segment 2 
increases when generic promotion occurs in this latter 
segment. The final promotion possibility considered 
allocated half of the postulated demand increase to each 
market segment. In this case, the same increases in 
price, output and producer returns occurred as with all 
V1 V2 V_ k ~TR" ~PS" P" Q" ('OOOt) ( 'OOOt) ('OOOt) ($M) ($M) ($M) ($'OOO/t) ('OOOt) 
COMPETITIVE 
PRICING 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.000 250 
12.50 0.00 12.50 0.0 12.6 6.3 1.025 256 
0.00 12.50 12.!i0 0.0 12.6 6.3 1.025 256 
6.25 6.25 12.50 0.0 12.6 6.3 1.025 256 
DISCRIMINATORY 
PRICING 
0.00 0.00 0.00 20.8 0.0 0.0 1.040 260 
12.50 0.00 12.50 27.5 19.1 9.5 1.076 269 
0.00 12.50 12.50 27.5 10.6 5.3 1.060 265 
6.25 6.25 12.50 23.0 14.7 7.3 1.068 267 
TABLE 6.11: THE INFLUENCE OF GENERIC PROMOTION ON LONG-RUN PRODUCER RETURNS 
51 
0.50 
0.53 
0.48 
0.50 
0.37 
0.38 
0.36 
0.37 
52 
0.50 
0.47 
0.52 
0.50 
0.63 
0.62 
0.64 
0.63 
I 
N 
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previous cases, while the original share of output 
allocated to individual market segments is preserved. 
By comparison, consider the case where discriminatory 
pricing is practised and generic promotion is undertaken 
in each market segment in turn. When this promotion is 
undertaken in the first segment alone, the pool price and 
output both increase, as does the short-term revenue gain, 
k, total revenue, and producer sur~lus. Note that, in 
this case, k measures the increase in short-run revenue 
from the original competitive pricing equilibrium before 
promotion to the discriminatory pricing equilibrium after 
promoti on. Similar effects occur when promotion occurs in 
the second segment alone, although these are relatively 
dampened in this case. Once again, the case is considered 
where half the demand increase is assumed to occur in each 
segment. The result of this simulation gives values for 
variables which lie between those noted for the segment 
and segment 2 examples. 
When comparing the relative returns to producers under 
alternative pricing regimes, it is of interest to note 
that generic promotion in the relatively less price 
elastic segment leads to greater increases in producer 
revenue and producer surplus under discriminatory pricing 
than under competitive pricing. However, when promotion 
is undertaken in the relatively price elastic segment, 
this observation is reversed with greater gains being 
captured under competitive pricing. 
This implies that care should be taken when allocating 
a promotion budget under aiscriminatory pricing, since 
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returns are relatively high when generic promotion is 
undertaken in the inelastic segment. However, when an 
identical absolute demand shift occurs in the elastic 
segme nt, producer returns are much lower. In fact, these 
simulations suggest that producer returns may actually be 
depressed by generic promotion in the relatively price 
elastic segment. 
explained as follows. When These results may be 
generic promotion induces a parallel rightward shift in 
(linear) demand in a particular segment, then at each 
pri ce, demand in this segment is relatively less price 
elastic than it was before promotion. 
Therefore, generic promQtion in the less price elastic 
segment alone further decreases this price elasticity. 
Thi s, in turn, increases the di vergence between the 
elasticities in the two market segments. As noted in the 
previous Section, this increases the short-run revenue 
gain, k, and ultimately, long-run revenue and producer 
surplus gains. Such an increase in the short-run revenue 
gains, k, can be noted in Table 6.11. 
Conve rs el y, such promotion in the price elastic 
segment alone also reduces the price elasticity in this 
segment. However, in this case, this promotion strategy 
reduces the divergence between segment elasticities, and 
hence, reduces the short-run revenue gain, k. Once agai n, 
this can be noted in Table 6.11. In the long-run, this 
leads to lower increases in producer returns. 
Caution must be exercised when considering the 
implications of these results, since the assumptions 
underlying the models employed, which were 
earlier parts of the study, must be borne 
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noted in 
in mind. 
However, they do illustrate that the influence of generic 
promotion differs in individual segments under 
discriminatory pricing without supply control, and it must 
not be presumed that such promotion is necessarily 
beneficial in all cases. 
6. 4. 4. Conclusion 
Long-run returns from market segmentation policies 
were analysed in this 
In the 
Section, and a number of 
observations made. first instance, long-run 
producer returns are lower when the price elasticity of 
demand in the aggregate market is high. Note that this 
composite elasticity is derived from individual segment 
elasticities, which are themselves influenced by a furth~r 
set of factors in the long-run. These will be discussed 
in a subsequent Section. In a similar manner, long-'run 
producer returns from market segmentation are likely to be 
lower in markets with price elastic supply. That is, if 
the supply response to price increases to a large degree 
over time, then the benefits to producers may diminish. 
When the consequences of generic promotion are 
evaluated, it becomes obvious that its influence on 
producer returns depends on where this promotion has been 
targeted. Producer returns will be greater when such 
promotion is targeted towards the less price elastic 
segment, rather than the more price elastic segment. 
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6.5 FACTORS INFLUENCING SPECIFIC LONG-RUN VARIABLES 
The factors which influence long-run variables such as 
the demand shift from advertising in an individual market 
segment, VI, and the price elasticities of demand in these 
segments, n I , were isolated previously and noted in 
Table 6.2. The former variable, Vi, is influenced by a 
number of factors which were discussed in the previous 
Chapter. Since these.. factors were not actually 
inc 0 r POl' ate din tot he mo del, t he y wi 11 not be con sid ere d 
further. However, some of those variables which influence 
• 
the individual demand elasticities, ni , merit further 
attention. In particular, this applies to the competitive 
supply elasticities, and the price transmission 
elasticities, <1>1. 
Recall equation (6.3) where I nl I can be expressed as 
follows. 
( 6. 3a) ~] + e I I 
XI a X I • 
where <\>1 represents all consumer and producer 
price transmission elasticities which 
are assumed equal, 
Inlil is the price elasticity of demand 
(absolute value) in market segment i, 
eli is the price elasticity of supply for 
competitors and is assumed to be equal 
for all supply sources, 
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is the market share held by the 
Ct 
by the marketing agency in country i, 
and, 
St oil 
is the ratio of product supplied 
Xt oil 
from all other sources to that supplied 
by the marketing agency. 
Consider the change i nth e de ma n del as tic i t y, I nil, 
with respect to a change in the competitive supply 
elasticities, et t. Differentiating (6. 3a) with respect to 
et t gives 
6\ nt I S t oil 
( 6. 6) = <IIt-- > a 
Similarly, considering the impact of a change in the price 
transmission elasticities, <lit, on I nt I yields 
( 6. 7) + e t t ~) > a 
Xt oil 
That is, demand elasticities in individual market 
segments will rise when both competitive supply 
elasticities, and price transmission elasticities, 
<lit, also rise. The implications of these observations for 
marketing agencies will now be considered. 
Competitive supply elasticities determine the 
magnitude of the competitive supply response. If, over 
time, such a response occurs in all market segments then 
competitive supply elasticities will increase. Thi s, in 
turn, will cause all demand elasticities to increase. All 
else remaining equal, it has been shown in previous 
-: : ,-' 
254 
Sections that this will reduce producer returns from 
market segmentation. Therefore, a marketing agency which 
practises market segmentation policies in a number of 
segments can expect a dissipation of producer returns from 
this activity in the long-run, with this dissipation being 
larger when competitive supply elasticities are high. 
Price transmission elasticities capture, among other 
things, the extent to which an agency's product is 
differentiated from that of a competitor, with ~i moving 
from unity towards zero as the degree of product-
differentiation increases. A decrease in price 
transmission elasticities can be interpreted to mean that 
a change in a marketing agency's pricing behaviour will 
induce less of a response from competitors when reacting 
to such pricing strategies than would otherwise occur. 
Equation (6.7) implies a reduction in price 
transmission elasticities 
that 
will make the demand for an 
agency's product, nl, less elastic than it would other~ise 
be. 
Since an agency can influence the transmission 
elasticities, and hence the demand elasticities, facing it 
through product-differentiating promotion, the influence 
of changing price transmission elasticities in individual 
market segments on 
investigated. Since it 
producer 
is the 
returns will now be 
actual change in the 
magnitude of the demand elasticity, nl, which influences 
the magnitude of producer returns, specified changes in 
these elasticities were postulated, and the required 
change in the price transmission elasticities to produce 
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such changes in de~and elasticities noted. For the 
purposes of this exercise, it has been assumed that all 
price transmission elasticities, q,i, were 0.5 in the base 
example. 
The simulation results are presented in Table 6.12, 
where the base example is shown as the first observation. 
When product-differentiating promotion is undertaken in 
the relatively inelastic segment alone, as shown in the 
second simulation, the aggregate demand elasticity 
decreases, and the elasticity divergence between segments 
increases. As a result, the gains in short-run revenue, 
total revenue and producer surplus from market 
segmentation are far greater than those returned in the 
absence of product-differentiating promotion. Conversely, 
when product-differentiating promotion is undertaken in 
the price elastic segment alone, the divergence between 
elasticities is reduced. This results in producer 
returns from market segmentation being considerably lower 
than they would have been when no such promotion had 
occurred. 
In order to investigate this result further, an 
additional set of simulations were conducted. In the 
fourth simulation product-differentiating promotion was 
undertaken in both segments. This resulted in 
considerable increases in short-ru~ revenue, total revenue 
and producer surplus, although these were not as great as 
they would have been if product-differentiating promotion 
had been undertaken in segment alone. A further 
promotion possibility was investigated in the final 
',' 
.;, 
PARAMETER CHANGES CHANGES IN PRODUCER RETURNS I 
ASSUMED, 
EFFECT n1 n:z n_ (n:z - n1) 0 1 0:z k($m) llTR($m) llPS($m) 
1. lln1 = 0.0 
0.5 1.5 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 20.8 20.4 10.2 
lln:z = 0.0 
2. lln1 = -0.25 
0.25 1.5 0.875 1.25 0.25 0.5 74.4 65.6 32.8 
lln:z = 0.0 
3. lln1 = 0.0 
0.5 1.25 0.875 0.75 0.5 0.42 16.0 14.8 7.4 
lln:z = -0.25 
4. lln1 = -0.25 
0.25 1.25 0.75 1.0 0.25 0.42 66.7 54.5 27.2 
lln:z = -0.25 
5. lln1 = -0.25 
0.25 1. 75 1.0 1.5 0.25 0.58 80.3 75.4 37.7 
lln:z = +0.25 
6. lln1 = +0.25 
0.75 1. 75 1.25 1.0 0.75 0.58 9.5 10.5 5.2 
lln:z = +0.25 
-- ---- ---- - - -- -- -- -- - - - - - -- -- - -- - - -------- - - - --
TABLE 6.12: THE INFLUENCE OF PRODUCT-DIFFERENTIATING PROMOTION UNDER DISCRIMINATORY PRICING 
N 
VI 
0'1 
',> 
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simulation, where product-differentiating promotion was 
undertaken in the inelastic segment, and promotion efforts 
in the elastic segment were aimed at increasing 
the perception of product homogeneity with respect to 
competi tors' products. Such a policy increases the 
divergence between elasticities quite markedly, and of all 
the simulations considered, this promotion policy leads to 
the greatest increase in producer returns. 
Obviously, caution must be exercised in interpreting 
the above results, since they merely show the influence of 
given changes in demand elasticities on producer returns, 
and give no indication of the promotion expenditure 
required to induce the various changes in price 
transmission elasticities which would be necessary to 
achieve these changes in demand elasticities. 
However, the analysis does suggest that the 
preaumption that product-differentiating promotion in all 
market se~ments is necessarily beneficial, is naive under 
conditions where optimal pricing is practised without 
supply control. 
6.6 THE INFLUENCE OF MARKET SEGMENTATION POLICIES ON 
PRODUCER PRICE VARIABILITY 
The relationship between market characteristics and 
market segmentation policies with respect to their 
influence on producer returns has been considered in some 
depth. However, the influence of such policies on the 
secondary producer objective of reducing price variability 
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is also important. Such an effect will now be considered. 
In the first instance, the change in producer price with 
respect to a change in output will be examined under both 
competitive and discriminatory pricing, and the relative 
price variability under both pricing regimes compared. In 
the second case, producer price variability under 
discriminatory pricing will be compared for alternative 
sets of market characteristics. 
For a given output, Q, then the price which producers 
receive is given by 
( 4. 2) 
and the average revenue which they receive under 
discriminatory pricing can be represented by 
k 
(4.21) Pad = a. - baQ + 
Q 
where k > 0 
By differentiating equations (4.2) and (4.21> with 
respect to a change in output, Q, the change in producer 
price under each pricing regime can be determined. 
gives 
oP. 
( 6. 8) = b. 
6Q 
and 
OPad k 
( 6. 9) = b. + 
oQ Q2 
k 
Since k > 0 and Q > 0, then > 0, which implies that 
Q2 
6P.d 6P. 
(6.10) > 
6Q 6Q 
This 
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That is, under the linear demand assumptions employed in 
each of these models, producer price will vary more with 
respect to a change in output under discriminatory pricing 
than it will under competitive pricing. 
Consider discriminatory pricing under alternative sets 
of market characteristics. Speci fi cally, consider two 
examples, one of which has relatively less price elastic 
demand at the competitive equilibrium, (P, Q), and one of 
which has aggregate demand which is relatively more 
elastic at this point. In this case, average revenue 
under discriminatory pricing in the relatively less price 
elastic situation is given by 
kl 
(6.11> 
Q 
Similarly, for the more price elastic case, this average 
revenue is given by 
(6.12) 
Q 
Differentiating each of these expressions with respect 
to Q gives 
6 P. d 1 kl 
(6.13) = b 1 + 
6Q Q2 
and 
6P.d2 
( 6. 14) 
6Q 
By definition, In. 1 I < In.2 I at the competitive 
equilibrium (P, Q), where n.1 refers to the aggregate price 
elasticity of demand in the appropriate case. This 
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implies that bt > b2. If all else is assumed equal, then 
previous discussiQn in this Chapter implies that' kt > 
where In .. tl < In .. 2\. 
Therefore, 
6 P .. d t 6P .. d2 
(6.15) > 
6Q 6Q 
That is, producer price variability will be higher when 
aggregate demand is less price elastic at the competitive 
equilibrium than it will be when such demand is more price 
elastic at this point. 
However, previous analysis also suggests that where 
demand is relatively less price elastic at the competitive 
equilibrium, then returns from discriminatory pricing are 
relatively high. That is, when marketing agencies 
practise market segmentation policies, producer prices are 
likely to be more variable when the returns from these 
policies are high, and less variable when such returns are 
low. Therefore, factors which are conducive to favourable 
.. 
producer returns also lead to increased price variability 
when such policies are practised. The implication of this 
finding will be further discussed in the final Chapter. 
6.7 AN APPLICATION TO THE NEW ZEALAND SHEEPMEATS INDUSTRY 
In previous Sections, the influence of specific 
variables on market segmentation outcomes was 
i nvesti gated. This was done by varying the magnitude of 
each of these variables in turn with respect to a base 
numerical example. This approach yields valuable 
... 
:- - ... ', ... - -. 
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information on the relationship between market 
characteristics and the outcomes of these policies. 
However, it gives no indication of what the actual returns 
from such policies might be in any particular industry. 
In this Section, therefore, the model which has been 
developed is applied to the New Zealand sheepmeats 
industry prior to the 1982 acquisition of industry output 
by the New Zealand Meat Producers' Board. 
was selected for two reasons. 
This industry 
Firstly, 
relatively 
the international sheepmeats industry is 
competitive ( Blyth, 1982) , and hence 
competitive responses depicted in the model provide an 
accurate representation of behaviour in this industry. In 
addi t ion, the Board was not actively engaged in market 
segmentation policies at that time, and therefore, the 
price and shares of output observed in individual market 
segments would provide a reasonable representation of a 
competitive allocation of output . 
A second reason for investigating this industry is 
that estimates of some of the required elasticities are 
available from a recent model of the world sheepmeats 
market (Blyth, 1982). Unfortunately, competitive supply 
responses are absent, as are advertising responses. 
Although reasonable estimates of the competitive responses 
can be made, this is more difficult with advertising 
elasticities since very little is known about these 
responses in agricultural industries. Therefore, 
promotion aspects of the model will be excluded when 
returns from market segmentation are considerea, although 
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comment will be made on the influence which promotion 
activity in alternative market segments is likely to have 
on producer returns. 
The data used in this sheepmeat market analysis are 
presented in Table 6.13. New Zealand export data (New 
Zealand Meat Producers' Board, 1 9S0), and world trade data 
(United States Department of Agriculture, 1982), were used 
to derive a set of trade flows between New Zealand and 
other exporters, and the major importing countries, for 
the 1979/80 season. Demand and price transmission 
elasticities were extracted from Blyth (1983). I n the 
long-run, values of unity have been assumed for the own 
price elasticity of supply and cross price elasticities of 
supply between products from alternative sources. 
In the empirical analysis, both short-run and long-run 
scenarios were simulated. The short-run situation will be 
considered" first. In this" case, it is assumed that the 
existing level of exports is reallocated among the eight 
market segments, and there is no response from other 
exporters. That is, the own and cross-price elasticities 
of supply are set to zero. Using the expression for 
measuring the export demand elasticities outlined 
previously, the short-run demand elasticities facing the 
New Zealand meat industry in individual market segments 
were derived by adjusting the market demand elasticities 
shown in Table 6.13 by the reciprocal of the market share 
held in that segment and the appropriate price 
transmission elasticity. 
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TABLE 6,13: DATA USED IN SHEEPMEAT MARKET ANALYSIS 
========================================================== 
( a) Quanti ti es (. 000 tonnes) 
Imports 
Market Production Consumption NZ Total 
Canada 5 19 10 1 4 
USA 144 1 59 1 1 15 
EEC ( 8) 350 410 1 3 102 
UK 278 432 184 191 
Iran 350 41 5 65 65 
Japan a 157 27 157 
USSR .. NA 1 NA 62 157 
Rest of World NA NA 78 165 
--
Total 4-50 866 
(b) Competitive Price 
$/tonne 
All Markets 2,600 
(c) Elasticities 
Market Demand Price Transmission 
Canada 
USA 
EEC (8) 
UK 
Iran 
Japan 
USSR 
-,99 
-, 16 
-, 12 
-. 14 
-.28 
-,94 
-1. 83 
1 , 0 
. '31 
.94 
.94 
.56 
.64 
Rest of World -.40 
1, 24 
1, 00 
========================================================== 
1 , NA - Not Available 
Sources: New Zealand Meat Producers' Board 
USDA 
Blyth (1983) 
..... -._ .. >-<," 
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These elasticities are shown in Table 6.14, along with 
the shares of output allocated to market segments which 
were observed at the 1979/80 price of $2,600/tonne. This 
table also presents the optimal market shares and market 
prices under market segmentation. As would be expected, 
prices increase in markets with low demand elasticities, 
while the converse occurs in markets with high demand 
elasticities. The results suggest that under such a 
strategy, the average revenue would increase by 26 percent 
to $3280 per tonne. 
industry of $307 m., 
This represents a gain to the 
which in the absence of supply 
response would represent a direct gain in 
welfare. 
producer 
The long-term gains from a segmentation strategy will 
now be considered. I n this case, the assumed competi ti ve 
supply response alters the demand elasticities facing the 
New Zealand industry. These modified elasticities are 
shown in Table 6. 15 . Similarly, the assumed own supply 
to 466,000 tonnes, response increases industry output 
which is then allocated among market segments according to 
optimal pricing procedures. The optimal prices, optimal 
market shares, and producer returns from. this strategy are 
are also shown in Table 6.15. 
As a result of the competitive supply response, the 
aggregate demand elasticity, na, has increased marke.dly 
from its short-run value. In addition, the relative 
elasticities between markets have also changed, which 
affects the optimal market shares and relative prices. It 
is important to note that the range of optimal prices over 
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TABLE 6.14: MARKET SEGMENTATION IN THE SHEEPMEAT 
MARKET - SHORT-RUN 
:========================================================= 
Region 
Canada 
USA 
EC ( 8) 
UK 
Iran 
Japan 
USSR 
ROW 
Aggregate 
elasticity ( n. ) 
Elasticity 
( n 1 ) 
1. 88 
2. 31 
3.78 
O. 32 
1. 78 
5. 46 
4. 63 
O. 85 
1 . 71 
Existing Price ($' OOO/tonne) 
Existing 
Market 
Share 
( S 1 ) 
.022 
· 024 
· 030 
· 410 
· 144 
.060 
· 138 
· 173 
Optimal Average Revenue ($' OOO/tonne) 
Quantity (' OOO/tonnes) 
Total Revenue ($m) 
Optimal Total Revenue ($m) 
Optimal 
Market 
Share 
( s 1 d ) 
.023 
· 028 
· 048 
· 243 
· 147 
.126 
· 250 
· 129 
2. 6 
3. 28 
450 
1 , 1 70 
1, 478 
Optimal 
Prices 
( P 1 d ) 
2. 53 
2. 40 
2. 1 8 
5. 90 
2. 57 
2. 07 
2. 12 
3. 36 
========================================================== 
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TABLE 6.15: MARKET SEGMENTATION IN THE SHEEPMEAT MARKET -
LONG-RUN 
========================================================== 
Region 
Canada 
USA 
EC ( 8) 
UK 
Iran 
Japan 
USSR 
ROW 
Aggregate 
elasticity ( n. ) 
Regional 
Elasticity 
( n t ) 
2.78 
11 . 81 
37. 48 
1. 82 
7. 1 6 
10. 27 
6. 1 6 
1 . 09 
5. 1 4 
Optimal 
Prices 
( P t d ) 
2. 80 
2. 42 
2. 37 
3. 03 
2. 51 
2. 46 
2. 54 
2. 97 
Existing 
Market 
Share 
( s t ) 
· 022 
· 024 
· 030 
· 410 
· 144 
· 060 
· 138 
· 173 
1 . 00 
Optimal 
Market 
Share 
( s t d ) 
· 017 
· 050 
· 124 
· 276 
.172 
· 090 
· 1 51 
· 120 
1 . 00 
----------------------------------------------------------
Existing Price ($' OOO/tonne) 
Quantity (' 000 tonnes) 
Total Revenue ($m) 
Optimal Average Revenue ($' OOO/tonne) 
Optimal Quantity (' 000 tonnes) 
Optimal Total Revenue ($m) 
Change in Revenue ($m) 
Change in Producer Surplus ($m) 
2. 6 
450 
1 • 170 
2.69 
466 
1.253 
83 
42 
========================================================== 
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the markets has lessened as the demands have become more 
elastic, and optimal average revenue is less than in the 
short-run case. The results show that in this particular 
environment, the average revenue has only increased by 3.5 
percent, and total supply has increased by a similar 
amount. Thus the total revenue would be about seven 
percent higher than it i.s in the existing situation, and 
producer surplus would increase by only $42 million. 
A comparison between the short-run and long-run 
producer gains shown above indicates that while short-run 
producer returns from optimal pricing may appear 
favourable, in the long-run these returns are severely 
eroded by the competitive supply response to these 
policies. As a result, long-run producer surplus gains 
from market segmentation appear to be quite low in this 
industry. Obviously, these results are dependent on the 
assumptions made about the own and competitive supply 
response. However, they emphasize the importance of the 
competi ti ve supply response in determining long-run 
outcomes of these policies. 
As noted previously, promotion policies have not been 
incorporated into the model because of the absence of 
reliable estimates of advertising responses. However, 
comment can be made on the likely influence of advertising 
in alternative market segments. The regional demand 
elasticities in Table 6.15 suggest that a given shift in 
demand which results from generic advertising of New 
. -~. . 
Zealand sheepmeats in a particular segment would have a 
more influential effect on producer surplus if it occurred 
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in the United Kingdom, Canada, or the residual Rest of 
World r'egion. Product differentiating promotion which 
decreases demand elasticities in these segments would have 
a similar effect. However, the costs associated with both 
types of promotion activity, which would be made more 
obvious if advertising elasticities were known, would need 
to be offset against any increased returns from promotion 
in these segmen'ts. 
- "-_.-.-J 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
7. 1 I NTRODUCTI ON 
This Chapter reviews the study, summarizes the results 
which were derived, and discusses their implications for 
marketing agencies. A summary of the research, including 
a list of the market conditions most appropriate for 
successful market segmentation is presented in Section 
7.2. In Section 7.3, the results of the study are related 
to the literature, and directions for further research are 
indicated in Section 7.4. Finally, in Section 7.5, some 
implications of importance for marketing agencies are 
di scussed. 
7.2 SUMMARY 
7. 2. 1 Outline of the Study 
The general aim of this study was to investigate the 
nature of benefits to producers from market segmentation 
through controlled export marketing wi t hi n the 
organizational context of a typically structured 
agricultural industry. Before doing this, the extent to 
which market segmentation policies were significant in 
agricultural exporting industries was investigated. On 
the basis of this, it was concluded that the major 
agricultural exporting industries were moving towards such 
policies. 
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In order to achieve the study objective, it was 
necessary to determine how marketing agencies operating in 
agricultural exporting industries are typically structured 
and what their objectives are. Once agai n, thi s was done 
through analysis of the major agricultural exporting 
industries. It was determined that a representative 
marketing agency would have the power to direct specified 
volumes of product to specific destinations or end uses, 
and to return a pooled price to producers. It would also 
have the necessary authority to acquire funds for 
promotion or product development, which may be necessary 
elements of a market segmentation policy. However, it 
would not have the power to control the level of industry 
output. 
It was determined that agricultural marketing 
institutions often have three general objectives. These 
are to increase producer returns, to stabilize producer 
prices, and to ensure equity among producers. This final 
... 
objective would be automatically fulfilled by the pool 
payment procedures adopted by a typically structured 
marketing agency. Of the other two objectives, increasing 
producer returns appears to be most important, with price 
stabilization seen as secondary. 
The bulk of the study was devoted to constructing an 
analytical model which could be used to determine the 
magnitude of benefits from market segmentation, and which 
incorporated the appropriate organizational and market 
features. With the exception of promotion, the marketing 
mix components of a market segmentation policy are 
271 
encapsulated in the standard eponomic model of 
third-degree price discrimination. I n an unmodified 
form, however, this model does not consider the producers' 
supply response to discriminatory pricing, nor does it 
include any competitive supply response which might result 
from such a pricing policy. 
Consequently, the product allocation procedure which 
maximizes producer surplus where an agency does not have 
the power to control supply was determined. This 
condition was then incorporated into an algebraic model 
which calculated the returns to producers from optimal 
pricing in any number of market segments. This model took 
into consideration the appropriate own and competitive 
supply responses to this pricing policy. 
Promotional aspects of the marketing mix were then 
included in the model. As a prerequisite to this, optimal 
promotion behaviour in alternative market segments under 
both competitive and discriminatory pricing was 
consi dered, and optimal rules for the allocation of 
promotion under these conditions were derived. While 
these results yielded insights into an appropriate 
allocation of promotional expenditure, they could not be 
directly incorporated into the model which calculated 
returns to producers from market segmentation activity. 
However, the returns from a given shift in demand or a 
given change in demand elasticities which result from 
either generic or product-differentiating promotion in 
alternative market segments were included in the model. 
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Expressions derived from the model were then used to 
evaluate the impact of market characteristics on the 
outcomes of market segmentation policies. In this way, it 
was possible to isolate those market conditions under 
which market segmentation activities by statutory 
marketing agencies are likely to be beneficial in terms of 
producer objectives. In order to observe what the actual 
benefits from market segmentation might be in a particular 
industry, the model was applied in a spatial dimension to 
the exports of New Zealand sheepmeats. 
7. 2. 2 A Summary of Results 
From the model, it was determined that market 
segmentation outcomes are influenced by a number of 
variables, where the magnitude of these variables is 
measured at their non-discriminating, competitive 
equilibrium values. 
In the short-run, the most influential variables 
appear to be price elasticities of demand in individual 
market segments, and by implication, the demand elasticity 
in the aggregate market. It was determined that, in both 
absolute and relative terms, short-run returns will be 
large when, in competitive equilibrium, the aggregate 
demand elasticity is low and the divergence between demand 
elasticities in market segments is large. In absolute 
terms only, such returns will be high when the size of the 
industry before market segmentation is large, and the 
corresponding competitive price is high. 
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In addition to the above variables, producer returns 
in the long-run are influenced by an additional set of 
factors. In particular, such returns will be high when 
the price elasticity of supply is low. Howe ver, it must 
be noted that producer returns are much more sensitive to 
changes in the magnitude of the demand elasticity over 
ti me than they are to similar changes in the supply 
elasticity. Long-run producer returns wi 11 also be 
affected by demand shifts induced by generic promotion. 
In this case, producer returns from optimal pricing will 
• 
be greater than those under competitive pricing when such 
promotion is undertaken in the relatively less price 
elastic segment. However, the converse applies when this 
type of promotion occurs in the relatively more price 
elastic segment. It would appear, therefore, that 
producer returns from optimal pricing will be relatively 
greater when generic promotion is undertaken in a less 
price elastic segment rather than a more price elastic 
one. 
Since the simulations indicated that the magnitude of 
producer returns are sensitive to changes in the aggregate 
demand elasticity, factors which influence the long-run 
value of this variable were also summari2ed. Competitive 
supply elasticities are particularly important in this 
respect. As these elasticities rise over time, long-run 
demand elasticities also ri se. Price transmission 
elasticities also influence long-run demand elasticities, 
with these falling as price transmission becomes less 
perfect through activities such as product-differentiating 
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pr- omot ion. If the net effect of the influence of such 
var-iables is to incr-ease demand elasticities in all mar-ket 
segments, then as noted above, long-r-un producer- r-eturns 
will fall. 
The magnitude of a demand shift in a mar-ket segment 
which results fr-om generic adver-tising is also influenced 
by a fur-ther- set of variables. Although these were not 
investigated in any depth, the obser-vation can be made 
that any such demand shift will be gr-eater- when the 
• 
proportionate incr-ease in adver-tising expenditur-e is lar-ge 
and demand is r-elatively r-esponsive to adver-tising. The 
influence of these r-esulting demand shifts on producer-
returns, however-, depends on the segment in which such a 
shift has occurr-ed. 
The above discussion indicates the market conditions 
under which producer r-eturns fr-om mar-ket segmentation ar-e 
likely to be high~ In addition to incr-easing pr-oducer-
r-eturns, however-, marketing agencies will be interested in 
r-educing pr-oducer- pr-ice variability. Unfor-tunately, the 
study indicates that those market conditions which ar-e 
conducive to high producer retur-ns fr-om market 
segmentation are also those which increase the variability 
in prices which producer-s r-eceive. Hence, a conflict 
between satisfying the primar-y and secondar-y pr-oducer 
objectives arises when market segmentation policies ar-e 
i mpl eme nt ed. 
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7.2.3 Qualification of the Model and its Results 
At this point, it is appropriate to qualify the 
conclusions reached in the study. The model which 
analysed market segmentation behaviour was constructed 
within a partial equilibrium comparative static framework. 
A partial equilibrium approach assumes that the market in 
question is separable from all other markets thereby 
implying that prices in these other markets are exogenous 
to the model. However, these ceteris paribus assumptions 
may not apply in some cases and care must be exercised in 
thi s respect when applying the model. In addi ti on, the 
comparative static nature of the model abstracts from the 
adjustment path of variables towards their equilibrium 
values after market segmentation. As such, the model can 
cope with a short-run perspective, when policies have been 
implemented and no response to these policies has 
occurred, and a long-run perspective, where such responses 
are incorporated. However, it does not trace the dynamic 
change in producer returns which occurs between these two 
outcomes. 
The model also assumes that the pricing response of 
competitors to market segmentation policies is essentially 
:.:.< .... ::! competi ti ve. When any of the various oligopolistic 
pricing responses more typically represent market 
reactions to these policies, then the above model may not 
be the most appropriate analytical tool for evaluating 
market segmentation outcomes. The model structure also 
assumes that an industry is in competitive equilibrium 
before it introduces segmentation policies. In those cases 
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where such policies have been partially instituted, it may 
be necessary to make appropriate data transformations 
before the outcomes of optimal segmentation policies can 
be evaluated. 
A further qualification to the use of the model arises 
from the linear functional form imposed on all demand and 
supply equations in the model. Therefore, caution must be 
exercised when interpreting model results if it is 
suspected that the true functional form of these equations 
is not linear, and that the market segmentation solution 
strays too far from the competitive solution, thereby 
invalidating the neighbourhood assumption used to justify 
the use of linear equations under non-linear conditions. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that the returns from 
market segmentation calculated in the model represent 
gross returns from this activity, and do not incorporate 
the costs associated with actually segmenting a market or 
preventing arbitrage between segments. As such, they 
represent the maximum returns which can be expected 
from implementing these policies. 
Notwithstanding the above caveats, the features of the 
model are robust enough for the purposes .of the present 
study. In this case, the emphasis is on isolating the 
market conditions under which market segmentation 
activities by statutory marketing agencies operating in 
typically structured agricultural industries are likely to 
be beneficial in terms of producer objectives. As such, 
the focus is on more general factors, rather than on some 
of the detailed observations discussed above. 
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7.3 A REVIEW OF RESULTS WITH RESPECT TO THE LITERATURE 
7. 3. 1 Introduction 
The results which were derived from the model will now 
be reviewed with respect to the appropriate literature. 
Short-run market segmentation outcomes will be discussed 
initially, followed by an assessment of the conclusions 
reached on the own and competitive supply responses. 
Comment will then be made on aspects of promotion in 
relation to the literature. Finally, the findings on 
price variability will be examined. 
7.3.2 Short-Run Considerations 
The conditions for successful short-run market 
segmentation by a marketing agency noted in the study do 
not appear to have attracted a great deal of attention in 
the agricultural economics literature. However, a 
qualitative observation from the general economics 
literature is that a monopoly firm must face a downward 
sloping demand curve in aggregate, and individual demand 
curves must not be isolastic at the competitive price for 
price discrimination to be successfully practised 
(Scherer, 1980). Price discrimination by an agency which 
does not control the level of output is equivalent to this 
monopoly case in the short run, and the analysis in this 
study supports Scherer's observations. In addition, 
however, it generalizes and quantifies them. 
.':-, 
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7.3.3 Own Supply Response 
Concern has been expressed in the literature that 
price discrimination among market segments will induce an 
own supply response which w~ll reduce producer returns to 
their original level (Baritelle and Price, 1974; 
Weisenborn, 1969). 
The analysis in this study suggests that where some 
inelasticity in supply remains, then long-run producer 
surplus gains will always be greater than what they would 
have been under a non-discriminating pricing policy. This 
conclusion supports a similar observation by Gardner 
(1983). Under these supply conditions also, the pool 
price returned to producers will always be greater than 
the competitive non-discriminating price. However, in the 
long-run, producer returns and the average pool price will 
be less than that realized in the short-run, an effect 
also noted by Reeves and Longmire (1982). Therefore, 
there is some support for the argument expounded by 
Wi esenborn (1969), that any supply response should be 
suppressed if maximizing producer returns is a primary 
objective. However, if such an objective is dominant, 
then a logical policy would be not only to suppress the 
supply response, but to restrict output further, from the 
competitive equilibrium output level back to the monopoly 
output level. In this way, producers capture additional 
gains from behaving as a price disc~iminating monopolist. 
The second concern which dominates the literature with 
respect to an own supply response is that such a response 
leads to sub-optimal resource use, since the average 
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(pool) price which producers receive is greater than the 
marginal revenue in the most elastic market segment. 
Therefore, the cost of the additional supply is greater 
than the marginal revenue received for this effort (Banks 
and Mauldon, 1966; Freebairn and Gruen, 1977). Although 
the focus of this study is essentially parochial to the 
extent that market segmentation policies are being 
evaluated in terms of producer, rather than national 
objectives, this effect will nevertheless be commented on. 
If it is assumed that optimality is meaningful ina 
national rather than a global (international) sense, then 
it would seem that where a marketing agency operates in a 
price-discriminating manner on export markets, and there 
is no linkage between the domestic price paid by consumers 
and the pool price returned to suppliers from activity in 
export markets, then allowing a supply response to occur 
is Pareto sub-optimal to the extent that returns to 
producers, and therefore to the nation, are not maximized. 
In these ci rcumstances, the optimal level of industry 
output for export would appear to be the monopoly 
profit-maximizing level. When a linkage exists between 
domestic consumer prices and the price received by 
suppliers for export returns, or where the domestic market 
is relatively price inelastic and included in the price 
discrimination scheme, then it must be determined if gains 
to producers, in the form of increased returns, exceed 
losses to domestic consumers, in the form of higher 
prices, before a judgment can be made as to whether this 
.•.•••.• j 
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price-discriminating 
national welfare. 
behaviour improves or reduces 
7.3.4 Competitive Supply Response 
A competitive supply response to market segmentation 
policies was incorporated through its influence on export 
demand elasticities. Although trade researchers have been 
concerned with the influence of various factors on the 
magnitude of export demand elasticities, much of this 
transmission research has concentrated on price 
elasticities ( Bredahl, 1979; Johnson, 1977; Tweeten, 
1977). With the exception of Powell ( 1959) who 
investigated the influence of market 
demand elasticities, there appears to be 
share 
little 
on export 
research 
on the relative long-run influence of other factors such 
as the responsiveness of competitors. 
However, the sheepmeats example investigated in this 
study indicated that this factor leads to a significant 
increase in the magnitude of export demand elasticities, 
thereby leading to a reduction in producer returns from 
optimal pricing over time. This supports the observations 
of other researchers who have expressed the opinion that 
optimal allocation policies will be constrained by 
potential competition, and that such competition could 
invalidate such allocation policies (Banks and Mauldon, 
1966; Wei senborn, 1969; Edwards, 1970; Freebairn and 
Gruen, 1977). 
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7.3.5 Pr-omotion 
A r-eview of the liter-atur-e on pr-omotion r-evealed that 
ther-e was little infor-mation on how adver-tising effor-t 
should be optimally allocated acr-oss mar-ket segments under-
either- competitive or- discr-iminator-y pr-icing. Although de 
Boer- (1977) consider-ed how to dir-ect adver-tising effor-t 
under- two-pr-ice schemes, he assumed monopolistic supply 
featur-es. Alter-natively, Ner-Iove and Waugh (1961) 
incor-por-ated the appropr-iate supply r-esponse, but their-
analysis was r-estr-icted to an aggregate market. By 
investigating optimal adver-tising under- appr-opriate supply 
conditions for alternative pricing regimes, this study 
extends the Nerlove-Waugh model and r-emoves the single 
market assumption for- which it has been cr-iticized (Str-ak 
and Gill, 1983). 
The effect on producer returns of a shift in demand 
through generic promotion has been well recognized in the 
Ii terature (May, 1977), but there appears to have been 
little investigation of how such pr-omotion in individual 
market segments influences producer returns. Si mi lar-l y, 
product-differ-entiating promotion is seen to be desirable 
for producers (Parish, 1963), since it allows an agency to 
. -c ..•.. :. ··c·: I extract greater monopoly rent from consumers. However-, as 
with generic promotion, there appears to have been lit~le 
investigation on how thi s product-differentiating 
promotion in individual market segments influences 
pr-oducer returns when pricing is discriminatory. In thi s 
study, a preliminary investigation of this problem was 
undertaken, with the results suggesting that promotion 
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effort should be carefully targeted to specific market 
segments when 
discriminatory. 
pricing between these segments 
7.3.6 The Influence on Producer Price Variability 
is 
It has long been assumed that price discrimination 
schemes stabilize producer prices, and instances of this 
belief have been documented by Myers and Piggott (1981). 
The theoretical reasoning behind this presumption is 
unclear, although Myers and Piggott (1981) cite the 
argument that the diversion of product onto a secondary 
market cushions changes in supply because of the 
relatively more elastic demand in this market. However, 
both Myers and Piggott (1981) and Alston and Freebairn 
(1986) question whether price discrimination schemes do 
stabilize producer prices under variable supply conditions. 
The results of this study support the reservations of 
these authors on the stabilizing eff~cts of such schemes. 
It was concluded that producer prices will be more 
variable when pricing across markets is discriminatory 
rather than competitive, with this variability being 
greater when returns to producers from such a policy are 
higher. 
7.4 DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The research conducted in this study could be extended 
in a number of directions, both theoretical and empirical. 
Consider some of these theoretical possibilities. This 
study assumed that market segments were predetermined 
.,;-, '. 
",-'---,. 
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according to some spatial, temporal or product form. 
characteristic. However, where a marketing agency has the 
ability to create further market segments, there may be 
scope for investigating producer returns from identifying 
additional segments and for determining the optimal number 
of segments. 
There is an obvious need to extend the research on 
promotion which was explored in this study. In 
particular, further work on the relative magnitude of 
producer returns in a number of market segments under 
varying market conditions given both discriminatory and 
competitive pricing could be unde rt ake n. It would be 
desirable for such research to incorporate more 
sophisticated linkages between advertising expenditure and 
demand shifts than the simple linear approximation 
suggested in this model. An adaptation of a 
multiplicative demand model, as used by Dewbre et al 
(1986), might be appropriate in this regard, since this 
would 
effort. 
incorporate diminishing returns to advertising 
If it was suspected that a competitive supply response 
to discriminatory pricing behaviour did not characterize 
the market structure in a particular industry, then an 
attempt could be made to include various oligopolistic 
responses into the analysis. Similarly, non-competitive 
market behaviour characterized by trade barriers could be 
more explicitly considered. 
Further extensions to the model could incorporate 
costs associated with segmenting a market and shifting 
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demand or altering demand elasticities in these segments. 
Obviously, alternative functional forms for demand and 
supply equations could be experimented with, although the 
algebra associated with this would be quite cumbersome, 
and simulation rather than analytical techniques may be 
more appropriate in this case. Finally, attempts could be 
made to track the dynamic adjustments by the industry to 
market segmentation behaviour by a marketing agency. 
Despite the obvious manner in which the model could be 
extended in its theoretical dimension, a more urgent 
priority is to operationalize the model for specific 
industry cases. This was done for the sheepmeats 
industry, where many of the required responses could be 
extracted from an international trade model (Blyth, 1983). 
This highlighted the complex nature of some of the data 
requirements. In particular, cross-price elasticities of 
supply fr.om alternative production sources were shown to 
have a significant influence on producer returns. 
Unfortunately, at this stage there are few theoretical 
models available for estimating such supply responses, and 
none exist for sheepmeats. One interesting exception 
though is a recent beef industry model developed by 
Goddard (1983). In that study estimates of the 
substitution and cross-price elasticities between 
products from alternative sources are derived from a 
modified market share model. 
Similarly, information on advertising elasticities of 
demand is crucial to any extension of the analysis. 
However, there have been very few attempts to estimate 
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these responses (Dewbre et aI, 1986; Quilkey et aI, 1986) 
or to investigate the extent to which these responses are 
inversely related to price elasticities of demand, as a 
priori reasoning suggests (de BoeL~, 1977; Parish, 1963). 
An obvious need exists, therefore, for estimates of 
these supply and advertising responses. Such information 
would have a number of uses beyond its input to the market 
segmentation model, and research in this direction would 
appear to be highly appropriate. This would allow the 
model to be more fully operationalized, thereby giving 
more precise estimates of the extent to which market 
segmentation policies benefit producers in particular 
industries. 
7.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKETING AGENCIES 
At the outset of this study, concern was expressed as 
to whether the wholesale application of marketing 
management strategies was appropriate in agricultural 
industries. These reservations were based on the fact 
that the organizational and market features in these 
industries may differ from those of their non-agricultural 
counterparts, for whi ch many of these marketing 
prescriptions were derived. 
The results of the study suggest that any presumption 
that market segmentation techniques will be automatically 
successful in agricultural industries should be treated 
with caution, particularly in the longer term. For 
example, the analysis of market segmentation in New 
Zealand's sheepmeats industry showed tha t, in the 
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short-run, average revenue to producers increased by 26 
percent. However, in the long-run, this average revenue 
increase was only 3.5 percent. 
It was further concluded from the study that 
untargeted promotion is not necessarily beneficial when 
optimal pricing policies are being practised. In fact, 
the study indicated that poorly targeted promotion activity 
produc~r returns from market could actually reduce 
segmentation activity. The implication of this finding 
for marketing ag~ncies is 
activity is inadvisable. 
that indiscriminate promotion 
Agencies which implement such policies must be 
prepared to accept that there will be a trade-off between 
producer obj ecti ves. When such strategies increase 
producer returns, they may also increase producer price 
variability when supply is variable. 
The above reservations do not 
segmentation activity by agricultural 
imply that market 
marketing agencies 
is unwarranted. They do suggest, however, that the 
success of such policies may vary from industry to 
industry, and that performance in one industry is not 
necessarily indicative of performance in another industry. 
Therefore, based on the model results, 
marketing agencies should take into 
considering market segmentation policies 
outli ned. 
factors which 
account when 
will now be 
Where an agency has access to an appropriate data 
base, such as an international trade model, it will be 
able to derive relatively precise estimates of producer 
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returns from segmentation activity. To implement the 
optimal pricing component of the model developed in this 
study, data would be required on the quantity of the 
product exported, both in aggregate and individual market 
segments, and the price received per unit of output. 
Details of trade flows from competitors to each market 
segment would also be required, thereby giving estimates 
of the agency's market share in each segment. 
In addition to these trade flows, an agency would 
require estimates of various responses. These include the 
own price elasticity of supply, and the price elasticities 
of demand in individual market segments. In order to 
determine these export demand elasticities, information 
would be required for each segment on the market demand 
elasticity in the segment itself, competitive supply 
elasticities to the segment, and price transmission 
elasticities relevant for the segment. 
To operationalize the promotion component of a 
segmentation policy, information for each segment would be 
required on the initial promotion level, any proposed 
increase in promotion expenditure, and the advertising 
elasticity of demand. An agency with access to this type 
of data base could then make a reasonably accurate 
quantitative assessment of outcomes to producers from 
market segmentation activity. 
In many industries, however, such detailed data will 
not be available. In this case, an agency wishinJ~ to 
assess market segmentation opportunities will have to rely 
on a more qualitative assessment. Data which are likely 
-.; :-::-;-:-:>.:-:1 
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to be accessible would include information on product 
sources and trade flows. If this indicates that output 
from the agency's suppliers is small, both in absolute 
terms and relative to that of competitors, then it is 
probable that export demand elasticities facing the 
industry in each segment will be large. This implies that 
returns from market segmentation are likely to be low and 
that such a policy might not be viable. 
If trade flow data indicates that the industry has a 
relatively important influence in export markets, then the 
next step would be to make a qualitative assessment of the 
relevant responses. Consider the market demand 
elasticities in each segment. If it seems likely that the 
demand for the product responds positively to changes in 
income, and has many substitutes or a few very close 
substi tutes, then market demand elasticities in each 
segment may be quite high, implying low producer returns. 
Supply elasticities could be likewise assessed. If 
the product in question has a relatively short production 
cycle and is carried out using inputs which have obvious 
alternative uses, then these elasticities are likely to be 
highly responsive in the long-run. Once again, this 
implies low producer returns from market segmentation 
activity. 
The final set of responses which must be considered 
are the price transmission elasticities. If the agency's 
p~oduct is not strongly differentiated from that of 
competitors, then the erosion of producer gains from 
market segmentation in the long-run will be more rapid. 
.. ;::;:1 
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Natural product-differentiating factors include variation 
from the competi tors' product in form or seasonal 
availability. Perceptions of product differentiation may 
also result from a strong brand image. 
If a qualitative analysis of the above type indicates 
that market segmentation activity might be successful, 
then a marketing agency could increase the precision of 
its judgments by investing research resources to estimate 
the appropriate responses in a more precise manner. 
However, it would be equally important for it to consider 
how it might influence the outcomes of segmentation 
policies when these are implemented. 
An obvious response might be to recommend restrictions 
on output by its own producers thereby suppressing the own 
supply response to this type of marketing activity. 
However, the sheepmeats example indicated that much of the 
reduction in producer surplus over time resulted from a 
competitive supply response to segmentation policies, 
rather than to an own supply response. Therefore, 
production quotas may do little to slow down the erosion 
of producer gains. 
Where competitive supply elasticities are high a more 
appropriate response might be to alter the purchaser's 
perception of the agency's product in those 
segments where demand is less price. elastic. 
market 
This 
product-differentiating behaviour could nullify, to some 
extent, the damaging effect of these competitive supply 
responses. 
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A more fundamental principle which an agency might 
consider is its segmentation base. The analysis in this 
study indicated that producer returns will be high when 
the divergence between demand elasticities in individual 
segments is large. Therefore, a producer agency would be 
advised to search for that division of its product which 
maximizes such a di vergence. Possibilities include 
segmentation in space, form, time and perception, or 
combinations of these. For example, the sheepmeats 
analysis indicated that returns from spatial 
were minimal in the long-run. 
segmentation 
As a consequence, where demand is known to have some 
price inelasticity in particular segments, then an 
appropriate strategy may be to enter a highly price 
elastic segment, into which product from less elastic 
segments can be di verted. This could encompass a 
processing option or any other market segment which takes 
undifferentiated product and where a marketing agency has 
minimal price influence. The agency could then 
concentrate on product differentiating activity in its 
less price elastic segment, thereby allowing it to further 
exploit this market. 
It is of interest to note that marketing agencies 
appear to have been practising these types of product 
diversion strategies. For example, the New Zealand Meat 
Producers' Board recently withdrew product from the 
carcase segment of the trade by rendering down mutton. 
Similarly, the New Zealand Dairy Board is advocating the 
conversion of surplus butter to butteroil. However, such 
-.-.-.- ... '.,< 
._' ..... _-- .. _- -
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policies tend to reflect short-term problems associated 
with stockpiles of product, whereas the results of this 
study suggest that long-term co-ordinated market 
segmentation strategies of this type could improve 
producer returns. 
- ,i 
292 
REFERENCES 
Abel, M. E. Price Discrimination in the World Trade of 
Agricultural Commodities. Journal of Farm Economics, 
194-208. 1966. 48 (2) 
Alston, J. M. and Freebairn, J. W. Producer Price 
Equalization. Contributed paper presented to the 30th 
Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural 
Economics Society, Canberra, 3-5 February, 1986. 
Apple and Pear Marketing Act 1971. Welli ngton, Government 
Printer, 1971. 28p. 
Balderstone, J. S. and others. Agricultural Policy 
Issues and Options for the 1980' s. Working Group 
Report to the Minister for Primary Industry. 
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1982. 167p. 
Banks, E. L. and Mauldon, R. G. Effects of Pricing 
Decisions of a Statutory Marketing Board. Australian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
1966. 
10 (1) 1 -1 3. 
Bari telle, J. W. and Price, D. W. Supply Response and 
Marketing Strategies for Deciduous Crops. 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 56 (2) 
1974. 
American 
245-253. 
Battelle Columbus Laboratories. Final Report on the 
Marketing of New Zealand Wool to New Zealand Wool 
Board. Ohio, Battelle. 1971. 73p. 
293 
Bateman, D. I. Agricultural Marketing: A Review of the 
Literature of Marketing Theory and of Selected 
Applications. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 27 : 
171-226. 1976. 
Blandford, D. West African Export Marketing Boards. 
Hoos, S. (ed.) Agricultural Marketing Boards An 
International Perspective. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1979. p.121-149. 
Blyth, N. The World Sheepmeat Market : Implications for 
Policy. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Canterbury, Lincoln College. 1982. 
Blyth, N. The World Sheepmeat Market An Econometric 
Model. Research Report No. 138. Agricultural 
Economics Research Unit, Lincoln College. 1 983. 
129p. 
Brash, D. T. The Case for Coordinated Export Marketing. 
Paper presented to the National Convention of the 
Export Institute of New Zealand, Rotorua, 8 August, 
... 
1985. 12p. 
Bredahl, M. E., Meyers, W. H. and Collins, K. J. The 
Elasticity of Foreign Demand for U. S. Agricultural 
Products: The Importance of the Price Transmission 
Elasticity. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 61 (1) 58-63. 1979. 
Breimyer, H. F. The Economics of Agricultural Marketing: 
A Survey. Review of Marketing and Agricultural 
Economics, 41 115-65. 1973. 
Campbell, K. The state Marketing Board 
Prototype? Australian Journal of 
Economi cs, 17( 3) 179-188. 1 973. 
Chi ang, A. C. Fundamental Methods of 
294 
Relic or 
Agricultural 
Mathematical 
Economi cs. 2nd ad. Tokyo, McGraw Hill Kogakusha, 
1974. 784p. 
Claycamp, H. J. and Massy, W. F. A Theory of Market 
Segmentation. Journal of Marketing Research, 5 : 
388-94. 1968. 
Cassady, R. Techniques and Purposes of Price 
Discrimination. Journal of Marketing, 11 : 135-150. 
1946. 
Chudleigh, P. D. New Zealand Wool : Towards an Improved 
Marketing System. Agricultural Administration, 5 : 
31 -43. 1978. 
Cohen, R. L. Further Reflections on Agricultural 
Marketing. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 14( 4) 
428-437. 1961. 
Cronin, M. R. Export Demand Elasticities with Less than 
Perfect Markets. 
Economics, 23(1) 
Australian Journal of Agricultural 
69-72. 1979. 
Currie, J. M. and Hoos, S. Marketing Boards A 
Comparative Summar~ 
Marketing Boards 
ill Hoos, S. (ed.) Agricultural 
An International Perspecti ve. 
Cambri dge, Massachusetts, Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1979. p. 287-298. 
Curri e, J. M., Murphy, J. A. and Schmi tz, A. The Concept 
of Economic Surplus and Its Use in Economic Analysis. 
Economic Journal, 81 741 -799. 1971 . 
295 
Dairy Board Act 1961. Welli ngton, Government Pri nter, 
1977. 56p. 
Davies, J. L. Reflections on the Marketing of Our Farm 
Produce. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 14( 2) 
128-142. 1960. 
De Alessi, L. Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and 
X-Efficiency An Essay in Economic Theory. American 
Economic Review, 73 : 64-81. 1983. 
De Boer, A. J. Rural Product Promotion Economic Aspects 
of Promotability, Organisation and Public Assistance. 
Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, 
45( 4) 121-145. 1977. 
Department of Statistics. New Zealand Official Yearbook. 
Wellington, Government Printer, 1984. 1054 p. 
De Vos, G. Agricultural Marketing Boards in the 
Netherlands. Hoos, S. ( ed. ) Agricultural 
Marketing Boards An International Perspecti ve. 
Cambri dge, Massachusetts, Ballinger Publisning 
Company, 1979. p. 239-267. 
Dewbre, J., Thomson, M. and Ri chardson, R. Responses to 
Wool Promotion in the United States: Some Preliminary 
Results. Contributed paper presented to the 30th 
Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural 
Economics Society, Canberra, 3-5 February, 1986. 
Dorfman, R. and Steiner, P. o. Optimal Advertising and 
opt i mal Qual it y. American Economic Revie~, 44( 2) 
826-836. 1954. 
296 
Edwards, D. R. An Econometric Study of the North American 
Lamb Market. Technical Paper No. 10. Agricultural 
Economics Research Uni t, Lincoln College. 197 O. 
255p. 
Edwards, G. w. Some Considerations in Allocating 
Resources between Shifting Supply and Shifting Demand. 
Paper presented to the 28th Annual Conference of the 
Australian Agricultural Economics Society, Sydney, 7-9 
February, 1984. 
Edwards, G. w. and Freebairn, J. W. The Gains from 
Research into Tradable Commodities. American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 66(1) 41 -49, 1984. 
Enke, S. Some Notes on Price Discrimination. Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science, 30: 
95-109. 1964. 
Freebairn, J. W. and Gruen, F. H. Marketing Australian 
Beef and Export Diversification Schemes. Australian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 21 ( 1 ) 
26-39. 1977. 
Gardner, B. L. Price Discrimination or Price 
Stabilization: Debating with Models of U. S. Dairy 
Policy. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
~. ',-.: '- - ... ' ': 
6 5( 2) 763-768. 1983. 
Goddard, E. W. Models of the Beef Markets in Japan and 
South Korea. Occasional Paper No. 3. School of 
Agriculture, La Trobe University. 1983. 45p. 
297 
Hoos, S. U. S. Marketing Agreements and Orders: A 
Retrospective View. ill Hoos) S. ( ed. ) Agricultural 
Mark.eti ng 
Cambri dge, 
Boards An International Perspective. 
Massachusetts, Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1979. p. 269-286. 
Johnson, P. R. The Elasticity of Foreign Demand for U. S. 
Agricultural Products. American Journal of 
Agri c ul t ural Economi cs, 59( 4) 735-736. 1977. 
Kiwifruit Marketing Licensing Regulations 1977. 
Wellington, Government Printer, 1977. 17p. 
Kohls, R. L. and Downey, D. Marketing of Agricultural 
Products. 4th ed. New York, Macmillan, 1972. 432p. 
Kohls, R. L. and Uhl, J. N. Marketing of Agricultural 
Prod uc t s. 5th ed. New York, Macmillan, 1980. 612p. 
Kotler, P. Principles of Marketi ng. New Jersey, 
Pre n tic e - Ha 11, 1 980. 684p. 
Kotler, P. Marketing Management. 5th ed. New Jersey, 
Pre n tic e - Ha 11, 1 984. 792p. 
Kout s oyi anni s, A. Non-Price Decisions. The Firm in a 
Modern Context. London, Macmillan, 1982. 671 p. 
Lambin, J. J. Advertising, Competition and Market Conduct 
in Oligopoly over Time. Ams t erdam, Nort h Holl and, 
1976. 312p. 
Le Vay, C. Agricultural Co-operative Theory: A Review. 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 34(1) 1-44. 
1983. 
Li ndner, R. K. and Jarrett, F. G. 
Size of Research Benefits. 
Agricultural Economics, 60( 1) 
Supply Shifts and the 
American Journal of 
48-58, 1978. 
298 
MachI up, F. Characteristics and Types of Price 
Dis c r i mi nat ion. National Bureau of Economic 
Research. Business Concentration and Price Policy: A 
Conference of the Universities National Bureau 
Committee 
Arno Press. 
Martin, S. K. , 
for Economic 
1975. 511p. 
Young, L. 
Research. New York, 
and Z war t, A. C. Optimal 
Pricing and Promotion for Agricultural Marketing 
Agencies. Research Report No. 177. Agricultual 
Economics Research Unit, Lincoln College. 1986. 21 p. 
May, M. E. Generic Advertising. Oxford Agrarian Studies, 
6: 135-156. 1977. 
McCarthy, E. J. Basic Marketing: A Managerial Approach. 
6th ed. Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. I rwi n, 1 978. 
(1st ed. 1960). 
McClelland, E. L., 
767p. 
Polopolus, L. and Myers, L. H. 
Optimal Allocation of Generic Advertising Budgets. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 53( 4) 
565-572. 1971 . 
Meat Export Control Act 1921-22. Welli ngton, Government 
Printer, 1980. 32p. 
Meat Industry Task Force. Report to the Minister of 
Agriculture. Wellington, 1983. 63p. 
Melamed, A. The Citrus Marketing Board of Israel. 
Hoos, S. ( e d. ) Agricultural Marketing Boards - An 
International Perspective. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1979. p. 179-208. 
Mi shan, E. J. What is Producer's Surplus? American 
Economic Review, 58 1269-1282. 1968. 
299 
Mishan, E. J. Cost-Benefit Analysis. 3rd ed. London, 
George Allen and Unwin, 1982. 447p. 
Morley, J. A. E. Marketing Boards. ill Warley, T. K. 
( e d. ) Agricultural Producers and their Markets. 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1967. p. 341-351. 
Myers, R. and Piggot, R. The Stability Effects of 
Two-Price Schemes: Preliminary Analysis. Contributed 
paper presented to the 25th Jubilee Conference of the 
Australian Agricultural Economics Society, 
Christchurch, February, 1981. 
Nagle, T. Economic Foundations of Pricing. Journal of 
Business, 57( 1, pt. 2) s3-s26. 1984. 
Nerlove, M. and Waugh, F. V. Advertising without Supply 
Control Some Implications of a Study of the 
Advertising of Oranges. Journal of Farm Economics, 
43( 4) 813-837. 1961 . 
New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board. 
Reports. 1980/81, 1981/82, 1982/83, 1983/84. 
New Zealand Dairy Board. Annual Reports. 
1982/83, 1983/84. 
New Zealand Dairy Board. 
1985. 
Dairy Exporter, 60( 10) 
Annual 
1981/82, 
37. 
New Zealand Fruit Export Control Board. 
1928, 1931, 1933, 1935, 1938. 
Annual Reports. 
New Zealand Kiwifruit Authori ty. Annual Reports. 
1977/78, 1978/79, 1980/81, 1981/82, 1982/83, 1983/84. 
New Zealand Meat Producers' Board. Annual Re port s. 
1979/80, 1980/81, 1981/82, 1982/83, 1983/84. 
300 
New Zealand Meat Producers' Board. The New Zealand Meat 
Producer, 13( 2) 6-9, 1985a. 
New Z e,a I and Mea t Pro due e r s . Boa rd. The New Zealand Meat 
Producer, 1 3( 3) 7-12, 1958b. 
New Zealand Treasury. Economic Management. Welli ngton, 
Office of Minister of Finance. 1984. 325p. 
New Zealand Wool Board. Annual Reports. 1980/81, 
1981/82, 1982/83, 1983/84. 
Parish, R. M. Possibilities for Promoting Farm Products. 
Australian Journal of Agriultural Economics, 7 ( 1) 
27-34. 1963. 
Phlips, L. The Economics of Price Discrimination. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983. 284p. 
Piggott, R. R. Potential Gai ns from Controlling 
Distribution of the United states Apple Crop. Search 
Agriculture, 6( 2) 1 - 21 . 1976. 
Pi ggot t, R. R. Agricultural Selling C ortels Relative 
Co-operator and Non Co-operator Gains. Australian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 25 ( 1 ) 14-29. 
1981. 
Pigou, A. C. The Economics of Welfare. London, 
'Macmillan, 1920. 976p. 
Powell, A. Export Receipts and Extension in the Wool 
I ndus try. Australian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 3( 2) 64-74, 1959. 
Primary Products Marketing Act 1953. Welli ngtol1., 
Government Printer, 1979. 11 p. 
301 
Quilkey, J. J. Gunawardana, P. J. and McGrath, B. 
Approximation of Optimal Promotion Allocation among 
Markets - A Note. Contributed paper presented to the 
30th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural 
Economics Society, Canberra, 3-5 February, 1986. 
Rae, A. N. An Evaluation of a New Zealand Marketing 
Rae, 
Board's Supply Diversion Strategies. Australian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 22 ( 1 ) 1 - 21. 
1978. 
A. N. The Role and Performance of Statutory 
Marketing 
Department 
Organisations. 
of Agricultural 
Management, Massey Uni versi ty. 
Discussion Paper 56. 
Economics and Farm 
1980. 1 3 p. 
Reeves, G. W. and Longmire, J. L. A Note on the Theory 
of Price Determination in the Australian Beef Market. 
Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economi cs, 
50 ( 1 ) 119-125. 1982. 
Robi nson, J. The Economics of Impefect Competition. 
London, Macmillan, 1933. 352p. 
Rose, R. N. 
Comment. 
Supply Shifts and Research Benefits 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
6 2( 4) 834-837, 1980. 
Samuelson, P. A. Foundations of Economic 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 1948. 
Anal ys is. 
447p. 
Scherer, F. M. Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance. 2nd ed. Chi cago, Rand McNally, 1980. 
632p. 
Schmalensee, R. The Economics of Advertising. Amsterdam, 
North Holland, '1972. 312p. 
302 
Schmalensee, R. Output and Welfare Implications of 
Monopolistic Third-Degree 
American Economic Review, 
Schmitz, A. and McCalla, 
71 
A. 
Price Dis c r i mi na t ion. 
242-7,1981. 
The Canadian Wheat Board. 
ill Hoos, S. (ed.) Agricultural Marketing Boards - An 
International Perspective. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1979. p. 79-99. 
Schultz, R. L. and Wittink, D. R. The Measurement of 
Industry Advertising Effects. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 13 71-75, 1976. 
Shepherd, A. R. Economic Rent and the Industry Supply 
Curve. Southern Economic Journal, 37 209-211. 
1970. 
Si eper, E. Rationalising Rustic Regulation. CIS Research 
Studies in Government Regulation 2. st. Leonards, 
N. S. W. 
87p. 
The Centre for Independant Studies, 1982. 
Si mon, J. L. and Arndt, J. The Shape of the Advertising 
Functi on. Journal of Advertising Research 20 : 11-28. 
1980. 
Strak, J. Optimal Advertising Decisions for Farmers and 
Food Processors. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
34 ( 3) 
Strak, J. 
3 0 3 - 31 5. 1 9 8 3 . 
and Gill, L. An Economic and Statistical 
Analysis of Advertising in the Market for. Milk and 
Dairy Products in the U. K. Bulletin No.189. 
Department of Agricultural Economics, University of 
Manchester. 1983. 152p. 
303 
Thompson, S. R. and Eiler, D. A. Determinants of Milk 
Advertising Effectiveness. 
Agricultural Economics, 59(2) 
American 
330-335. 
Journal of 
1977. 
Tisdell, C. The Promotion of Wool and Synthetic Fibre 
Blends: Some Alternative Strategies for the Wool 
Industry. Revi ew of Marketing and Agricultural 
Economics, 44( 3) 101-113. 1976. 
Tomek, W. G. and Robi nson, K. L. Agricultural Product 
Prices. 2nd ed. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 
1981 . 367p. 
• 
Tweeten, L. The Demand for United States Farm Output. 
Food Research Institute Studies, 7( 3) 343-69. 1967. 
Tweeten, L. The Elasticity of Foreign Demand for U. S. 
Agricultural Products: Comment. American Journal of 
Ag I' i cuI t u I' a I . E con 0 m i c s , 5 9 ( 4) 737-738. 1977. 
United States' Department of Agriculture .. Foreign 
Agricultural Circular Livestock and Poultry, Foreign 
Agri cuI tural Servi ce, Washi ngton. 1982. 
Veeman, M. M. D. Marketing Boards in New Zealand: An 
Economic Analysis and Appraisal. (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis). University of California, Berkeley, U. S. A., 
1972. 500p. 
Veeman, M. M. D. New Zealand Marketing Boards. ill Hoos, 
S. ( ed. ) Agricultural Marketing Boards An 
International Perspective. Cambr i dge, Massachusetts, 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1979. p. 101-119. 
Wallace, T. D. Measures of Social Costs and Agricultural 
Programs. Journal of Farm Economi cs, 44 ( 2) 580-94. 
1962. 
-'. ::1 
, .. ,i 
304 
Warley, T. K. A Synoptic View of Agricultural Marketing 
Organisations in the United Kingdom. ill Warley, T. K. 
( ed. ) Agricultural Producers and their Markets, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1967. p. 328-340. 
Watson, A. S. Marketing Policy in Relation to 
ill Proceedings of the 
Conference of Agricultural 
Agricultural Development. 
Eighteenth International 
Economists. ~ Alder'shot, Gower, 1983. p. 306-314. 
Waugh, F. V. Needed Research on the Effectiveness of Farm 
Products Promoti ons. Journal of Farm Economics, 
• 
41 ( 2) 364-376. 1959. 
Weisenborn, D. E. Allocation of Florida Orange Production 
among Alternative Product Forms and Market Sectors. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 51 ( 5) 
1134-1137. 1969. 
Woods, L. D. Historical 
Products, 
Survey 
Wool, 
of Marketing of New 
Meat and Pipfruit. Zealand Dairy 
Unpublished notes. Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Marketing, Lincoln College, 1981. 
Wool Industry Act 1977. 
1978. 48p. 
Wellington, Government Printer, 
Wool Marketing Study Group. Final Report Prepared for 
New Zealand Wool Board and New Zealand Wool 
Commission. Wellington, Bayleys Secretarial Services 
Ltd. 1967. 91p. 
Yerex, D. and Haines, W. The Kiwifruit 
Masterton, Agricultural Publishing Associates, 
96p. 
Story. 
1983. 
305 
APPENDIX 1 
PROOFS TO EQUATIONS IN CHAPTER 4t 
A1. DERIVATION OF EQUATION (4.2) FROM EQUATION (4.1 b) 
( 4. 2) P. = a. - b.Q. 
where P. is the competitive price 
Q. is the total quantity demanded 
m at 
1: 
i = 1 bi 
a. = 
m 1 
1: 
i = 1 bi 
and b. = 
m 1 
1: 
i = 1 b 1 
and 
(4.1b) 
where Pi and Q1 are price and quantity, respectively, 
in market segment i. 
Rearranging (4.1b) gives 
Pi - ai 
(A1.1a) 
- Qi = 
b1 
Now, 
Pi = P .. 
1. All algebraic proofs presented in this Appendix have 
been numerically verified against a simple simulation 
model. 
Therefore, 
(A1.1b) 
Pd -
- Qi = 
b t 
and 
m 
(A1.2a) Qa = L 
i = 1 
Therefore, 
m 
(A1.2b) 
- Q. = L 
i = 1 
Let m = 2. Then 
P. 
- Q. = 
bl 
In general terms, 
- Qa = 
Therefore, 
( 4. 2) 
where ail = 
and b a = 
m 
L 
i = 1 
m 
L 
i = 1 
m 
L 
1 
at 
Qi 
[P. -
bl 
al 
+ 
bl 
al 
bl 
1 
bl 
1 
i = 1 b I 
a
l ] 
Pa 
b2 
m 
+ L 
i = 1 
1 
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a2 
b2 
Pa 
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A2. PROOFS TO EQUATIONS (4. 5a) AND (4. 5b) 
Competitive equilibrium is determined when equations (4.2) 
and (4.3) are equated. This gives 
a. - b ... Qo = c + dQo 
That is, 
a. - c = (b... + d) Qo 
Therefore, 
a. - c 
( 4. 5b) Qo = 
b. + d 
By substituting (4. 5b) into (4.2) 
( 4. 5a) [
a. - CJ 
Po = a. - b ... 
b ... + d 
A. 3 PROOF OF EQUATION (4. 11 ) 
(4.11) A = a. - 2b. Q. 
Take equation (4.10) and solve for the vector {Qt Q2 A.} 
2bt 0 1 Qt at 
(4.10) 0 2b2 Q2 = a2 
1 0 A Q ... 
From Cramer's Rule, 
- 1 
Ql 2bl a 1 at 
( A3. 1) Q2 = a 2b2 1 a2 
A 1 0 Q ... 
if the 3 x 3 matrix is non-singular 
"-"<,-'.-.:. -~"~1 
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Let the 3x3 matrix be called B 
Now, 
1 
(A3.2a) B- 1 = (adj B) I B I :j: 0 
Find the adjoint of B 
Now, 
+ 1 btl 1 -I b t 2 1 + 1 b t J I 
cof B = -I b2 t I + I b221 -I b2J I 
+ I bJ t I -I bJ 2 I + I bJJ I 
-1 1 -2b2 
= -1 -2bt 
Therefore, 
-1 1 
( A3. 3) adj B = 1 -1 -2bt 
-2b2 -2bt 
Find the determinant of B 
IBI = 2btC-1) + (1)-2b2 
Therefore, 
(A3.4) 
Therefore, substituting (A3. 3) and (A3.4) into (A3. 2a) 
gives 
1 -1 
( A3. 2b) B- 1 = 
1 -1 -2bt 
-2b2 -2bt 
.'. - .'. --' .'.'~'.' 
Substituting (A3. 2b) into (A3. 1) givEls 
1 
A = (-2b2at - 2bla2 + 4btb2Q~) 
-2(bl + b2) 
That is, 
a 1 b2 + a2 b I blb2 
( A3. 5 a) A = - 2 Q~ 
bl + b2 bl + b2 
b I b2 
Take 
bt + b2 
Now btb2 
= 
bl + b2 [bl + b2] 
btb2 
1 
= 
bt b2 
+ 
b I b2 b t b2 
btb2 1 
= 
bt + b2 2 
I: 
i = 1 bi 
Therefore, from equation ( 4. 2) 
blb2 
( A3. 6) = b. 
bi + b2 
alb2 + a2 b I 
Take 
bt + b2 
at b2 + a2 b t b2 
Now = at + a2 
bt + b2 bt + b2 bl 
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bt 
+ b2 
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2 
L 
i = 1 
= 
2 
L 
i = 1 
Therefore, 
( A3. 7) = a~ 
Therefore, 
( A3. Sb) )..= a. - 2b~Q. 
A4. PROOF OF EQUATION (4. 1S) 
(4.1S) 
2bi 
Now, when MR, = MR~ 
That is, 
Therefore, 
( 4. 1 S) = 
2b, 
AS. PROOF OF EQUATION (4.16) 
( 4. 16) 
From equation (4.1 b), 
[2 b.o 0.. + a I - a.] 
= al - bl 
2bl 
ai a .. 
= at - b.o 0 .. - + 
2 2 
Ther-efor-e, 
(4.16) P t d = ~( al + aol) - b.O.o 
A6. PROOFS OF EQUATIONS (4. 17a) TO (4. 17d) 
(4.17a) 
and 
(4.17b) 
al = Pol [1 + ~l Int~ 
P .. 
b I = 
Now, fr-om equation (4.1b), 
( A6. 1> 
Now bi = 
[
6 P i 0 i ] Pi 
=- -- . -
Oi Pi 01 
Pi 
= 
I nl I 01 
Since PI = P.o, then 
1 Pol 
(4.17b) bi = 
In i I 01 
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Substituting (4.17b) into ( A6. 1) gi ves 
P. = ai - [6· ~J Qi Q1 
P. 
= a1 -
I n1 I 
Therefore, 
(4.17a) a1 = P. [1 1 J' +~ 
Consider 
(4.17c) a. = P. [1 +~] 
and, 
1 P. 
(4.17d) 
Equations (4. 17c) and (4. 17d) can be proved in the same 
way as (4. 17a) and (4. 17b) using equation (4.2), where 
( 4. 2) P. = a. - b.Q. 
instead of equation (4.1 b) above. 
A7. PROOF OF EQUATION (4.18) 
(4.18) 
,I 
Recall equation (4.15) 
(4.15) 01 d = 
2bi 
Substitute equations (4. 17a) to (4. 17d) into (4.15) 
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Then, 
1 P .. P a P .. 
2.- Q .. + P .. + -P .. -
n .. Q .. ni n(l 
Q i d = 
1 P .. 
2. 
ni Qi 
That is, 
ni Qi n i Qi [ 1 _1 J ( A 7. 1 ) Q i d = + -
n .. 2 ni nil 
Now, 
(A7.2) Sid = 
Substitute (A7.1) into ( A 7. 2) 
Therefore, 
[n. Q. ni Q i C. -:J 1 Sid = --- + Q" n" 2 
n, Qi n i Q i ni Q i 
= + 
n .. Q" 2ni Q .. 2n" Q. 
That is, 
~s i [ ni 1J (4.18) Sid = + 
n .. 
A8. PROOF OF EQUATION (4.19) 
--i 
(4.19) P i d = P II + ~ P .. [~ - _1-J 
ni n .. 
Recall equation (4.16) 
(4.16) 
. --.-,' -.- ,'-~-:.: 
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Substitute equations (4. 17a), (4.170) and (4.17d) into 
equation (4.16) 
This gives 
Pol] 
+ -- + Pol + -- -
ni nol nol 
P. Pol 
Qol 
Qol 
= ~ [2 P ol + Pol [ __ 1 + __ 1 ] ] 
nt nol nol 
Pol 
Pol P. Pol 
= Pol + + 
2 nt 2 n .. n .. 
Pol 1 P. 1 
= Pol + 
2 ni 2 nol 
Therefore, 
( 4. 1 9) P t d = Pol + ~Pol [~ - __ 1 ] 
nt nol 
A9. PROOF OF EQUATION (4. 21) 
k 
( 4.21> Pold = a .. - bol Qol + 
Qol 
n [, B, - B.l' ] 
where k = L > 0 
i = 1 4bi 
Let n = 2 
From equation (4. 20a) 
( A9. 1 ) P II d = 
31 5 
That is, 
P & d = 
Substi tute equation (4.1 b) for Pi d 
Therefore, 
P &. d = 
Substitute equation (4.15) for Qld 
1 [ [2b. Q. + at - a.] [2b .. Q .. + at - a .. ] 2 P .. d = - at - bt 
Q. 2bt 2 b 1 
1 
= 
[
4 b .. 2 Q .. 2 + 4 a t b .. Q.. - 4 a .. b a Q .. 
- bt . 
4b1 2 
- 2at ail + at 2 
2al a~ -
4 b 1 
4a~b.Q. - 2ala~ -
= _1 [ [a 1 2 - a .. 2 + 
Q .. 4bl 
a .. 2 + 4a .. b .. Q .. 
= _1 [[a 1 2 - a .. :2 + a:2 2 - a ~ 2]. + 
Q.. 4bl 4b:2 
_ [4 b .. 2 Q .. 2 
4bl 
That is, 
( A9. 2) P & d = 
[4a .. b~Q .. + 4a .. b~QaJ 
4bl 4b2 
[b 1 b .. 2 + b 2 b a 2] Q .. 
blb2 
1 
+ -
Q .. [
[a 1 2 - a .. 2] + [a 2 2 - a .. 2] 1 
4bt 4b2 
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Take ter'm 1 of this expr'ession 
Now, 
= 
Fr'om equation (A3. 6), this 
a. b. 
= 
b. 
= a. 
Take ter'm 2 of this expr'ession 
Now, 
which, fr'om equation (A3. 6), 
b.:1 
= - -- Q. 
b. 
= - b. Q. 
Take ter'm 3 
1 
[
[a 1 :1 a .. 2] + [a 2:1 - a.:1 J] 
4bl 4b2 
[ 2 [S" - a.,]] 1 = t i=1 4bi Q. 
It can be shown that ter'm 3 
[ 2 ca. -a.)']] = t 
i = 1 4bi Q. 
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Now 
and 
2 
L 
i = 1 
2 
L 
i = 1 
[<a, - a.p] 
4bl 
= 
Hence, it is required 
a .. 2 a .. 2 
- -- - = 
4bt 4b2 
aa 2 
= 
4 b t 4bt 
at 2 2ataa 
-- - + 
4 b t 4bt 
to prove that 
2at a .. a .. 2 
+ -- -
4 bt 4 b t 
Take the RHS of this expression 
a .. 2 a,,2 
+ -- - + 
4 bt 4bt 
= 
+ + 
= + 
a2 2 a .. 2 
+ - --
4b2 4b2 
aa 2 a2 2 
+ 
4 b t 4b2 
2a2 a .. a,,2 
+ 
4 b2 4b2 
4btCbt + b2) 4b2(bt + b2) 
+ + 
4btCbt + b2)2 4b2(bt + b2)2 
= 
4btb2(bt + b2) 
+ 
4btb2(bt + b2)2 
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2a2 aa aa 2 
+ 
4b2 4b2 
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= 
+ 
= 
= 
a .. 2 (bt + b2) 2 
= 
a .. 2 ( b t + b2) 
= 
= 
= ------
= L. H. S. 
Therefore, collecting together the three terms, and 
substituting back into (A9. 2) gives 
k 
( 4.21> P .. d = a .. - b .. Q .. + 
Q .. 
2 [ ( a 1 - a .. ) 2 1 where k = L > a i = 1 4 b 1 
A10. PROOF TO EQUATION (4.22) 
( 4.22) k = ~ P • Q. ~ [n i s i 
i = 1 
From equation (4.21) 
(A10.1) 
n 
k = I: 
i =1 [
( a i-a. ) 2] 
4bi 
Substitute equations (4. 17a), 
equation (A1 0.1) 
Therefore, 
n 
k = I: 
i = 1 
n 
= I: 
i =1 
[ 
P. 
P. + 
n, 
4 
[PO [_1 
ni 
4 . P a • 
= ~ .~ [n,Q,P.[ 
1 =1 
- P. 
1 
_1 J]' 
n. 
1 
ni Q t 
ni 
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(4.17b) and (4.17c) into 
P. 
n. r] 
321 
Therefore, 
( 4. 22) 
A11. PROOFS TO EQUATIONS (4. 23a) AND (4. 24a) 
b .. (a .. - c + Xo.,) 2k(b .. + d) 
( 4. 23a) + 
2( b.. + d) a.. - c + Xo., 
and 
a.. - c + Xo., 
( 4. 24a) 
2( b.. + d) 
where X = (a .. - c) 2 + 4k( b a + d) in both cases. 
To find Ql 
First, equate equations (4.21) and (4.3) to give 
k 
= c + dQt 
That is, 
k 
= (c - a .. ) 
Therefore, 
k 
-( b a + d) Ql + - (c - a .. ) = 0 
That is, 
k 
- (aa - c) = 0 
Therefore, 
(b .. + d) Qt 2 - (aa - c) Qt - k = 0 
Recall that the solutions to a quadratic equation 
ax 2 + bx + c = 0 are 
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x = 
2a 
Therefore, 
2(b~ +d) 
Ignoring the negative root, this gives 
a~ - c + Xo ., 
( 4. 24a) 
2( b~ + d) 
where X = (a~ - c) 2 ... 4k( b. + d) 
Recall (4.21) 
k 
( 4. 21> P~d = a.- b.Q. + 
Sub s tit ute (4. 24-3-) i II tot his to fin d P t 
Therefore, 
b.(a. - c + Xo.,) 2k( b. +d) 
( 4. 23a) + 
2( b. + d) a. - c + Xo., 
A12. PROOF TO EQUATIONS (4. 17e) AND (4. 17f) 
(4.17e) 
and 
Po 1 
(4.17f) d = 
Qo e 
Now, from equation (4.3) 
(A12.1) Po = c + dQo 
Now, 
6Po 
(A12.2) d = 
6Qo 
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= [~ . ~J . 
6Qo Po 
Po 
Qo 
Therefore, 
( 4. I,f) d = 1 Po 
e Qo 
Sub s tit uti n g (4. '7+ ) i n t 0 (A 1 2. 1) g i ve s 
1 Po 
Po = c + Qo 
e Qo 
Therefore, 
Po [1 
1 ] (4.17e) c = -
e 
A13. PROOFS TO EQUATIONS (4. 23b) AND (4. 24b) 
,(4.23b) = Po [1 + _1-J _ PoZ O • 5 + 
2n.. Qo n" ~Qo 
k 
and 
Qo 
( 4. 24b) 
2 
Q01 kQo 
where Z = + in both cases 
4 
Po [_1 + ~ 
n.. e 
Recall equation (4. 24a) 
( 4. 24a) 
2( b. + d) 
where X = (a. - C)1 + 4k(b .. + d) 
Substitute equations (4. 17c) to (4.17f) into (4. 24a). 
This gives 
[~ + ~J 
n. e 
Po [_1 + 
= n. 
PO] 1 
+ - + 
e 
~ + ~ . ~J 
Qo e Qo 
2PO[_1_ + 
Qo n. 
~J 
e 
4k[_1_ . 
n. 
[PO [_1 + ~]r 
n. e Qo 
Po [1 
+ 4k--
Qo n. 
= + 
2 1] 1 
+ -
e 
Qo 
= + 
2 
+ ~J [~[_1 + ~JJ 
e Qo 1 n. e 
Qo 
= + 
2 
4Po [_1 + ~J 
n. e 
4k 
Qo Qo 
= + + 
2 
4Po [_1 + ~J 
n. e 
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Po 
+ 
Qo e 
o • , 
o . , 
... 
o • , 
o • , 
QOl 
325 
o . , 
Qo QOl kQo 
= + + 
2 4 
Po [_1 + ~J 
n.. e 
Therefore, 
Qo 
( 4. 24b) 
2 
QOl kQo 
where Z = + 
4 
To find equation (4. 23b), take equation (4.21) 
k 
(A13.1> 
Now substitute equation (4. 24b) into (A13.1) 
Therefore, 
Po [1 _1 J Po 1 Qo Po Pdt = + - Zo., 
n. Qo n .. 2 Qo n .. 
k 
..., 
+ 
Qo 
+ z 0 • 5 
2 
QOl kQo 
where Z = + 
".<'-
4 
Po [_1 ~J + 
n. e 
Therefore, 
Po [1 + _1 J 1 Po 1 k Pdt = - Po -- - Z 0 • 5 + 
Ln. 2n .. Qo n. Qo 
+ Z 0 • 5 
:-::~::.:; :-:-~'.-:::-~ ::~~~~ 2 
Po [1 2:.1 
Po k 
= + - Z 0 • , + 
Qo n .. ~Qo + ZO., 
- .. :---=~--<-
That is, 
P d 1 = Po [1 + _1 ] 
2n. 
Pozo., k 
( 4. 23b) + 
Q0 2 kQo 
where Z = + 
4 
Po [_1 + ~J 
n" e 
A14. PROOF TO EQUATION (4. 25a) 
( 4. 25a) 6. Q = 
2( b a + d) 
where X = (a" - e)2 + 4k(b" + d) 
From equations (4. 24a) and (4. 5b) 
a. - e + Xo., 
( 4. 24a) 
2( b. + d) 
and 
a. - e 
( 4. 5b) Qo = 
b. + d 
Now, 
(A14.1) 6.Q = Ql - Q·o 
Therefore, 
-( a" - e) + Xo., 
( 4. 25a) 6. Q = 
2( b" + d) 
A15. PROOF TO EQUATION (4.25b) 
Qo 
( 4. 25b) 6.Q = + ZO., 
2 
Q0 2 kQo 
where Z = + 
4 
Po [_1 + ~J 
n" e 
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Take equation (4. 25a) 
-( a~ - c) + Xo ., 
( 4. 25a) 6. Q = 
2( b a + d) 
From the proof to equation (4. 24b), the proof to equation 
(4.25b) is directly analogous. That is, 
Qo 
( 4. 25b) 6. Q = 
2 
Qo 2 kQo 
where Z = + 
4 
A16. PROOF TO EQUATION (4.30) 
1 
( 4.30) S t t d = S i + 
na 2 
Recall equation (4.29) 
(4.29) 
2bt 
Substitute equations (4. 17a) to (4.17d) into equation 
(4.29). This gives, 
1 Po Po Po 
2 . Ql + Po + - Po -
n. Qo n. 
1 Po 
2 . 
-- -.~ -' • > • 
2 Po 
Po [_1 - _1 ] Ql 
n. Qo n, n. 
= + 
2 Po 2[_1 ~J Ql nl nl Qt 
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Ther-efore, 
n, Qi niQI C. _1 ] (A16.1) Q { , d = Qi + nil Qo 2 nil 
Q tid 
(A16.2) S t t d = 
Q{ 
Substitute equation (A16.1> into equation (A16.2) 
nl Qt Qt nl QI 
1 C _1 ] S { I d = + -
n. Qa Ql 2 Qt n i nil 
nl n,Qt nlQ, 
= 8 I + 
nil 2 Q 1 n 1 2Qt nil c 
n, Qi QI ni 
= 81 + -- -
n. 2Ql 2 Q 1 nil 
Therefore, 
ni 1 Qi [1 ~J ( 4. 30) S { I d .: S I + 
n" 2 Ql n .. 
A17. PROOF TO EQUATION (4.31b) 
(4.31b) P i i d = Po [1 + _1 _ + 1 
2nl n" 
[~ -~Jl Qo 
Recall equation (4.31 a) 
(4.31a) 
Substitute equations (4.17a), (4.17c) and (4.17d) into 
equation (4.31 a) 
Therefore, 
PI 1 d [
Po 
= ~ Po + 
n, 
PO] 
+ Po + - -
n .. 
1 Po 
Qo 
• 
···i 
-, ' ... ' ........ - .. 
~[2PO+ p,[_1 J] Po = + - Ql n! n .. n .. Qo 
Po 1 Po 1 Qt 
= Po + + - Po 
2 n! 2 n .. n .. Qo 
Po 1 Po [~ -~J = Po + + 
2 n! n .. Qo 
Therefore, 
Po [1 1 [~ -~J] (4.31b) PI! d = + + 
2n! n. Qo 
A1 B. PROOF TO EQUATIONS (4. 32c) and (4. 32d) 
Begin with 
(b .. +d) [a .. XO ., -2b .. k-a .. ( a .. -c) J +b. ( a .. -c) ctd 
(4. 32c) 6TR;k~-------------------------------------------
2(b .. +d)l 
where X = (a .. - c) 1 + 4k( b .. + d) 
Begin with equation (4. 32b) 
( 4. 32b) 
Recall equations (4. Sa), (4. Sb) (4.24) and (4.33) 
a .. -c 
( 4. Sa) Qo = 
b a + d 
( 4. Sb) [a .. - c] Po = a .. - b .. 
b. + d 
a .. - c + XO • , 
( 4.24) Ql = 
2( b .. + d) 
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. -, "'--,'.'.-.' 
"." :-","-
( 4. 33) P t :: a I. _ b.. [a.. - e + X 0 • , 1 
2( b.. + d) 
where X = (a .. - e)2 + 4k(b .. + d) 
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~ TR can be found by substituting these equations into 
( 4. 32b) 
Find Pi Q1 by multiplying (4.24) by (4.33) 
Therefore, 
[a.. - 0 + i
o
. ,] [a .. 
2( b.. + d) [
a .. - 0 
- b a 
( 2 b .. 
+ XO"J] 
+ d) 
aa ( a .. - c + XO . , ) b .. (a .. - 0 + XO")2 
= 
2 ( b .. + d) 4( b.. + d) 2 
aa(a .. -o) a .. XO • , b .. (a .. -o+Xo. ~) (a .. -e+X o .,) 
= + 
2 ( b .. +d) 2(b .. +d) 4(b,,+d)2 
a .. ( a .. - 0) a .. XO . , 
= + 
2( b .. + d) 2( b .. + d) 
b a ( a .. 2 -a .. e+a .. XO • , -a .. e+e 2 -oXo . '+aa Xo. , -eXo . '+X) 
4(b .. +d)2 
aa (a.. - e) 
= + 
2(b a + d) 2(b a + d) 
ba[(a .. - e)2 + 2aaXo., - 2eXo., + Xl 
4( b a + d) 2 
aa (aa - e) a .. Xlt • , ba(a .. - e)2 
= + 
2( b.. + d) 2( b a + d) 4(b .. +d)2 
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Take term 5 
= 
4b .. k(b .. + d) 
= 
4(b. + d)2 
Therefore, 
2b .. ( a .. - c) 
(A18.1> + 
2( b.. + d) 2( b .. +d) 4(b .. + d) 
4( b. + d) 2 (b.. + d) 
Find PoQo by multiplying (4. 5a) by (4. 5b) 
Therefore, 
Po Qo 
- [:: : :] [a. 
That is, 
(A18.2) Po Qo = 
(b.. + d) 
Substi tuti ng (A18. 1) and (A18. 2) into (4. 32b) gi ves 
a .. ( a .. -c) 2b .. ( a .. -c) 2' 
6.TR = k + + 
2( b .. +d) 4(b .. +d)2 4(b .. +d)2 
a .. (a .. -c) b .. (a .. -c)2 
+ 
(b .. +d) (b .. +d) (b .. +d)2 
~'::'--- .'. ':-~'. :;-',', . ~ .. Therefore, 
a .. (a .. -c) b .. (a .. -c)2 b .. k 
(A18.3) 6TR = k - + + 
2( b .. +d) (ba+d) 2(b .. +d) 
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2(b .. +d)2 
That is, 
( 4. 32c) 
( b a +d) [ aa XO • '-2b. k-a a ( aa -c) ] +b .. ( aa -c) ( aa -c-X o . ') 
.6TR = k + 
2(b a +d)2 
where X = (a .. - C)2 + 4kCb .. + d) 
Recall equation (4. 32d) 
( 4. 32d) [
P 0 2 Q0 2 na e ] 0 • , 
.6TR = k + + Po Qo k 
4 n .. + e 
Po Qo e 
- -- - k 
2 na + e 
Substitute equations (4. 17a) to (4.17f) into equation 
(A18.3) 
Take term 2 
aa(aa - c) 
2( b.. + d) 
-[p 0 + ~J [p 0 + P 0 
= na na 
PO] 
- Po + -
e 
2[_1 
Po 1 ~J + 
na Qo e Qo 
-Po [1 + _1 J Po' [_1 + ~J 
= na na e 
2Po [_1_ 
Qo na 
+ ~J 
e 
Po Qo 
[1 _1 ] '-'---.','." = - -- + 
-', -'--"-
2 na 
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Take term 3 
b. ( a .. - c) 2 
2 ( b a + d) 2 
Po [~ ~J2 + 
n .. Qo n .. e 
= 
2[_1 
Po 1 ~J2 + 
n .. Qo e Qo 
1 Po 
Po 2 [_1 ~J 2 + 
n. Qo n. e 
= 
Po2 
[_1 ~J 2 2-- + 
Qo2 n. e 
PoQo 
= 
2 n. 
Take term 4 
b.k 
( b. + d) 
1 Po 
k 
n .. Qo 
= 
[_1 Po 1 ~J + 
n .. Qo e Qo 
Po 
k 
Qo n .. 
= 
Po [_1 ~J + 
Qo n. e 
:.;...~·:·:·:-~-:<·;:x-:· 
. -.. ", ..... 
= 
= 
= 
::' C ..: 1 
Po [1 + _1 1 [PO [_1 + ~ [PO [_1 + ~l + 4k]r' 
n. n. e n. e Qo 
4kJO., 
+ -
Qo 
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Take term 6 
2(b .. + d)2 
2(b .. +d)2 
1 ~[[~ PO] 2 4k[_1_ Po ~]] .. , [~ ~J + - + + + 
n .. Qo n .. e n .. Qo e Qo n .. e 
= 
2[_1 Po ~J2 + 
n .. Qo e Qo 
1 Po 
[ 
1 1 jO., [ 1 1 4k]0., 1 1 
Po [-+-J Po [-+-J +- Po [-+-J 
n.. e n.. e Qo n.. e n .. Qo 
= 
Po 2 
2 
1 [ 1 1 ]0" [ 1 1 4k]O., 
- -Qo Po [-- + -] . Po [-- + -J +-
n.. n.. e n.. e Qo 
= 
Put all terms back together again. 
This gives 
pOQO[ 1] PoQo ~TR =K- -- 1 + -- + 
2 n.. 2 
n .. k 
n .. 
. . . >:.:-~.: ::< 
+ 
~] 
e 
Po Qo 
=-K+--
2 
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2[_1 + ~J 
n" e 
1 
k 
[_1 _ 1 __ 1 J _ _n,, __ 
n" nil [_1_ + ~J 
nil e 
[PO [_1 + ~]r' [PO [_1 +~] + 4k]'" [QO [1 + _1 ] _ ~] 
n" e nil e Qo n" nil 
+ 
2 [_1 + ~J 
nil e 
1 1 1 0.'[ 1 1 4k]O.' 
k Po 0 • '. [-+-J Po [-+-J +- . Qo 
Po Qo nil n" e nil e Qo 
=k- -- - + 
2 [_1 +~J [1 1 ] 0 • 'c 1 J 0 • , 2 -+- -+-
nil e nil e nil e 
[PO [PO [_1 +~J + 4k]r' 
. Qo 
=k-
PoQo k nil e Qo 
-- - + 
nil [_1 +~J [1 1 J 0 • , 2 2 -+-
nil e n .. e' 
Po 2 [_1 +~J o • , 
Po Qo k Qo 4kPo 
=k-
n.. e 
-- - + + 
2 nil(n .. +e) 2 
[_1 +~J Qo C. +~] 
n" e n" e 
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=~ - Po Qo e.k Q, [ 
+ Q, ~:p:~] r' -- - + ---; P02 2 no.+e 
no. e 
[ P 0 2 Q0 2 4kPoQo2 no.e ]o.~ Po Qo ke 
"" k-t + 
4 4Qo ( no. +e) 2 ( no. +e) 
no. e ] 0 . ~ __ P_o _Q_o 
(n .. +e) 2 
+ PoQok 
ke 
Therefore, 
( 4. 32d) t.TR = k + [P,':" + Po Qo k no.e JO'~ 
( no. + e) 
Po Qo e 
- k 
2 ( no. + e) 
A19. PROOF TO EQUATION ( 4. 35a) 
d 
( 4. 35a) t.C = c ( Qt - Qo) + -( Qt 2 - Qo2) 
2 
Now 
Qt 
(A19.n t.C = Icc + dQ)dQ 
Qo 
.. ,-. - ,:.:,~; -.1 
[CQ r d = + Q2 2 Qo 
d d 
= cQt + Q12 - cQo - Qt 2 
2 2 
That is, 
d 
t.C = c( Qt - Qo) + ( Qt 2 - Qo2) 
2 
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A20. PROOF TO EQUATION (4. 35b) 
(4.35b) 6.c = 
3d d 
-( a. - c) 2 + d ( a. - c) X ° ., + X 
2 2 
where X = (a. - c) 2 + 4k( b. + d) 
From (A19. 1) 
d 
(A19.1) C(Q1 - Qo) + (Qt 2 - Q02) 
2 
Substitute equations (4. 5b) and (4.24) into (A19. 1) 
6.C 
[
- ( a. - c) + X ° . , ] d [ 
= c + -
2(b .. +d) 2 
That is, 
(aa-C)2] 
(b.+d)2 
4(aa-C)2] 
4(b .. +d)2 
( a .. -c) 2 +2( a .. -c) Xo., +X-4( a. -c) 2] 
4(b.+d)2 
3d d 
- -( a .. - c) 2 + d ( a .. - c) X ° . , + - X 
(A20.1) 6. c = 
-cBa .. -c) +xo'1 2 2 
+ 
2( b. +d) 4(b.+d)2 
TheJ:'efore, 
2 ( b.. + d) [- cE a.. - c) + X ° . ~ ] c t d 
( 4. 35b) 6C = 
4(b +d)2 
3d 
- -( a .. 
2 
- C)2 + d(a .. - c)Xo.~+ d X 
2. 
A21. PROOF TO EQUATION (4. 34b) 
-de a .. -c) 2 +d( a .. -c) XO . ~ +2dk( b .. +d) 
( 4. 34b) 6PS = 
(4ba+d)2 
wheJ:'e X = (a. -C)2 + 4k(b. + d) 
Combine equations (A18. 3) and (A19. 1) 
This gives 
a .. (a.-c) 2b .. k b .. (a .. -c)2 
6PS = k - +---- + 
2(b .. +d) 2( b .. +d) 2(b .. +d) 2(b .. +d)2 
b .. XO·'(a .. -c) -c( a .. -c) +CXO . ~ 
2(b.+d)2 2( b .. +d) 
3d d 
- -(a .. -c)2+d(a .. -c)Xo·~+-X 
2 2 
4(b .. +d)2 
2k( b .. +d) -a" ( a" -c) +a .. XO • ~ -2b .. k+c( a" -c) -cXo . ~ 
= 
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3d d 
2 b .. ( a .. - c) 2 - 2 b .. X ° . , ( a .. - c) + -( a .. - c) 2 - d ( a .. - c) X 0 • , - -X 
2 2 
+ 
4(b .. +d)2 
,':-.-',' 
:: > ... ! 
340 
2k( b~ +d) -2b~ k-a~ ( a~ -c) +c( a. -c) +a. XO • ~ -cX o . ~ 
= 
2(b .. +d) 
3 d 
2 b ~ ( a ~ - c) 2 +-d ( a .. - c) 2 - 2 b X 0 • ~ ( a ~ - c) - d X 0 • ~ ( a ~ - c) - -X 
+ 
= 
+ 
2 2 
4(b~+d)2 
2 k( b ~ + d - b. ) - ( a ~ - c) ( a. - c) + X 0 • ~ ( a ~ - c) 
2(b~+d) 
3 
( a ~ - c) 2 ( 2 b ~ +-d) - ( a ~ - c) X 0 • ~ ( 2 b ~ + d) - c t d 
2 
~ [( a~ -c) 2 +4k( b~ +d) ] 
= 
2(b~+d) 
3 d 
2 b ~ ( a ~ - c) 2 +-d ( a .. - c) 2 - -( a .. - c) 2 c t d 
2 2 
+ 
4(b.+d)2 
- (a. -c) XO • ~ ( 2b .. +d) -2dk( b. +d) 
4dk( b .. +d) -2( a .. -c) 2 ( b. +d) +2X o • ~ ( a. -c) ( b .. +d) ctd 
= 
4(b .. +d)2 
+ (2b~ +d) ( a .. -c) 2 -( 2b. +d) ( a .. -c) XO • ~ -2dk( b. +d) 
( a .. -c) 2 ( 2b .. +d-2b .. -2d) +X o • ~ ( a .. -c) ( 2b .. +2d-2b .. -d) ctd 
= 
4(b .. +d)2 
+ 2dk( b .. +d) 
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Therefore, 
-de a .. -c) 2 +d( a .. -c) XO ., +2dk( b .. +dl 
(4.34b) .0.PS = 
(4b .. +d)2 
A22. PROOF TO EQUATION (4. 34c) 
1 2k 
( 4. 34c) 6 PS = - PoQo+ 
• 
Substitute equations (4.17a) to (4.17f) into (4. 34b) 
Take term 1 of the numerator in (4. 34b) 
1 Po 
-d(a .. -c)2 = 
e Qo 
1 Po 
[
1 1 2 
Po 2 - + -J 
n.. e 
= 
e Qo 
Take term 2 of the numerator in (4. 34b) 
1 Po 
d(a .. -c)Xo., = 
e Qo 
Take term 3 of the numerator in (4. 34b) 
2dk( b .. +d) = 2k ~[_1 + ~J 
Q0 2 n. e e 
Take the denominator in (4. 34b) 
P 0 2 
4( b .. +d) 2 = 4 
Put all terms back together 
Po 
e Qo 
6 PS = 
4Po 2 [_1 +~] 2 
Qo 2 n. e 
Po 
+ 
e Qo 
1 2 k 
= Po Qo + 
4e 4e [_1 + 
n .. 
1 ~[_1 +~J + Po 2 
4e Qo n. e 
ctd 
~J 
e 
[_1 +~J 2 
n .. e 
Po 2 [_1_+~] c t d 
Qo 2 n. e 
Po [1 1] 1 0 • , 
+ 4k- -+-
Qo n. e 
o . , 
Po C 1 J + 4k- -+-
Qo n.. e 
Po 4 
[_1 +~J 4 
Q0 4 n" e 
Simplify the last term of this expression 
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1 Po Qo 4 4k ]0"' 
[_1 +~J J 
n" e 
+ 
4e Po 4 Qo 
1 P02C 1J Qo 
= ~. ~ -;;:-+: . Po 2 • 
Po Qo 2 
P02 Qo 2 +---
Qo 
4e 
o • , 
+ 4kPoQo 1 I 
[_1 +~J 
n" e 
= 
o . , 
4k 
343 
Therefore, 
1 2k 
( 4. 34c) 6. PS = - PoQo + 
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APPENDIX 2 
PROOFS TO SELECTED EOUATIONS IN CHAPTER S 
A22. DERIVATION OF EQUATION (S.10al AND (S.10b) FROM 
EOUATION (S.9) 
Take equation (S.9) 
02 - 132 P1132 
(S.9) = 
Assume 
(A22.1) PI > P2 
(A22.2) 131 = 132 = 13* 
and 
. :"·1 
(A22.3) 13* < 01, 02 
Therefore, 
13* P1 02 - 13* 
(A22.4) = 
13* P2 01 - 13* 
From equations (A23.1) and (A23.3), it follows that 
(A22.5) 13* P1 > 13* P2 
and 
(A22.6) (02 - 13*) > (01 - 13*) 
Therefore, 
( 5 . lOa) 01 < 02 
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-'," .: If, however, 
(A22.7) 13* > 01,02 
then 
(A22.8) (02 - 13*) < (01 - 13*) 
and 
(5.10b) 01 > 02 
A23. COMMENT ON EQUATIONS (5.11a) AND (S.llb) 
If 
(A23.1) TT = P1Ql + P2Q2 - C(Q) - Ai - A2 
It can be shown that 
(A23.2) 01 = 
and 
_.' .;-
132 
(A23.3) 02 = 
n2 
From {A22.1} and (A22.2) 
(S.lla) 0 1 > 02 
If, however, 
(A23.4) 131 < 132 
then it is not possible to determine from equations 
;;~-~ -..: :-;~:-::::-:::. ~~ 
" .. - -.-. (A23.2) and (A23.3) whether 
> 
(S.llb) 01 = 02 
< 
.' . -;.;.: .. -.,. >., -'.',' 
>.-- ~-~-~-
A24. PROOF TO EQUATION (5. 22a) 
6Rt 6P 
( 5. 22a) = Q - 1 
6At 6A1. 
Recall equation (5. 20a) 
( 5. 20a) Rt = PS - At 
That is 
Q 
( A24. 1) R, = PQ - I S-' (Q) dQ - A, 
o 
Therefore, 
Q 
6 Rt 6 6 [ J S- , ( Q) dQ] = --( PQ) - --
6 At 6 A t 6At 
0 
6Q 6P 6Q 
= P-- + Q- - s-tCQ)-- -
6 At 6A 1. 6At 
Now, s-t(Q) = P. Therefore, 
6 Rt 6Q 6P 6Q 
~ P-- + Q- - P-- - 1 
6 At 6At 6At 6At 
That is, 
6Rt 6P 
C5.22a) = Q- - 1 
6At 6At 
A25. PROOF TO EQUATION ( 5. 23a) 
6Q 6 D 1. 6P 6D2 6P 
( 5. 23a) -- - -- - = 
6At 6P 6A t 6P 6 A t 
Recall equation C5.17a) 
(5.17£) 
6 A t 
- --
6 At 
1 
6 D t 
6 A t 
Differentiating (5.17<:) with respect to At gives 
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6Q 6 
= [OtCP, AI) + 02 ( P, A2 ) ] 
6 At 6Al 
6 6 
= [OtCP, AI) ] + --[ 02 ( P, A 2) ] 
6Al 6A! 
6 6 6 6 
= --{ 01 ( P) ) + --[ Od At> ] + --[ 02 ( P) ) + --[ 02 (A;d] 
6 A! 6 A 1 6 A t 6At 
60 t 6P 60 t 6Al 6 O2 6P 602 6 A2 
= -- + + -- + 
6P 6 A t 6At 6 A t 6P 6 At 6At 6 At 
6At 6A2 
Now, = 1 and = O. Therefore, 
6At 6 A! 
6Q 601 6P 601 6D2 6P 
:: 
-- + + 
6A t 6P 6 At 6At 6P 6 At 
That i 5, 
6Q 6 DI 6P 6D2 6P 60 t 
( 5. 23a) -- - -- - = 
6 At 6P 6At 6P 6 A 1 6 A t 
A26. PROOF TO EQUATION (5. 23b) 
6Q 6S 6P 
( 5. 23b) = 0 
6 A 1 6P 6 At 
Recall equation (5.1 B) 
( 5. 1 8) Q - S( P) 
Differentiating (5. 1B) with respect to At gives 
6Q 6 
= [S(P)] 
6At 6Al 
6S 6P 
= 
6P 6AI 
Therefore, 
6Q 6S 6P 
( 5. 23b) --- = 0 
6 At 6P 6A 1 
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A27. PROOF TO EQUATION ( 5. 24a) 
60 t 
6P 6 A t 
( 5. 24a) = 
6Al 6S [~ 602J + --
6P 6P 6P 
Recall equations ( 5. 23a) and ( 5. 23b) 
6Q 60 t 6P 602 6P 6 D t 
( 5. 23a) -- - = 
6 At 6P 6 A 1 6P 6 A t 6At 
6Q 6S 6P 
( 5. 23b) -- - = 0 
6 A t 6P 6 A t 
Subtract ( 5. 23b) from (5. 23a) 
This gives 
6Q 6 D t 6P 602 6P 6Q 6S 6P 6DI 
- -- -- - -- - + = 
6At 6P 6 AI 6P 6AI 6AI 6P 6 A t 6 A I 
That is, 
601 6P 6D2 6P 6S 6P 601 
- -- -- - + = 
6P 6 A t 6P 6 AI 6P 6AI 6 AI 
.' :.~.< and 
6P [ 6S 601 ~J 601 - - = 
6 A 1 6P 6P 6P 6 AI 
Therefore, 
-, . 
.... , 601 
. >~ .. ~;. 6P 6At 
( 5. 24a) = 
6AI 6S [~ ~J + 
6P 6P 6P 
.:..~:.: -.~<.~ .<~~'. A28. PROOF TO EQUATION ( 5. 26a) 
6 Rt a:l 
( 5. 26a) = - 1 
6 At e - (nl s I + n2 S2) 
349 
Recall equation ( 5. 25a) 
601 
6 Rl 6 A 1 
( 5. 25a) :; Q - 1 
6 A t 6S [~ 602J + --
oP oP 6P 
Multi ply the right-hand side by [~] I [~] 
Ther-efor-e, 
P 001 
Q 
6Rt Q 6 At 
;: 
- 1 
6At P 6S [~ Q Q1 001 P Q Q2 ~J - -- + 
Q 6P Q Qt Q 6P Q Q2 Q 6P 
Therefor-e, 
6Rt CiCl 
( 5. 26a) ;: - 1 
6A1 e - (n! S 1 + n2 S2) 
CiCl = P . 
6At 
Multiply the r-ight-hand side of equation ( 5. 27a) 
by 
At 
This gives 
- -, >.---
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PQ1 At 6D1 
cq = 
A1 Q1 6 A t 
= [~ :, ] [~J [~ . ~J At Q Q1 6 At 
That is, 
PQ 
(S.2CJb) CC1 = Sl /31 
At 
A30. PROOF TO EQUATION (5. 30a) 
/3 t S 1 
( 5. 30a) 
Recall equation (5. 27a). 
= 
Substi tute (5. 2C(b) into (5. 27a) 
Therefore, 
PQ 
St. 81 
At 
= 
e - (ntSl + nzsz) 
and 
At sl131 
= 
.. ':'-_ .. " 
That is, 
8 1 S 1 
( 5. 30a) 9t = 
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A31. PROOF TO EQUATION ( 5. 32) 
n 
( 5. 32) na = ~ n t s t 
i = 1 
Take a tvl0-market case. Then 
Q = Qt + Q2 
and 6Q 6Qt 6Q2 
= + 
6P 6P 6P 
That is, 
------.'< 6Q P 6Qt P Qt 6Q2 P Q2 
= - + 
6P Q 6P Qt Q 6P Q2 Q 
That is, 
n. = nt81 + n2 82 
2 
= ~ nt S I 
i = 1 
Therefore, for an n-market case 
n 
( 5.32) nil = ~ nl S t 
i=1 
:.: .':' > >~ : .: ·'.L,_. 
A32. DERIVATION OF EQUATION (5.31 d) FROM (5.31 c) 
B 
( 5. 31 d) e = 
e + I n. I 
Recall (5.31 c) 
n 
£ B 1 S t 
i = 1 
(5.31c) e = 
e + I na I 
Let all Bt = B. 
Therefore, (5.31 c) becomes 
n 
/3 L 8 \ 
i =1 
9 = 
e + I n. I 
That is, 
a 
(5.31d) 9 = 
e + I n. I 
A33. PROOF TO EQUATION (5. 33b) 
( 5. 33b) r \ = 
a \ 8 \ 
n 
L /3\8\ 
i = 1 
Recall equation (5. 30c) and equation (5.31 c) 
/3 i 8 \ 
( 5. 30c) 9\ = 
e + I n. I 
n 
L /3 \ 8 \ 
i = 1 
(5.31c) 9 = 
e + I n. I' 
Now note that by manipulating equation (5. 33a) 
(A32.1> 
e 
Therefore, by dividing equation (5. 30c) 
(5.31c) 
( 5. 33b) r \ = 
fh 8 \ 
n 
L /3\8\ 
i =1 
by 
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equation 
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A34. PROOF TO EQUATION (5. 34b) 
( 5. 34b) 91' = 
e - n~ 
Recall equation (5. 30c) 
B 1 S 1 
( 5. 30e) 91. = 
e + I na I 
AI. Q1 61. 
Tha tis 91 = = 
PQ Q e + I na I 
Q 
Multiply both sides by 
That is 
AI Q Q Qi 
= 
PO OJ. Qi 0 e + I n~ I 
Therefore, 
01 
( 5. 34b) 91 = 
e - na 
A35. DE R I V A T I ON OF EO U A T I ON (5. 51 b FROM (5. SI. a) 
( 5. 516) 
n 
where Va = 1: VI 
i = 1 
.. - .. ",-.:-:-:.", 
.",.: 
Take (5. 5\ a) 
(5.5Ia) 
where al 
Now, from proof A 1 inA ppe ndi x 1, 
( A35. 1) Pap = aa' - baQiI 
where, for a two-market example, 
..... , .. -. I 
···1 
a .. 
. Therefore, 
( 5.51> 
at' b2 + a2 ' b t 
= 
bt + b2 
( at + btVtlb2 
= 
bt + b2 
atb2 + a2 b t 
= + 
b t + b2 
= a .. + b .. V .. 
n 
where V .. = L Vi 
i =1 
+ ( a2 + b2V2) bt 
btb2 
( V t + V2) 
bt+ b2 
A36. PROOFS TO EQUATIONS (5. 53a) AND (5. 53b) 
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See A2, Appendix for analagous proofs to equations 
(4.5a) and (4.5b). 
A37. PROOF TO EQUATION (5. 55b) 
( 5. 55b) b .. V.. [ [a .. -c] ~TR = ---- 2a .. -c-2b .. ----
b.+d b .. +d 
Recall (5. 55a) 
( 5. 55a) 
Substi tuti ng (5. 53a) , (5.53bl, (4.5al and (4. 5b) into 
(5.55al gives 
~ T R = [a .. _ b .. [a .. - c + b .. V .. ] + b .. V .. ] [a .. - c + b .. V .. ] 
b.. + d b.. + d 
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Take the first two terms 
aa( aa-c+baV a ) ba(aa- c +b .. Va ):2 b .. V .. ( a .. -c+b .. Va) 
+ 
bol + d (b ol + d) 2 b a + d 
aa(aol-c) aa bol Va 
= + 
bol + d b .. + d (bol + d) 2 (b .. + d):2 
baV .. (a.-c) 
+ + 
(b.+d):2 b a + d b a + d 
Take the last two terms 
[a.<a.- c) b.<a. - cl'] 
b a + d (b.. + d) 2 
a. ( a.. - c ) b a ( a.. - c) 2 
= + 
b.. + d ( b a + d):2 
Recombining all terms gives 
~TR = 
b a + d (b a + d) 2 
Therefore, 
( 5. 55b) ~TR = [ [a a -cJ [b .. Va J 1 2a a -c-2b a ---- + baVa 1- ----b .. +d b .. +d ba+d 
A38. PROOF TO EQUATION (5. 56c) 
b a + d 
+ b a Va d ] 
2( b. +d) 
( 5. 56c) ~c = baVa [c + 
b-.. + d 
d(aa-c) 
Recall (5. 56b) 
356 
d 
(5.56b) /1C = C(Qap- Qa) + 
2 
By substi tuti ng (5. 53b) and (4. 5b) into (5. 56b) 
/1 C = c C .. -c + b .. V .. _ a .. - C] + ~ [[a .. - c + b a Va] 2 
b .. +d b .. +d 2 ba+d 
- [~J2] 
b .. +d 
= c[b .. V .. ] + ~[b .. Va(2a .. -2C+b.V .. )] 
b.+d 2 (b .. +d)2 
b.V. 
[
c + ~ [2 a a - 2 c - b .. V .. ] ] 
2 b .. +d 
= 
ba+d 
That i S, 
b .. Va [c + d(a .. -c) d ] ( 5. 56c) tiC = + b .. Va b .. +d b .. +d 2( b .. +d) 
A39. PROOF TO EQUATION (5.57) 
b .. V. [ (5.57) /1PS = ---- 2(a .. -c) -
b.+d 
[
a .. -C] 
---- (2b .. +d) 
b .. +d 
+b .. V .. [ d J] 
2Cb .. +d) 
Subtract equation C 5. 56b) from (5. 55b) 
b .. V .. [ [a .. -C] /1PS = ---- 2a .. -c-2b .. ----
b .. +d b .. +d 
+ b .. V .. [1- ~J] 
b .. +d 
b .. V .. [ 
-----c+ 
b .. +d b .. +d 
d ] + b.V .. ----
2( b .. +d) 
dCa .. -c) 
b. V. [ 
= -- 2a .. -
b .. +d 
2 C - [a .. - CJ [2 b .. + dJ + b. V .. [1 -
b .. +d 
b .. V .. [ [a. - CJ [ J [ 
= --- 2a .. - 2c- --- 2b.+d +b.V .. 1-
b.+d b.+d 
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b. 
2( b~ +J ] b .. +d 
b. V. [ 
= --- 2[ a. -c] 
b.+d 
[
a. - CJ [J [2 b. + 2 d - 2 b .. - dJ ] 
- --- 2b.+d + b .. V .. 
b. +d 2( b .. +d) 
Therefore, 
A40. PROOF TO EQUATION (5.58) 
From Section 4.4.2 of Chapter 4 
k 
Q .. 
Therefore, by analogy, 
(5.58) P"dp = a .. - b .. Q. + 
where a. - a .. + b .. V .. 
~ [{( a 1 - a.) + (b 1 V t - b a V .. ) } 2 ] 
and k' = £. 
i=1 4bl 
n 
wi t h V.. = L V 1 
i = 1 
From A35, Appendix 2, 
a. = a. +b .. V .. 
n 
and V .. = L VI 
i = 1 
From A10, Appendix 1, 
k = 
= 
~ [( a I '- a..') 2] 
Therefore k' ~ 
i=1 4bl 
~ [( ( a, + blVd 
= 
i = 1 
- (a .. 
4 b I 
n [« a, - a .. ) + (b I V I 
= L 
i =1 4bl 
+ b.v.)P] 
- b.v.)P] 
A41, PROOF TO EQUATIONS (5. 60a) and (5. 60b) 
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For (5. 60b), see A11 (Appendix 1), for an analogous proof 
to equation (4. 24a). 
For (5. 60a), substi tute (5. 60b) into the supply curve, 
equation (4.3). 
A42. PROOF TO EQUATION (4.23) 
Substitute (4. 24a) into the supply curve, equation (4.3). 
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A43. PROOF TO EQUATION (5. 61b) 
(5.61b) 6TR = 
2(b" + d) 
2d{[ (a.' 2_ a ,,2) -2c( a,,' -a,,») ctd 
+ 
4( b" + d) 2 
Recall (5.61 a) 
(5.61a) 
Take the first term. From (5. 60a) and (5. 60b) 
P d 1 p Q 1 P = [a.' - c + X' 0 • ,] c + d [a" '- c + X' '0 • ,] 
2( b. +d) 2( b. +d) 
c( a" , -c+X'o.,) d(a,,'-c+X'O")2 
= + 
2( b. +d) 4(b.+d)2 
c( a" , -c) eX'o., d[ ( a" 
, 
-c) +X' 0.,) [( a,,' -c) +X' 0.,) 
= + + 
2( b. +d) 2(b,,+d) 4(b.+d)2 
c( a" , - c) cX' 0 . , d[ ( a" , -c) 2 +2( a" -c) X' 0.' +X' ) 
= + + 
2( b" +d) 2(b.+d) 4(b,,+d)2 
e( a. , - c) cX' 0 . , d ( a" , - c) 2 2dX'o"(a",'-c) 
= + + t 
2(b",+d) 2(b.+d) 4(b.+d)2 4(b a +d)2 
dX' 
+ 
4( b. +d) 2 
Take the final term of this expression 
dX' d[(a,,'-c)2 + 4k'(b,,+d») 
= 
4(b,,+d)2 
d(a,,-c)2 dk' 
= + 
4(b,,+d)2 b,,+d 
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Therefore, 
c(a~'-c) cX'o., 2d(a~'-c)2 2dX'o"(a~'-c) 
Pd1pQlp = + + + 
2(b .. +d) 2(b~+d) 4(b a +d)2 4(b .. +d)l 
dk' 
+ 
(b.+d) 
By analagous reasoning 
c( a. -c) 2d(a.-c)l 2dXo·'(a .. -c) 
= + + + 
2(b~+d) 2(b .. +d) 4(b.+d)l 4(b .. +d)2 
dk 
+ 
(b.. +d) 
Therefore, 
Ll T R = [c ( a~.' - c ) - c ( a .. - c )] + [c X' ° . , - c X ° . ,] 
2( b~ +d) 2( b. +d) 
+ [2 d ( a .. ' - c) 2 - 2 d ( a .. - c) l] 
4(b.+d)l 
+ [2dX'o,'(a.'-C) 
4(b .. +d)2 
Take term 1 of this expression 
c(a.' - c) - c(a .. -c) 
= 
2( b. +d) 2( b. +d) 
Take term 2 of this expression 
= 
2( b~ +d) 2( b. +d) 
Take term 3 of this expression 
2d( a .. ' -c) 1 - 2d( a .. -c) 1 
4( b. + d) 1 
[
dk' - dk ] 
(b. + d) 
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= 
4(b a + d)2 
2d«(a.'2 - a. 2 ) - 2c(a.' - a.)) 
= 
4(b .. +d)2 
Take term 4 of this expression 
4 ( b. + d) 2 
2d(a'X'O'~ 
-
cX'O~.~ 
-
a .. -XO . ~ + cX O. ~) 
= 
4( b .. + d) 2 
2d(a'X'O'~ 
-
aXO . ~ ) 
-
c[X'O.~ 
-
XO.~]) 
= • 
4( b. + d) 2 
Take term S of this expression 
dk' - dk 
(b.. + d) 
d( k' - k) 
= 
(b a + d) 
Therefore, putting all terms back together again gives 
(S,Otb) !:ITR = 
c(a .. '-a.) + 2d( k' -k) 
2( b a + d) 
+ 
4( b. + d) 2 
- c(X'o.~ - XO.~»)} 
A44. PROOF TO EQUATION (5. 62b) 
(S.62b)!:Ie = 
2( b. + d) 
- .. ~~.--- ~::.-
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d( ( a" ' 2 -a" 2) -2c( a" ' -a,,) +( a .. ' X' o. ~ -a. XO • ~) -c( X' 0 • ~ -Xo. ~) 1 
+ 
4( b" + d) 2 
Recall (5. 62a) 
d 
( 5. 62a) 6.C = C(Q1p - Qil + 
2 
Substitute (5. 60b) and (4. 24a) into (5. 62a), and take term 
of the expression above. 
+ X'o.~) - (a .. -c) 
2(b" + d) 
= 
2( b" + d) 
c(a .. '-a,,) c(X'o·~-Xo.~) 
= + 
2( b" + d) 2( b. + d) 
Take term 2 of the expression in (5. 62a) 
d 
-( Q 1 p 2 - Q 1 2 ) 
2 
= d [[a .. - c + X""r _ [a. - c + X"'r] 
2 2( b.. + d) 2( b" + d) 
= ~ [a" ' 2 - a .. ' c + a .. ' X' 0 • ~ - a .. ' c + C 2 - C X' 0 • ~ + a .. ' X' 0 • ~ - c X' 0 • 5 + X ' 
2 4( b.. + d) 2 
4(b .. + d)2 
= ~ [a .. ' 2 - 2 a .. ' c + C 2 + 2 a .. ' X' 0 • ~ - 2 eX' 0 • 5 + X' - a .. 2 + 2 a .. c - c 2 C t d 
2 4( b.. + d) 2 
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- _2_a_a __ x_
O
_'_' ___ + ____ 2_C_X_
O 
__ '_' __ -___ X ___ ] 
Take (X' - X) 
X'-X = (aa'-C)2 + 4k'(b a +d) - (aa-C)2 - 4k(b a +d) 
Substituting this back into te~m 2 and rearranging gives 
= ~[2( aa ' 2 -a .. 2) -4cC a .. ' -a .. ) +2( aa ' X' ° , , -a. XO , ') ctd 
2 4(b. + d)2 
d( k' -k) 
2(b .. +d) 
Putting terms 1 and 2 back together gives 
( 5, 62b) b.C = 
2( b.. + d) 
d[ ( a .. ' 2 -aa 2) -2c( a .. ' -aa) +( a .. ' X' 0,' -aa Xo,') -c( X' 0,' -Xo;,») 
+ 
.... -.- .. 4( b.. + d) 2 
A45, PROOF TO EQUATION (5.63) 
Subtracting (5, 62b) from (5, 61b) gives 
c( aa' -a .. ) +c( X' 0,' -Xo,,) -c( a .. ' -aa) -c( X' 0,' -Xo,,) ctd 
b.PS = 
2( b.. + d) 
+ 2d( k' -k) -de k' -k) 
2 d [( aa 2 - a .. 2 ) - 2 c ( a .. ' - a a ) ) - d [ ( a .. ' 2 - a .. 2 ) - 2 c ( a a ' - a a ) ) c t d 
+ 
4( b.. + d) 2 
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ld [ ( a. ' x' ° . 5 - a X ° . 5 ) - c ( x' ° . 5 - X ° . 5 ) ] - d [ ( a. ' X' ° . 5 - a. X ° . 5 ) c t d 
+ 
d(k'-k) d{[(a.'2-a. 2 )-2c(a.'-a.)] + ctd 
= + 
2( b .. +d) 4( b. + d) 2 
[(a'X O • 5 - aX O • 5 ) _ c(X O • 5 - XO. 5 )]} 
Therefore, 
6PS = 
4( b. + d) 2 
APPENDIX 3 
PROOFS TO SELECTED EQUATIONS IN CHAPTER 6 
A46. PROOF TO EQUATION (6.5) 
( 6. 5) 6TR = k when e = 0 
Recall equation (4. 32d) 
( 4. 32d) 6TR = k + 
n .. e 1 0 • , 
+ PoQok-- -
n .. +e 
As e -) 0, ( n .. + e) -) n .. and 
[p,: Q,' r ~ Po Qo 
-6 TR -) k + 
2 
Ther"efor"e, 
( 6. 5) 6TR = k when e = O. 
A47. PROOF TO EQUATION (6.6) 
Po Qo 
Po Qo - k 
2 
e 
( 6. 6) 
[
p 0 2 Qo 2 1 0 • , 
6TR = 4 + PoQokn.. - when e -:-) Q) 
2 
Recall equation ( 4. 32d) 
[p,:QO' n.e r' Po Qo e ( 4. 32d) 6TR = k + + PoQok-- - -- - k-,-
n .. +e 2 n .. +e 
Le t x = n.. + e 
e = x - n .. 
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6 TR = k + + Po Qo kn .. [1 -
= k + + Po Qo kn .. [1 -
n. 
Now, as e -) a), X -) a) and -) o. 
x 
Therefore, as e -) a) 
6 TR -) k + 
o • 5 
+ p, Q, kn.] - Po Qo - k 
2 
That is, 
( 6. 6) 6 TR = 
" ;.j 
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PREFACE 
Marketing agencies which operate in international 
markets are faced with pricing and promotion decisions in 
individual markets. Economic theory can assist in these 
tasks by providing a framework for evaluating specific 
commercial strategies in particular products. 
Therefore, the Agricultural Economics Research Unit 
has an interest in theoretical research which widens our 
understanding of optimal decision-making by agencies 
operating in agricultural markets. 
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Mrs S.K. Martin has been considering aspects of the 
economics of market segmentation by agricultural marketing 
institutions as part of her doctoral dissertation under the 
supervision of Professor A.C. Zwart. This Research Report 
outlines one aspect of this research. It was undertaken in 
collaboration with Professor L. Young from the University of 
Texas, Austin, Texas, USA. Professor Young derived the 
solutions to the problem established in Chapter 3. 
(ii) 
R.G. Lattimore 
Director 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, marketing institutions operating in 
New Zealand's agricultural export sector have placed 
increasing emphasis on market segmentation strategies as an 
economic instrument. Indications that marketing 
institutions have moved towards this type of policy are 
evident in attempts to diversify markets, and to gear 
promotion activities and product development to specific 
market segments. The change in policy emphasis by these 
agencies reflects the increasing influence of the 
prescriptions of marketing management in agricultural 
marketing. 
When the general term (market segmentation' is used in 
the marketing management context, it tends to refer to the 
practices of segmenting a market, targeting specific market 
segments, and positioning products within these segments. 
Product positioning requires the development of a marketing 
mix for each target segment using a particular blend of 
controllable marketing variables (Kotler, 1984). 
In attempting to apply these principles in the markets 
for agricultural products, agencies are faced with the 
problem of how much product to allocate to individual market 
segments, and what pricing and promotion strategies to adopt 
in each of these segments. The prescriptions of economic 
theory can assist in these tasks, by indicating optimal 
strategies for a particular marketing agency objective. In 
the literature, attention has been directed towards this 
problem of determining optimal marketing mixes (Lambin, 
1976). However, much of it uses extensions to the theory of 
monopolistic or oligopolistic markets, but in typical 
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agricultural industries these market conditions do not 
apply. 
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In this Report, the development of economic models of 
marketing behaviour are discussed, and the analysis is 
extended to consider the specific environment faced by an 
agriqultural marketing agency. The major feature of such 
analysis is the incorporation of a competitive supply 
response in a model which determines the optimal pricing and 
promotion strategies in more than one market segment. 
The following Chapter describes the development of 
such models, while Chapter 3 focusses on their extension. 
The final Chapter compares the alternative model 
prescriptions for pricing and promotion. 
3 
CHAPTER 2 
ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND THEIR 
OPTIMAL MARKETING STRATEGIES 
Since a great deal of attention in the literature has 
been directed towards the marketing behaviour of a. 
monopolistic firm (Lambin, 1976), a generalised version of 
this problem will be discussed, and variants and extensions 
of this general model will be subsequently examined . 
• 
Consider a monopolist who operates in a number of 
predetermined market segments, and provides a product of 
identical quality to each of these segments. In this case, 
demand in the ith market segment, Q., can be written as 
1 
( 1) Q. = Q.(P., A.) 111 1 
where Pi and Ai are price and advertising, respectively, in 
that segment. Aggregate demand, Q, is then given by 
(2) Q = EQ . (P ., A.)· 
ill 1 
If the firm maximises profit net of advertising costs, 
then its profit function, IT, is 
(3) n = EP.Q.(P., A1.) - C(Q) - EA. .11 1 . 1 
1 1 
where C(Q) is the total cost of producing output Q. To 
develop appropriate decision rules for marketing mix 
optimisation, this objective function, IT, would be 
maximised. 
373 
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Variants of this generalised problem have been 
examined in the literature. For example, Dorfman and 
Steiner (1954) considered marketing mix optimisation by a 
monopolist in one (aggregate) market, where the decision 
variables available to the firm are price or output, and 
advertising. In this case, demand, Q, is given by 
(4) Q = Q(P,A) 
and the profit function, IT, by 
(5) IT = PQ(P,A) - C(Q) - A 
where P and A are price and advertising. 
When this profit fUDction is maximised, it yields the 
optimal advertising decision rule 
(6) e = P - MC ~[------] P 
where e is the advertising to sales ratio, A/(PQ), ~ is the 
advertising elasticity of demand, and MC is marginal cost. 
The corresponding product-price decision rule is given by 
(7) P - MC [-----~] = l/~ p 
where ~ is the price elasticity of demand (absolute value). 
This is the familiar profit-maximising rule where marginal 
cost equals marginal revenue. 
These optimal product-price and advertising decision 
rules can be expressed in a single relationship which 
encapsulates both rules as follows. 
(8) e = ~/~ 
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Equation (8) has become known as the Dorfman-Steiner 
theorem, and is appropriate for a monopolist operating in a 
single market, which includes a marketing agency concerned 
with aggregate demand and with the ability to control 
output. This theorem of optimal advertising by a monopolist 
has been extended to include oligopolistic market structures 
(Lambin, 1976), and from its static formulation to include 
the dynamics of the sales response to advertising (Nerlove 
and Arrow, 1962). 
Although the Dorfman-Steiner model considers price, 
product and promotion as elements in its marketing mix, it 
abstracts from the fourth variable of place, or market 
segments. An alternative model which does this, but which 
abstracts from promotion, is the familiar model of 
monopolistic price discrimination. 
is given by 
(9) Q = EQ·(P.) 
.11 
1 
and the profit function, n by 
(10) n = E P.Q.(P.) - C(Q) 
.11 1 
1 
In this case, demand, Q, 
Maximisation of this profit function gives the 
familiar output and pricing rules for a price discriminating 
monopolist. That is, 
(11) = = = MR. 1 = = MC 
where MR. is marginal revenue in the ith market and MC is 
1 
the marginal cost of production. 
The decision rules derived from these models give 
partial indicators as to how a profit-maximising monopolist 
might optimally choose a marketing mix or mixes in specific 
6 
circumstances. However, such prescriptions are not 
appropriate for a marketing agency operating in a typically 
structured agricultural industry. When operating 
collectively on behalf of producers, such institutions may 
be able to exert monopoly power in their markets. However, 
in New Zealand, they do not have the power to restrict 
output by producers. Therefore, when producers receive 
higher returns, in the form of a pool price, which results 
from demand management strategies in individual market 
segments, they may respond by increasing output accordingly. 
Unlike the monopoly case, where output is a decision 
variable which can be optimised, output is determined 
competitively. 
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Nerlove and Waugh (1~6l) recognised these supply-side 
differences between a monopolist and a typical agricultural 
marketing agency. Assuming the above agricultural supply 
conditions, they considered the optimal advertising decision 
for such agencies operating in one (aggregate) market. In 
their model, demand, Q, is given by 
(12) Q = Q(P,A) 
and supply can be represented by 
(13) S = S(P) 
where S is the output supplied at price P. The profit 
function to be maximised then becomes 
(14) IT = PQ(P,A) - C(S(P» - A 
where C(S), the aggregate cost of production, is the area 
under the supply curve to the left of S. However, this 
profit function must be maximised subject to the constraint 
that excess supply is zero. That is, 
(15) Q(P,A) = S(P) 
7 
The solution to the Nerlove-Waugh model yields the 
following advertising decision rule 
(16) 8 = --~--
" + € 
where € is the price elasticity of supply and other 
variables are as defined for the Dorfman-Steiner model. 
In the Nerlove-Waugh case, the optimal promotion 
decision can be determined by the marketing agency, whereas 
the product-price decision is determined by the market. 
However, like its counterpart, the Dorfman-Steiner theorem, 
this model abstracts from the marketing mix variable, place, 
since it does not consider pricing and promotion strategies 
in individual market segments. 
An attempt was made by De Boer (1977) to examine the 
direction of advertising effort to individual market 
segments under discriminatory pricing between these 
segments. However, his prescriptions for agricultural 
marketing agencies are not necessarily valid, since he 
assumes monopolistic supply features. In fact, the theory 
of advertising under competitive agricultural supply 
conditions has advanced little since the Nerlove-Waugh 
theorem (Strak, 1985). 
An obvious extension to the Nerlove-Waugh theorem 
would be to consider the allocation of optimal advertising 
effort among a number of market segments, where price in 
each of these segments is determined by aggregate (total) 
demand and supply conditions. This has been done by Martin 
(1985) . 
In this case, demand in market segment i is given by 
(17) QJ.' = Q.(P, A.) J. J. 
and aggregate demand by 
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(18) Q = E Q.(P,A.) 
i ~ ~ 
8 
Supply is represented by 
(19) S S(P) 
The profit function to be maximised is given by 
(20) II = PEQ.(P,A.) - C(S(P» - EA. 
. ~ ~ . ~ 
~ ~ 
subject to the constraint that 
(21) EQ . (P, A . ) = S ( P ) 
. ~ ~ 
~ 
In this case, optimal advertising effort in market 
segment i, is given by 
(22) 
where 8. = 
~ 
s. 
~ 
Ai 
= 
13· ~ 
" + e 
and 13. is the advertising elasticity of PQ. ~ 
~ 
demand in market segment i, with all other variables being 
defined as for the Nerlove-Waugh model. 
In a two market segment case, the relative direction 
of advertising effort can be given by the following ratio. 
(23) = 
That is, the ratio of advertising per unit sales in one 
market segment to that in the other market segment is equal 
to the ratio of the corresponding advertising elasticities. 
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Although the above model extends the Nerlove-Waugh 
theorem to consider a number of market segments, it 
abstracts from optimal pricing policies which such an 
institution might pursue when it has the power to control 
the allocation of industry output among alternative market 
segments. Consequently, the next Chapter develops a 
marketing mix optimisation model which yields decision rules 
for optimal pricing and promotion in individual market 
segments, and which takes account of typical agricultural 
supply features. 
(24) 
In such a case, demand is represented by 
Q = EQ. (P., A.) 
ill 1 
and supply by 
(25) S = S(R) 
where R is the return per unit of output, or pool price, 
received by the producer. This return is given by 
(26) 
(27) 
R 
The profit function to be maximised is 
II = E P. Q. (P., A.) - C(S(R» - E A. ill 1 1 i 1 
where C(S) is defined as for the Nerlove-Waugh model. 
As with the Nerlove-Waugh case, the marketing agency 
is constrained to adopt policies such that it sells all the 
~~. output supplied when producers receive the average return, 
R. That is, 
10 
(28) L Q.(P., A.) = S(R) 
. ~ ~ ~ 
~ 
The solution to this constrained maximisation problem 
would yield decision rules for the optimal allocation of 
output, and therefore prices, in individual market segments, 
and for the optimal allocation of advertising effort to 
these segments. However, the aggregate output produced is 
determined by market forces. 
380 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
For analytical ease, a two-market segment case of the 
generalised model outlined in the previous Chapter will be 
considered. To avoid cumbersome mathematical expressions, 
some of the notation will also be redefined. 
Let d(p,a) be the demand in the first market segment 
where the price is p and advertising expenditure is a. The 
corresponding variables for the second market segment are 
denoted by the corresponding upper case letters. Producers 
receive the average return per unit of output, or the pool 
price, 
(29) r(p,P,a,A) 
Let the supply at this pool price be s(r). The aggregate 
cost of production of supply, s, is the area, c(s), under 
the supply curve to the left of s. The marketing agency 
maximises aggregate profits net of advertising costs. 
(30) IT(p,P,a,A) = pd(p,a) + PD(P,A) - c(d(p,a) 
+ D(P,A» - a - A 
Let excess supply be 
(31) x(p,P,a,A) s(r(p,P,a,A» - d(p,a) - D(P,A) 
381 
The marketing agency is constrained to adopt policies such 
that it sells all output supplied when producers receive the 
pool price, r. 
- .' 
, 
(32) 
12 
Therefore, it solves 
max 
P A IT(p,P,a,A) subject to x(p,P,a,A) = 0 p, ,a, 
Let A be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the 
constraint in (32). Using a subscript to denote partial 
differentiation with respect to the corresponding variable, 
the Lagrange equations can be written in the form 
or 
(33) 
~E 
x p 
= 
d + (p - c )d 
s p = 
s r - d 
r p p 
= = = 
(p - c)d - 1 
. s a 
= = 
-s-r-:T-
r a a 
(P - c)D - 1 
s A 
Since c(s) is the area under the supply curve to the 
left of s, 
(34) c (s(r» = r, 
s 
Moreover, recalling the definition (29) of r, 
(35) p - r = p - (pd + PD)/(d + D) - mid 
where 
(36) m = (p - P)dD/(d + DJ 
Note that with this definition 
(37) P - r = -miD 
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Using (34) - (37), the first order conditions (33) 

simplify to 

d + md2 __ Id D - mDp/D md Id - 1 a(38) = --------- = --------- = s r - d srrp - Dp srra ­r p p d a 
or 

pd + mpd Id PD - mPDp/D
___________2 ____ _ 
= srs pr pd d = -----------------Prp PDpD 
___! . __2 __2_ srsr 
s r d s r D 
(39) 
-mADA/D - A 
= srs 
r 
s 
Define the elasticities 

P a P a
(40) e =-pdp/d; e =ad Id; t =pr Ir; t ar Iri ~ =rs Is5a r 
with similar definitions for the second market segment using 
the corresponding upper case symbols. Then (40) becomes 
a
mE P_2~L:_!!l!~__ PD + me - a(41) = ----------- = ----------­
sfrt p + de P sfrTP + DE P sfrt a _ ead 
The transmission elasticities are now evaluated. 

Since 

r 
then 
Therefore 
(42) 
Similarly 
(43) 
Also 
Therefore 
r /r 
a 
= 
= 
14 
pdd + pDd - pdd - QDd 
a a a a 
----(pd-:;-QD)(d-:;-D)-----
Dda(p - P) 
(pd-:;-PD)(d-:;-D) 
t
a 
= ar /r 
a 
r /r p 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
d(d + D) + pd d + pd D - pd d - PDd 
_____________ ~ ______ E ______ E _______ E 
(pd + PD)(d + D) 
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(44) 
Similarly, 
(45) 
= 
pr /r p 
15 
pd(d + D) + pDd ( p - P) 
_______________ 2 _______ _ 
(pd + PD)(d + D) 
= (2~_=_~:~~i2_=_~11Li~_~_Q) = 
(pd + PD) 
Prp/r 
PD + EPm 
= (p;r:;-PD) 
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Substituting (21) - (24) into (20) gives 
(46) 
a 
me - a 
= --------
_mEA - A 
= --------
meafr/r - dea -mEA~/r - E~ 
Inverting all expressions in (46) 
(47) fr + _d_e_P __ = _fr + DE
P 
= _f:!!!~_a ____ ~_e a_ = 
r pd - meP r PD - mEP r(mea - a) mea - a 
frmEA DEA 
------- + ----
r(mEA + A) MEA + A 
fr 
Subtracting from each term in (47) 
r 
(48) fra dea -~A DEA = ------ - ----- - + -----
r(mEA + A) mEA + A a a r(me - a) me - a 
Inverting each expression in (48) 
(49) P 
a mEA + A 2_ m m me - a 
- d = + = ----------- = ------------
e P EP D r de a r DEA af /r - -Af /r + 
16 
(49) can be alternatively expressed 
(50) = = 
a 
a 
e 
d -
- m 
a 
a r 
e 
= 
Expression (50) gives the first-order conditions in 
their final form. Optimal pricing and promotion policies in 
both market segments can now be determined by making the 
appropriate pairwise comparisons between equations in (50). 
Consider the first two equations in (50) and 
substitute (35) and (37) into them. This gives 
or 
(51) = 
P + r - P 
EP 
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The left and right hand sides of (51) are simply the 
marginal revenues from sales in the first and second market 
segments. Equation (51) gives the optimal pricing decisions 
in the first and second market and the relationship between 
them. 
Without loss of generality, assume that, at the 
optimum, e P < EP , so that p > P and m > O. 
Consider the first and third equations in (50). Since 
they are equal 
That is, 
, 
or 
(52) 
(E_ 
e P 
;e~ 
e P 
;e~ 
e P 
a 
e 
a 
a 
e 
a 
a 
rd 
-
-
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
17 
~) (d afr a - ---) = - m d a a 
m 
a 
e 
a 
e r e 
r 
maf r ~;ef __ 
+ 
a 
- = - m 
eareP rde a a e 
fr 
1 + (E_ ~) = r 
e P d 
e P fr e P frm 
+ pd rd - pd . rd-
e P + fr e P (! 1 1 frm ------- + d- - - ---) rd P r P rd 
e P + fr e P r (E 1 f (p - r) 
--rd--- + dr - - ---------) P P 
e P + fr - e P (l + fr)(l - E) 
____ - ____________________ _ 
rd 
a 
e 
.. 
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This equation gives the optimal advertising decision for the 
first market segment when an optimal pricing policy is 
pursued in that segment. 
By a similar comparison of the second and fourth 
equations in (50), the corresponding optimal advertising 
decision in the second market is given by 
(53) A 
rD 
18 
Note that when a single market is assumed, (52) and (53) 
collapse to the Nerlove-Waugh theorem. 
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The relationship between advertising in the two market 
segments can be examined by considering (52) and (53). 
Under the convention that e P < EP , which gives P < p, then 
P < r < p, and 
(54) 
and 
(55) 
Now this implies that 
or 
(56) 
a 
a 
rde 
> 
aid 
AID 
I 
> 
> 1 > 
That is, the ratio of advertising per unit sales in the less 
price elastic market segment to that in the more price 
elastic market segment exceeds the ratio of the 
corresponding advertising elasticities. 
/ 
/' 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the previous Chapter, optimal pricing and promotion 
rules were determined for an agricultural marketing agency 
which has control over these marketing variables, but not 
over production. These optimal policies will now be briefly 
compared with those prescribed by alternative models. 
The optimal pricing policy was to set prices in the 
two market segments so as to equate the marginal revenue 
from selling in each market. That is, a higher price should 
be charged in the market segment with the lower price 
elasticity. Thus, the conventional rule of the price-
discriminating monopolist for allocating output to market 
segments should be maintained, even though the marketing 
agency is required to sell all output supplied to it. 
However, the marginal revenues in these individual market 
segments are not required to equal the marginal cost of 
production, and hence, the profit-maximising monopoly level 
of output is not produced. 
Given optimal pricing, the optimal ratio of 
advertising in a market segment to producer returns from 
that segment is given by equations (52) and (53). That is, 
optimal advertising in a segment is a function of the 
advertising and price elasticities of demand in that 
segment, the price elasticity of supply, and a measure of 
the relationship between the optimal price in that segment 
and the pool price returned to suppliers. 
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Recall the Nerlove-Waugh theorem that a marketing 
agency facing a single market should choose policies such 
that the ratio of advertising to sales revenue equals the 
ratio of the advertising elasticity to the sum of the demand 
390 
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and supply elasticities. By comparison, a price-
discriminating marketing agency should choose advertising 
policies such that in the market segment with the lower 
(higher) price elasticity of demand, the ratio of 
advertising to producer payments should exceed (be less 
than) the ratio of the advertising elasticity in that market 
to the sum of the demand and supply elasticities in that 
market. That is, relatively more (less) advertising effort 
(as measured by the advertising to producer returns ratio) 
would be directed to the less (more) price elastic market 
segment than would be the case if this was the only market 
faced by the agency. 
Finally, consider relative advertising effort in each 
market segment, and recall from inequality (56) that the 
ratio of advertising per unit sales in the less price 
elastic market to that in the more price elastic market 
exceeds the ratio of the corresponding advertising 
elasticities. Equation (23) indicates that where pricing is 
uniform across market segments and market determined, then 
the ratio of advertising per unit sales in one market 
segment to that in the other market segment equals the ratio 
of the corresponding advertising elasticities. That is, 
under optimal pricing, relatively more (less) advertising 
effort (as measured by advertising per unit sales) is 
directed to the less (more) price elastic market segment 
than under uniform pricing across these segments. This 
result makes intuitive sense, since relatively more 
advertising effort is directed to the less price elastic 
segment where the potential to exploit monopoly power 
through discriminatory pricing is greater. 
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